VOL. II. NO. 1.

THE NEW YORK REVIEW

A Journal

of

The Ancient Faith and Modern Thought

"Every scribe who is instructed in the Kingdom of Heaven, is like unto a man that is a householder, who bringeth forth out of his treasure, things new and old."

(*Matt. XIII, 52*)

July-Aug., 1906

St. Joseph's Seminary, Yonkers

NEW YORK

Copyright, 1906, by John F. Brady

PRESS OF
THE HOME JOURNAL AND NEWS
YONKERS, N. Y.

N993
v.2

INDEX OF ARTICLES.

(For the sake of convenience of reference the more complex titles are repeated under different headings).

PAGE

Abraham, A Historical Study
FRANCIS E. GIGOT, D. D..... 37.

Apology, A New Catholic
M. D. PETRE..... 602.

Apostolic Christianity, Was It a Church?
RT. REV. PIERRE BATIFFOL, D. D..... 306.

Archeology, Oriental A. and Higher Criticism
GABRIEL OUSSANI, D. D..... 719.

Assisi in Modern Critical Thought, St. Francis of
ERNESTO BUONAIUTI, D. D..... 459.

Athanasius, Constantius and
MAURICE M. HASSETT, D. D..... 698.

Athenagoras: A Patristic Study
JOSEPH TURMEL..... 189.

Augustine, The Dogma of the Trinity in St.
JOSEPH TURMEL..... 86.

Bible and the Ancient East, The
GABRIEL OUSSANI, D. D..... 322.

Bible, The Higher Criticism of the
FRANCIS E. GIGOT, D. D..... 66, 158, 302, 442, 585.

Catholic Apology, A New
M. D. PETRE..... 602.

Catholicism, Liberal
VINCENT MCNABB, O. P..... 271.

Christianity and the Comparative Study of Religions
NICOLA TURCHI..... 590.

Christianity, Was Apostolic Christianity a Church?
RT. REV. PIERRE BATIFFOL, D. D..... 306.

Church, A Plea for a More Comprehensive Definition of the
DAVID BARRY, S. T. L..... 691.

11587

PAGE

Clement of Alexandria
JOSEPH TURMEL..... 625, 761.
Conceptualism, Newman and
THOMAS J. GERRARD..... 430.
Constantius and Athanasius
MAURICE M. HASSETT, D. D..... 698.
Criticism of the Bible, The Higher
FRANCIS E. GIGOT, D. D..... 66, 158, 302, 442, 585.
Criticism, Oriental Archeology and Higher Crit.
GABRIEL OUSSANI, D. D..... 719.
Date of the Exodus, The
F. HUGH POPE, O. P..... 566.
Dawn of Europe, The
CHARLES PLATER, S. J..... 545.
Dilemma of Epicurus, The
THOMAS J. GERRARD..... 486, 640,
HON. FRANK MCGLOIN..... 379.
A. B. SHARPE, M. A..... 514.
Divorce in the New Testament
FRANCIS E. GIGOT, D. D..... 479, 610, 749.
East, The Bible and the Ancient
GABRIEL OUSSANI, D. D..... 322.
Ethics, The Method of Teleology in
JOHN A. RYAN, D. D..... 409.
Europe, The Dawn of
CHARLES PLATER, S. J..... 545.
Evil and Faith
A. B. SHARPE, M. A..... 514.
Evil, The Philosophy of
HON. FRANK MCGLOIN..... 379.
Exodus, The Date of
F. HUGH POPE, O. P..... 566.
Fourteenth Chapter of Genesis, The
GABRIEL OUSSANI, D. D..... 204.
Francis of Assisi in Modern Critical Thought, St.
ERNESTO BUONAIUTI, D. D..... 459.
French School of Pragmatism, A Contemporary
WILLIAM TURNER, D. D..... 27.

PAGE

Function of Intransigeance, The
WILFRID WARD, M. A..... 3.
Genesis, The Fourteenth Chapter of
GABRIEL OUSSANI, D. D..... 204.
Ibsen's Greatest Plays, Two of
M. D. PETRE..... 282.
Idea of Light in the Old Testament, The
LEON GRY, D. D..... 70.
Intransigeance, The Function of
WILFRED WARD, M. A..... 3.
Liberal Catholicism
VINCENT MCNABB, O. P..... 271.
Light in the Old Testament, The Idea of
LEON GRY, D. D..... 70.
Lucian of Samosata and the Asiastic and Syrian Christianity of His Times
ERNESTO BUONAIUTI, D. D..... 49.
Mallock's Essay in Reconstruction
JAMES J. FOX, D. D..... 146.
Method of Teleology in Ethics, The
JOHN A. RYAN, D. D..... 409.
Mystics, Persian
WILLIAM BARRY, D. D..... 135, 452.
Miracles, A New Theory of
WALTER MCDONALD, D. D..... 675.
New Knowledge and the Old Philosophy, The
WALTER MCDONALD, D. D..... 162.
Newman and Conceptualism
THOMAS J. GERRARD..... 430.
Notes.
FRANCIS P. DUFFY, D. D....106, 244, 389, 517, 642, 769.
Persian Mystics
WILLIAM BARRY, D. D..... 135, 452.
Philosophy, The New Knowledge and the Old
WALTER MCDONALD, D. D..... 162.
Pragmatism, A Contemporary French School of
WILLIAM TURNER, D. D..... 27.
Real Presence in the Fathers, The
..... 360, 495.

PAGE

Reconstruction, Dr. Mallock's Essay on
JAMES J. FOX, D. D. ..... 146.
Religions, Christianity and the Comparative Study of
NICOLA TURCHI. ..... 590.
Review of Periodicals ..... 129, 266.
ERNESTO BUONAINTI, D. D. ..... 49.
Synoptics, Studies on the
FRANCIS E. GIGOT, D. D. ..... 335.
Teleology, The Method of, in Ethics
JOHN A. RYAN, D. D. ..... 409.
Three Heavenly Witnesses, The
WILLIAM L. SULLIVAN, C. S. P. ..... 175.
Trinity in St. Augustine, The Dogma of the
JOSEPH TURMEL ..... 86.

BOOK REVIEWS.

———Ante-Nicene Fathers ..... 539.
AVELING—The God of Philosophy ..... 794.
BAILLIE———Reflections from the Mirror of a Mystic ..... 126.
BENSON—The Queen's Tragedy ..... 542.
BENSON—The Religion of the Plain Man ..... 543.
BONJOANNES—Saint Thomas Aquinas: Pars Prima ..... 794.
BRIGGS—A Critical and Exegetical Commentary on the Book of Psalms ..... 657.
BROWN—A Hebrew and English Lexicon of the Old Testament ... 402.
BUONAIUTI—Lo Gnosticismo ..... 798.
CABROL—Les Origines Liturgiques ..... 661.
COLOGAN—Folia Fugitiva ..... 801.
Catholic Encyclopedia ..... 790.
DECHARME—La Critique des Traditions Religieuses chez les Grecs, des Origines au Temps de Plutarque ..... 404.
DEVAS—The Key to the World's Progress ..... 116.
GASQUET—Lord Acton and His Circle ..... 536.
GIGOT—Special Introduction to the Study of the Old Testament ... 254.
HASTINGS—A Dictionary of Christ and the Gospels ..... 529.
HEALY—The Life and Writings of St. Patrick ..... 126.
HEALY—The Valerian Persecution ..... 113.

PAGE

HERBERT—St. John Baptist de Rossi ..... 125.
HICKEY—Short Sermons ..... 668.
HULL—Studies in Idolatry ..... 264.
HULL—Theosophy and Christianity ..... 264.
KLEIN—In the Land of the Strenuous Life ..... 126.
LADD—The Philosophy of Religion ..... 654.
LE CAMUS—The Life of Christ ..... 399.
LEPICIER—The Unseen World ..... 115.
LEROY—Jesus Christ ..... 667.
LEWIS—Life of St. Teresa of Jesus ..... 126.
LUCAS—At the Parting of the Ways ..... 673.
MCGINLEY—The Profit of Love ..... 670.
MARINI—Il Divorzio al lume de la ragione ..... 265.
MARTIN—Le Livre d'Henoch, traduit sur le Texte Ethiopien ..... 257.
———Meditations on the Mysteries of Faith ..... 126.
NORTHCOTE—Mary in the Gospels ..... 673.
O'MALLEY AND WALSH—Essays in Pastoral Medicine ..... 533.
PEABODY—Jesus Christ and the Social Question ..... 796.
ROBINSON—The Golden Sayings of the Blessed Giles of Assisi ..... 669.
RYAN—A Living Wage ..... 406.
SCHUMACHER—The Knowledge of God ..... 794.
SHERAN—A Handbook of Literary Criticism ..... 126.
STONE—Studies from Court and Cloister ..... 262.
TAUNTON—The Law of the Church ..... 260.
———The Church and Kindness to Animals ..... 669.
TYRRELL—Lex Credendi ..... 251.
WAGGETT—The Scientific Temper in Religion ..... 663.
WALSH, O'MALLEY AND —Essays on Pastoral Medicine ..... 533.
WARD—Out of Due Time ..... 122.

INDEX OF CONTRIBUTORS.

BARRY, DAVID ..... 692.
BARRY, WILLIAM ..... 135, 452.
BATIFFOL, PIERRE ..... 306.
BRUNOWE, M. J. ..... 122.
BUONAIUTI, ERNESTO ..... 49, 459.
BUTIN, ROMAIN ..... 254.

PAGE

Clifford, Cornelius....670.
Driscoll, J. F....790.
Duffy, Francis P.106, 115, 244, 264, 389, 517, 539, 642, 654, 769, 794.
Fox, James J....146.
Gerrard, Thomas J....386, 430, 640.
Gigot, Francis E....37, 66, 158, 257, 302, 335, 399, 402, 442, 479, 585, 610, 749.
Gry, Leon....70.
Hassett, Maurice M....113, 698.
Herrick, J. C....665.
Hughes, W. F....798.
Leo, J....533.
McDonald, Walter....162, 675.
McGinley, A. A....116.
McGloin, Frank....379.
McNabb, Vincent....271.
Macpherson, Samuel P....262, 563, 542, 543, 667, 669, 673, 801.
McSorley, Joseph....251.
Mahoney, John R....260, 265.
Mitty, John J....663.
Morgan, John F....404.
Mulvey Thomas I....796.
Murphy, Joseph F....657.
Oussani, Gabriel....204, 322, 529, 719.
Petre, M. D....282, 602.
Plater, Charles....545.
Pope, F. Hugh....566.
Ryan, John A....409.
Sharpe, A. B....514.
Sheeran, Daniel W....661.
Sullivan, William L....175.
Turner, William....27.
Turchi, Nicola....590.
Turmel, Joseph....86, 189, 625, 668, 763.
Tierney, T. W....668.
Ward, Wilfrid....3.
Wickham, J. E....670, 673.
With Our Contributors....134, 270.

THE
NEW YORK REVIEW

VOL. II JULY-AUGUST, 1906 NO. 1

THE FUNCTION OF INTRANSIGEANCE

Wilfrid Ward, B. A.

In the present paper only a small part of a large subject can be dealt with. I have elsewhere pointed out[1] that it is inevitable and reasonable that in subscribing to certain theological *formulæ*, in the light of modern science and criticism, we should not explain them exactly as those explained them who first framed them. I have tried to show that such a course is no confession that truths once held to be divine, are not truths, no "retreat" on the part of theology from the original revelation—but rather a clearer discrimination in individual cases between the human and divine elements in theological propositions. It is the recognition in special instances of a fact which has long been admitted in general terms—namely, that the first expression of divine truths was necessarily conditioned by the imperfect *secular* knowledge of their exponents just as it was conditioned by the limitations of human language. And I have pointed out the existence in Catholic theology of that assimilative adaptability which is necessary for the re-explanation of ancient *formulæ* in the light of new secular knowledge and intellectual conditions. It is not unnatural that critics of this view should regard it at the first blush as a *deus ex machina*—a nineteenth century hypothesis devised to get rid of a nineteenth century difficulty; that they should point to the especial rigidity of "Roman" Catholicism, and should argue that facts give the lie to any such plausible theory; that the history of the past and the experience of the present show that the genius of Rome is not assimilative but *intransigeant.*

[1] See *Problems and Persons* (Longmans): Essay on "Unchanging Dogma and Changeful Man."

My endeavor in the present paper is to point out that the *intransigeance* of Rome (which I am far from denying) has its function in preparing for the very process of assimilation. To use a very homely comparison—we kill and eat the sheep before we are in a position to gain nourishment from it. The theory I urged as a practical help to us in our own century has been instinctively acted on by the Church in the past. Rigidity and *intransigeance*, in rejecting fresh explanations of dogma and new currents of thought, have no doubt been characteristic of Rome and of the authorities of the Church in in the past; but this attitude has been succeeded by partial assimilation of what was at first rejected. The view then which would be so helpful to us at the present hour, is in itself, if I am right, no new one, but only the clear recognition of what may be called the abiding organic principle of theological progress. A temporary *intransigeance* succeeded by partial assimilation of what she has opposed, has ever been the Church's *via media* between amorphous plasticity and permanent obscurantism. Historical critics have aimed a blow at the ancient faith. History should save it. It is subtle and critical intellects minutely examining the history of the sacred documents, who have formulated many of the modern objections to the form in which dogmatic propositions have been currently explained. Let us in reply generalise from the history of the Church. We shall find that such explanations have not been in the long run immutable.[2] However firm and unalterable has been the view that "the faith" cannot change, however marked have been the consequent manifestations of *intransigeance* among its authorised guardians, the theological account and explanation of it has in fact taken an ever growing and modifying form, from the discoveries and the thought of nearly every century of the nineteen hundred years through which it has lived. It was largely by adopting the intellectual and scientific conceptions of the early centuries of our era that the faith was first able to find articulate expression at all. The whole terminology of the definitions which expressed the mysteries of the Trinity and Incarnation was that of the Platonic philosophy. And yet those philosophical conceptions were in themselves human and liable to growth and modification. What human thought supplied, human thought could and did amend. The view here indicated is at least in itself no "retreat" of the theo-

[2]An obvious instance is the doctrine of the Ascension which was long explained as the going up of our Lord into the sky from a stationary earth until Copernicanism showed that the earth moves.

logians, but their persistence in the course which they have ever held—though now they may have to move more rapidly than heretofore. In an age when we telegraph for rooms at Lugano, and follow our telegram within a few hours by the "grande vitesse," theology, like everything else, may travel faster—changes may be more abrupt and startling than in the days when our forefathers crossed the Alps by slow stages on the back of a mule.

It is to be especially noted that these changes in the theological explication of the one ancient "faith" have been due in part to the assimilation of modes of thought distinctly external, and even hostile in the first instance, to the orthodox theology. Novel and external systems, albeit opposed at first by the orthodox, or even condemned as heterodox, have ultimately had a profound influence on Catholic theology, and have in some cases eventually entered into the explanation of dogma adopted in the formal definitions of the Church.[3] The supposition, therefore, that modern Biblical criticism and advancing physical science may have their function in formulating fresh explications of Catholic dogma rests none the less on precedents in Church History, because the Church has shown a measure of hostility to the leading exponents of both these branches of inquiry.

Of this phenomenon, as apparent in Church History, I will take four illustrative instances:

(1) The first of all the heresies—Gnosticism—brought with it both the method of intellectual reflection on the faith, and its detailed explication in terms of Greek philosophy, which the orthodox dogmatic treatises subsequently adopted. Yet it was at the outset opposed as a whole by the Church.

(2) The Montanists were the first to introduce that systematic asceticism which medieval Catholicism afterwards brought to its perfection. Yet the Montanist system was at its first appearance condemned by the orthodox as self-willed rigorism.

(3) Neo-Platonism was, in the days of Porphyry and of Julian the Apostate, in sharp antithesis to Christianity. Yet the teaching of Plotinus was ultimately fused closely with the most approved Catholic Mysticism.

(4) Aristotle's philosophy was regarded by most of the Fathers with the greatest suspicion. The dialectic method and the Aristotelian logic, employed by Abelard, were condemned by St. Bernard as ration-

[3] I need hardly instance the use of Aristotle's philosophy (so emphatically condemned by the Fathers) in the definition of the Real Presence.

alistic. Aristotle's *Metaphysic* was burnt by a Papal Legate in the days of Innocent III. Both the dialectic method and the Aristotelian philosophy are treated as the key to sound Christian philosophy in the works of Albertus Magnus and St. Thomas Aquinas.

We have in each of these cases an attitude of *uncompromising* opposition succeeded by *partial* assimilation and incorporation.

Does this phenomenon disparage the system of official condemnation? Does the subsequent assimilation show that the previous resistance was a mistake? Was the Church simply wrong in opposing what she afterwards accepted—in Tertullian, in Aristotle, in Marcion? So Hume thought. The heretics were, in his opinion, always right, and the Church, which condemned them, always wrong. If this be so, the subsequent assimilation on the part of the Church was simply a confession of error. And the theory of "retreat" is established. The Church has tacitly receded again and again from her supposed infallible teaching. But is there not another alternative? May not a *system* be condemnable, though some of its characteristic doctrines and methods bear a true sense? May not doctrines, practices, modes of reasoning, or inquiry, be false or objectionable in one context, and yet true or valuable in another—worthy of condemnation when put forward without or to the exclusion of the pre-suppositions of Christian tradition, allowable or even helpful with them? dangerous and false as absolute or unqualified positions or as parts of a false general view, useful and tenable in their place?

In truth, the conception of any new philosophical or doctrinal system as merely so much pure thought, each item of which may be labelled "true" or "false," is unreal. A system expresses the mind of its founder, is informed by his enthusiasms, his passions and prejudices; by his intellectual character and convictions. These give to the system a context which in the first instance colors and largely interprets it. They determine its *ethos*. And its several doctrines are parts of a whole.

Let us consider first the case of the Gnostics. It is the story of the Church's first conflict with heresy. And it shows her fresh spontaneous genius and character in dealing with secular thought as well as any later instance. Harnack, writing from an independent standpoint, agrees with Cardinal Newman, who writes from the Catholic and Anglican standpoint, as to the ultimate obligations of orthodox theology to the heretical Gnostics. Harnack treats this fact as of capital importance, and as his own discovery—although Cardinal

Newman had said substantially the same thing forty years earlier. "The position to be assigned to the Gnostics in the history of dogma, which has hitherto been always misunderstood," writes Harnack,[4] "is obvious. They were, in short, the theologians of the first century. They were the first to transform Christianity into a system of doctrines." To the same effect Newman had written in 1844. "The Gnostics seem first to have systematically thrown the intellect upon matters of faith."[5] Catholic dogmatic theology was in this respect the elaboration, with certain important safeguards and qualifications, of the process they first began. Their speculations supplied, in Cardinal Newman's words, "the raw material," which the Church "had the power by means of the continuity and firmness of her principles to convert to her own uses." The phraseology of the Nicene theology undoubtedly owes much to the Gnostics. They supplied the terms and the intellectual forms from which the Church afterwards selected. Gibbon went so far as to attempt to trace to their influence the very idea of the Incarnation. Yet their systems as a whole were strenuously opposed by the orthodox of their own day.

Did the orthodox then simply "retreat" from their attitude of opposition? Did they simply unsay what they had said? A little consideration of the facts of the case will show that the case was far otherwise. Gnosticism was not merely a collection of philosophical ideas, or a suggested philosophical method, offered to the Church as material for its use. It was a living movement inaugurated by certain writers with a marked character of their own. Its spirit was not calm and philosophical, but restless and aggressive. The Gnostics represented, in Harnack's phrase, "the acute secularizing or Hellenizing of Christianity."[6] A crowd of Greek ideas, partly profound, partly fantastic, was thrown wholesale before the Christian mind. The Church had to resist by all means in its power a flood which threatened to carry away the root-principles of Christianity, or bury them beneath an immense weight of extraneous and eminently speculative philosophy. The Gnostics professed to present the whole Christian faith in philosophical form. They asked the Christian Church to recognise in this elaborate and complete, and in part highly fanciful, system the expression of its own latent thought. Christianity, weak as yet in words, strong in the consciousness of its own ruling ideas, vague in its intellectual analysis, but most definite in its living type, summarily

[4] *History of Dogma*, i, 227.
[5] *Essay on the Development of Christian Doctrine*, p. 365.
[6] *History of Dogma*, p. 226.

refused. "The traditional religion," says Harnack, "on being, as it were, suddenly required to recognise itself in a picture foreign to it, was yet vigorous enough to reject that picture."

Yet what the Church simply rejected when presented as a complete rationalised system, brought so much with it which was true, that Harnack does not hesitate to say (not without some exaggeration) that Gnosticism virtually obtained in Catholicism "half a victory." The Church accepted gradually and with qualifications much that Gnosticism attempted to formulate prematurely and absolutely. She profited by it ultimately as a philosophy, though she opposed it as a movement. The general view of the case, then, indicated by Cardinal Newman, is confirmed by the more recent and detailed studies of Professor Harnack. "The Gnostic systems," he writes, "represent the acute secularizing or Hellenizing of Christianity with the rejection of the Old Testament, while the Catholic system represents a gradual process of the same kind, with the conservation of the Old Testament." Orthodox Christianity, which had so sternly rejected the living system as a whole, offered but little resistance "to the gradual, and one might say, indulgent remodelling to which (the Christian teaching) was subjected," in the extensive introduction of the Hellenic ideas and phraseology. And in place of finally rejecting the method of intellectual reflection on the faith introduced by the Gnostics, the Church forthwith pursued it in the science of dogmatic theology. "Gnosticism has left an enduring mark on the history of the Church," says a recent writer.[7] "It was in opposition to this heresy that Irenæus wrote the earliest treatise we possess on Catholic dogma . . . the Arian heresy itself did not . . . contribute more to the development of Catholic doctrine." "The scientific labors in the Church," writes Harnack, "were merely a continuation of the Gnostic schools under altered circumstances, i. e., under the sway of a tradition which was now more clearly defined and more firmly fenced round as a *noli me tangere*." The Gnostic Hellenism was rejected. The Hellenism of the Apologists was accepted. And the Alexandrian School elaborated a system in which the Hellenic elements were as conspicuous as in Valentinus himself. With the Apologists Christian revelation is all in all. The Hellenism is but illustrative. Their attitude was reverent. The main outline, instead of being fantastic and speculative, and startling to the Christian community, on the contrary justified their deepest convictions. In Harnack's words, they "appeared to

[7] *Catholic Dictionary*: Article "Gnosticism."

advance nothing inconsistent with Christian common sense."

Let us for a moment consider, in further justification of this view of the case, the attitude taken up against the Gnostics by St. Irenæus himself. He condemned primarily their method and their intellectual pride. Their elaborate attempt to set forth a full analysis of the faith with the aid of fantastic speculations in Greek philosophy was based on a false view of the sufficiency of the intellect in such matters. St. Irenæus invokes the one tradition handed down by the Apostles and the written Scriptures, as the primary guides to enquiry on such subjects. Mere intellectual curiosity and speculation (he maintains) lead us away from the fundamental truth of Revelation—the knowledge of God himself. The reverent study of God's mysteries, on the contrary, under the guidance of Apostolic tradition and Scripture, and in a spirit of the love of God, will lead us to a fuller understanding of the truth. "Having therefore," he writes, "the very rule of truth and the witness concerning God openly set forth (in Scripture) we ought not by solution of questions, swerving away further and further, to cast out the firm and true knowledge of God. Rather it becomes us, directing our resolution of difficulties by this outline, while we practise ourselves in enquiry concerning the mystery and ordinance of the living God, to grow also in love of Him, Who did and doth so great things for us, and never to fall away from that conviction whereby it is most expressly declared that He alone is truly God and Father."[8]

The full solution of the mysteries revealed in Scripture is not, he maintains, a matter for fanciful speculation without adequate *data*. Human reason cannot effect the full solution. We must "commit it to God." Even the subject matter of natural science we must often be content to know empirically without understanding its causes. We may make ingenious speculations, but we can have no certain or profitable knowledge. "Thus if we try to explain the causes of the rising of the Nile, many things indeed we say, perhaps persuasive—perhaps also not persuasive; but what is true and certain and final is laid up with God. . . . In all these things our words indeed will be many, while we seek out their causes, but only the God who makes them speaks absolute truth." And the argument is *a fortiori* to the revealed mysteries of Religion. We cannot find their ultimate explanation. Our ultimate trust is in what God alone fully knows and is revealing to us partially. Our immediate allegiance is to the guardians of the Apostolic deposit of truth.

[8] *Adversus Hæreses*, in "Library of the Fathers," p. 174.

Conservatism, then, is the very basis of enquiry among Christians The tradition handed down (oral and Scriptural) is what the orthodox have ever been exhorted to cling to as a guide in their gradual discovery of the true intellectual analysis of the faith—though so far as its merely verbal expression is concerned, that tradition was only (in the early centuries) an "outline." It contained, however, in those who guarded and transmitted it that living faith which inspired the martyrs. Its words by themselves were no more adequate to its spirit and potential content than the body of a child represents to him who sees it, the child's future possibilities as a man. But in both cases to preserve the external framework is to keep alive the identity of spirit and the principle of life and growth. Gnosticism was a premature and false intellectual synthesis injurious to that life and natural growth; and the exponents of the written word, who were the inheritors of the unwritten tradition, energetically rejected the heresy which they felt to be at variance with the faith as a whole, though they could not (it may be) fully and precisely answer it at once in detail. It jarred with the spirit and teaching of which they were the guardians, though they might be unequal to the task of adequately expressing that spirit and teaching in words, or of fully representing the points at issue. Irenæus declares that if the instructor of his own youth, blessed Polycarp, who conversed with the Apostles, had "heard any such thing" as some of the Gnostic extravagances "he would have cried out and stopped his ears, as was his wont, saying, 'Oh, good God, unto what time hast thou reserved me that I should endure these things,' and would have fled from the place where, sitting or standing, he had heard such words."[9] The instinctive rejection of heresy may be more prompt, and confident, and secure, than the formulation of the truth, which is the antithesis to it. St. Irenæus touchingly apologizes for his own insufficient equipment to express the Catholic truth. He has, he writes, no "skill in discourse," nor "eloquence of phrase, nor persuasiveness." He speaks "in simplicity and truth and plainness," as a witness that Gnosticism is at variance with the Apostolic teaching. That heresy opposes "the faith" is clearer and easier to express than what "the faith" is. And the gradual working out of this latter problem may come to include the acceptance of methods and ideas contained in the very system which has been as a whole rejected as heretical.

[9]Elsewhere he invokes against Gnosticism the testimony of Polycarp, who "had been trained by the Apostles" and who "taught them things which he learnt from the Apostles, which the Church delivers and which alone are true."

We have, then, (1) the condemnation of the Gnostic attempt to reduce the faith to a complete speculative philosophy; (2) the appeal to a powerful, definite living tradition incompletely analysed, which clearly rejects Gnosticism as a whole, and the cardinal elements of the Gnostic system,[10] and (3) we have a residuum of valuable ideas first broached by the Gnostics which are ultimately incorporated in theology—notably by St. Clement and Origen—and utilised by the Church.

So it was, also, with the early promoters of the systematic cult of the ascetic life. Their excesses were out of harmony with the Christian spirit. They struck at the vitality of the "religion of love." When Tertullian and the Montanists indulged in self-righteous condemnation of the laxity of the current practice, they were in turn condemned by the orthodox theologians. It was a "movement" which, whatever truths it incidentally contained, was as a whole a foe to orthodoxy. Yet the very Church which condemned this system as a whole ultimately assimilated the main features of its ascetic teaching. Tertullian is styled by Harnack as the "precursor" of later Catholicism.[11] Cardinal Newman speaks of the "rigorous fasts (of Montanism) its visions, its commendation of celibacy and martyrdom, its contempt of temporal goods, its penitential discipline and its maintenance of a centre of unity" as "Catholic in principle." "The doctrinal determinations," he adds, "and the ecclesiastical usages of the Middle Ages are the true fulfilment of its self-willed and abortive attempts at precipitating the growth of the Church."[12]

Take again the great philosophical opponents of Christianity on the very eve of the triumph of the Church in the Roman Empire under Theodosius. The dramatic history of Julian the Apostate embodies not only the restoration of pagan worship in Sanctuaries where the cross had been erected and the relics of the martyrs enshrined, but the engrafting on the old paganism of a sublimated theology, based on the Neo-Platonism of Plotinus. The trenchant attack of Porphyry on Christianity received imperial sanction. While the name of Christ was struck off from the Labarum, and Julian professed

[10]Among the Gnostic doctrines most definitively and finally condemned are dualism, which divides the Demiurge from the supreme God, the elaborate and totally unproved doctrine of *æons* and of the *pleroma*, the impugning of the authority of the Old Testament and unjust infringement of the continuity between the Jewish and Christian churches, the disparagement of martyrdom—opinions which in one way or another clearly struck at the vital doctrines of Christianity.

[11]*History of Dogma*, vol. vii, p. 8.

[12]*Essay on Development*, p. 364.

to hold converse with Mercury and Jove, he lived the life of an ascetic mystic and wrote on a Neo-Platonic basis his work against Christians. Neo-Platonism became the symbol of opposition to the Church. Yet St. Augustine records how he found all that was beautiful and true in the writings of the "modern Platonist" to be contained in a higher degree in Christianity itself; and later on the opposition was bridged by the writings of the pseudo-Dionysius the Areopagite. The language of Christian mysticism in later years was largely a direct transcription from the teaching of Plotinus, including the very phrases which he first invented.

In each instance, then, we have methods, practices, systems, distinctly opposed or condemned by the Church for a long time and ultimately used by her. The very method of speculating on the faith which the Gnostics introduced, is opposed by Irenæus. Yet his more or less speculative reply is our first orthodox treatise of dogmatic theology. The Gnostics were condemned for the wholesale introduction of Hellenic intellectual forms, yet Substance, Person, Nature, in their Greek equivalents, give to the mature Church the only orthodox explication of the Trinity and Incarnation Systematic asceticism finds its first devoted exponents among the condemned Montanists. Their teaching and practice is assimilated by the mediæval Church. The mystic philosophy of the Neo-Platonists is the antithesis of Christianity in the fourth century, and a part of it in the Middle Ages.

The philosophy of Christian doctrine, which appears to the present writer at once to be borne out by history and to justify and explain this mode of action on the part of the Church, is really a part of that very generalisation as to the "development of Christian doctrine," which Newman invoked to account for those new determinations of Catholic theology, which Protestants had condemned as innovations and corruptions.

The Catholic revelation is regarded (on this view) as having been entrusted to the "Church"; yet its first exponents definitely and explicitly analysed only a few fundamental points of faith. The organism had to grow and to develop more and more clearly the content of the revelation. It was a body of ideas largely latent, which had gradually to realise themselves and become distinct. As a man learns to formulate his opinions and express his mind by the pressure of events, and the controversies in which he is called upon to intervene, so with the Church. The formal expression of what the individual holds, what is the expression of his intellectual character

and point of view in reference to a controverted question, is elicited for the first time by the controversy itself. He opposes, or he assimilates, the statements placed before him as the case may be. And so too with the Church. In this way the primitive Christian ideas gradually developed their relations to the philosophy and science of successive ages. The Revelation was in its original expression fragmentary and unsystematic; but Christians were conscious of holding a real truth, a real energising system of religious thought in embryo, and the orthodox defenders of the faith were looking out for every guiding sign as to the further analysis of that truth, the expression of the Christian faith, which they felt to be so real and living, and which was yet intellectually so little defined.

The orthodox were keenly conscious of what jarred with the living ideas which they had not put into words. Where jarring theories were broached, they rejected them boldly and vigorously. *Intransigeance* was the first weapon of orthodoxy, ready to hand. Their point of view was on the whole hostile. And to begin with, therefore, they opposed the "heresies" absolutely. They answered them as they could, and often at first only partially. The negative was absolute. The positive analysis was incomplete. Each heresy by evoking an answer brought out some fresh attempt to effect the analysis of truth. The heresy was dangerous because it included an incidental antithesis to truth, or because of the attempt on the part of the heresiarchs at a premature synthesis, or because of the aggressive character of the system as a whole—often arising from these very features. The heresiarch was generally a theorist and an individualist. He affected systematic completeness and tried prematurely to put into words the explanation of problems the material for whose explicit solution did not yet exist; problems which the Church can only gradually unravel and solve up to a certain point, by living her life and developing, under pressure of experience, her corporate consciousness.

Such attempts to substitute the intellectual system of an individual for the tradition of the Gospel—an invented mechanism for a growing organism—were at variance with the laws of life in the Church. The Church vindicated the reality of the living truth of revelation by standing out against them. To accept such rationalistic explanations would be to lose her own principle of vitality, and to destroy her own type so definite in its mode of action and its results, though its intellectual analysis was as yet so incomplete. The true method was that of the discovery, patient and (in a sense) experimental, of what state-

ments *were* in harmony with the type and really expressed "the faith" once for all revealed. The heretical method, on the contrary, was the immediate creation by force of reasoning, of a more or less complete system. Thus the Apologists are at once full of reverence for "the faith," and incomplete—even at times inconsistent—in their analysis. The Gnostics are independent, irreverent, and complete.

In such cases the Church condemned the heretical *system* as a *system*, broke the power of the heresy as a rationalising movement, insisted on the essential necessity of a modest faith as a stone in the theological edifice which the Christian Church was gradually building. And *then*, when the heretical system had been rejected as a whole—when *intransigeance* had done its work—the orthodox thinkers were free gradually to assimilate its true parts—to discover gradually and appropriate those parts which *were* in harmony with the original type. The Church, then, opposed Gnosticism, Neo-Platonism, Montanism, bodily as rival systems; but the whole ground of opposition was not necessarily to be found in the several doctrines and methods at first rejected—although at the time the orthodox might oppose them absolutely and unconditionally. Particular elements might be at first opposed as parts of the whole system, and yet might be to a large extent admitted and adopted in the end. The real *gravamen* against the Valentinians and their friends was not the Gnostic intellectual reflection on the creed, which eventually took its place in the Church's own theological method; not the Gnostic doctrine of the Incarnation or of the Trinity; but the complete elaborate rationalising system which destroyed the true proportion between the great fundamental facts of Christianity concerning God and Christ, and the comparatively idle and uncertain results of an imaginative philosophy which exalted fanciful speculation at the expense of faith; which struck at the historical roots of Christianity as a fact—rejecting the Old Testament; which attempted to substitute philosophical roots, tending to reduce Christianity to a subjective idea; which strove forcibly to Hellenise Christianity by a rapid and arbitrary process; which attached an absurdly great significance to the philosophical fancy of individuals, and ventured on the strength of it to strike even at the unity of God and a future life. But when the Church had made her protest against the whole system—for the whole was poisoned by its leading ideas—and had successfully resisted its encroachments, she proceeded to assimilate numerous truths which its framers had

perceived, and to which the system had owed its influence, incidental truths of method and of fact which had necessarily been at first branded as parts of a dangerous whole.

This first exponent of heresy in Ecclesiastical history then, supplied the type which Cardinal Newman detects in heresy as such. It struggled to absorb into itself the Catholic Church; it was defeated in the struggle, and then the Church in its turn absorbed much of that teaching which in its original form had been incompatible with the Catholic teaching and *ethos*. The vigorous, though at first incompletely analysed, Catholic faith struck with all its force against each successive heresy. The sects, in Newman's words "contained elements of truth amid their error; and had Christianity been as they, it might have been resolved into them, but it had that hold of truth which gave its teaching a gravity, a directness, a consistency, a sternness, a force to which its rivals were for the most part strangers . . . hence in the collision it broke in pieces its antagonists and divided the spoils."[13]

This general view of the case is borne out distinctly by the fourth instance to which I have referred—namely Abelard's aggressive advocacy of the scholastic and dialectic method; his condemnation, and yet the ultimate adoption of that method by St. Thomas Aquinas and by the Church itself. It is a curious parallel to the Gnostics. Here again we see in the energetic and elaborate repudiation of Abelard's teaching by St. Bernard, that it was not only nor even primarily Abelard's doctrines themselves, but the proud and rationalistic temper which characterized his intellectual movement, which was blamed by his great opponent. "Peter Abelard," St. Bernard writes,[14] "is endeavoring to destroy the virtue of Christian faith, inasmuch as he thinks he is able to comprehend the whole that God is by his unaided human reason. He is ascending to the skies, he is descending to the depths. . . . He is a great man in his own eyes, a disputer of the faith against the faith, a man who busies himself about great and wonderful matters out of his reach, a prier into the Majesty of God, a manufacturer of heresies." Again we have these noteworthy words: "he proves his heresy not so much by his error as by his obstinate adherence to his error."

In this case as with Gnosticism we have the excesses of a rationalistic—and, it may be added, individualistic—method condemned; he was regarded as a "negative theologian"; we have the disregard

[13] *Essay on Development*, p. 359.

[14] *Letters of St. Bernard* (John Hodges), p. 592.

of the authoritative tradition condemned as the essence of the heresy; and then we have the doctrines themselves attacked far less conclusively or satisfactorily. And again, as with the Gnostics, we find in the course of two centuries some salient features of the method accepted, but with the safeguards required to prevent the identification of the traditional faith with a speculative philosophy. We have a Bonaventura contemporary with an Aquinas, to save just that mystical and meditative element which in St. Bernard's eyes Abelard was losing. "The fathers are derided," (by Abelard) wrote St. Bernard, "because they held that such things (of God) are to be tasted rather than solved." And it was precisely this element of "tasting," of mystic contemplation which St. Bonaventura represented; while St. Thomas Aquinas himself, though some of his arguments, if isolated from his system as a whole, might perhaps have incurred the very charges laid by St. Bernard at the door of Abelard, recognised to the full the sphere of patristic mysticism and its value. For the rest far more was ultimately assimilated than rejected of what Abelard taught. The dialectical method and the metaphysics of Aristotle were freely admitted as raw material to be utilised, after their claim to all-sufficiency had been once for all set aside. "The negative theologian," says Harnack, "really laid the foundation for the classical structure of mediæval conservative theology." But that theology was ruled and penetrated by the doctrines of St. Bernard and the Fathers. "Church faith, mysticism, and Aristotelian science formed a close alliance."[15]

In like manner it may be maintained that it is not in all cases the nature of the discoveries or hypotheses made by science or advanced criticism in our own time, but the living aggressive creed of modern scientific men and critics, which inevitably provokes a certain hostility on the part of the Church. So far as the creed of science professes to be a system which is to solve the problem of existence, she still fights it. She began with speculative Gnostics, she now deals with scientific agnostics. She began with men who went preposterously beyond the data at our disposal, to construct an elaborate and minute intellectual system which was no true representative of that unanalysed faith which lay at the root of the fortitude of the martyrs and the heroism of the Christian saints; she now faces those who use an elaborate

[15]Thus some theologians have held that the Thomistic doctrine of *gratia sufficiens*—which the Church permits—logically issues in Calvinism. It is saved by the express rejection of Calvinism on the part of Thomists, and the logic of the accused passages must look after itself.

system of true data to give credit to scientific theories and inferences far beyond their warrant, and to substitute them for the Reality which the Church holds—so self-assertive, yet so elusive; so persistent in its claim, so unsatisfactory, so vague, sometimes so self-contradictory, to the mere analysist. The Gnostic said "here is the Reality; we give you a fully intellectual account of it"; the Agnostic says "we are discovering all that is to be known, and your Reality is not there. It has no existence, but we will give you a system of known facts, which is better and has the advantage of being true." The two systems have the resemblance which Pantheism has to Atheism. The Church obstinately cleaves to her *via media*. She insists that she does know, and that there is a Reality—a body of real truth represented by the growing dogmatic system; and yet that it will, on earth, ever be seen by man "through a glass darkly." The Gnostic "it is philosophically explicable here," the Agnostic "it is simply inexplicable and nowhere discoverable" equally contradict the fundamental fact of which she is conscious. To the first she opposes mysticism; to the second the dogmatic system. She urges that position so hard to the ordinary man—even to the man of science—suspense as to ultimate *speculative* explanations, coupled with implicit trust that in adhering to the dogmatic system we are keeping a true hold on Reality —just as a man who for the first time takes in Berkeley's Idealism, may be at a loss to answer it, and yet does not doubt that his knowledge of a table is something more than simple delusion. Love of theory and idolatry of forms are the Scylla and Charybdis between which she steers. How hard it is for the biological evolutionist to keep to his perplexing facts without canonising the theories he frames beyond their warrant—to regard even evolution itself as only a highly probable working hypothesis; to accept natural selection and yet to recognise how little it explains; to face our profound ignorance as to the main factor—namely the causes in the first instance of the variations themselves as distinct from the causes of their preservation. How hard it was for the Jew to worship the hidden God and not adore the definite "graven" idol. How hard it is for the dogmatist to trust the Church revealing the dogma, and yet not to idolise the visible tangible symbol itself—the formula or the rite—as the final object of his belief and worship. Yet science is true, though its creeds may be false. Statues symbolise the divine, though to worship them for themselves be vain superstition. Dogmatic formulæ fruitfully represent transcendental truth, though they must fail if they are

regarded as co-extensive with the Divine mysteries they symbolise.

But if certain intellectual views rejected by the Church in one generation are accepted later, what becomes, it will be said, of the *semper eadem* of Christianity? Where is the unchangeableness of the faith? What does the Christian believe which he may not ultimately have to sacrifice?

Materials for the answer to this question have been already given. The initial error has been in identifying the *semper eadem* of the faith, or of the Divine Realities themselves, with a supposed *semper eadem* of philosophical or scientific explication. The faith of the Apostles —which preceded dogmatic science—was the same as the faith of Aquinas. The revealed truth was the same in itself. The general character of the attitude of faith which formed the Christian character was the same. Scientific explication, on the other hand, has ever moved and must ever move. What remain the same are the Divine truths which are partially revealed, and that revelation—the "deposit of faith"—which is the subject of ever-growing explication. That the sky is blue, that the sun rises, are constant beliefs, and they represent an abiding reality in nature. But their explication is not ever the same. To us now the color of the sky is not objective in the sense that it was in the eyes of Aristotle; to speak of "the rising of the sun" is not an ultimate explanation of the event it records as it was to Dante. But as practical facts, accessible to gentle and simple alike, the blueness of the sky and the rising of the sun are unchangeably true. And so, too, not philosophical explications which are the property of the few, ever incomplete, ever changing, but the main practical religious beliefs which are taught to "little ones," have remained the same for the uneducated fishermen who first taught the gospel, for the mediæval Aristotelians who saw it through a Greek medium and threw it into syllogisms, and for ourselves. The truth, as it is to God, does not change. The practical essential teaching of the Church which guides simple souls does not change. It is in the intervening stages of intellectual analysis that there is constant displacement. The *depositum fidei*, which is gradually further and further defined, is, as the Vatican Council has reminded us, something quite distinct from any philosophical elaboration.

And in the course of these inevitable displacements the unchangeableness of the two extremes must not be forgotten. The man who investigates physics and metaphysics, who learns gradually to discount sensible impressions as informants concerning the ultimate reality,

doubts neither the practical unchangeableness of sensible knowledge, nor the fact that the Universe he is exploring is an abiding Reality. But he has brought home to him the limits of our speculative knowledge and the falsity of the promise, "ye shall be as Gods." Enough knowledge for the practical life of every day he has. And it is knowledge of that which as known to God is intelligible and stable. But when his limited mind tries to advance to speculative analysis he begins what he cannot complete. He starts a journey on the infinite road which separates the normal standpoint of man—enough for his daily requirements—from the all-seeing, all-knowing view of God. If he is wise he will not allow the pursuance of an endless speculative path to dim his clear recognition and discrimination of the two resting points at either end—the abiding sensible knowledge which is sufficient for his daily wants, and the larger and deeper reality known to God of which his own knowledge is but a practical and economical representation. So, too, practical orthodox Christianity preserves its unchanged character and *ethos*. The religious life is what it was, and it rests on a belief in supernatural truths—the *depositum fidei*—in themselves unchangeable.

What remains *speculatively* unchanged in the Christian himself is the dogmatic principle, the assertion that there is such an unchangeable truth in the Divine mind, and that it belongs to the Church gradually to unfold its intellectual analysis; and the consequent acceptance of the definitions whereby Divine truth, as known partially and by analogy to the human mind, is gradually expressed. It is just the attempt to put *exhaustively* into words that which *is* "semper eadem," to identify the whole speculative truth which exists only in the mind of God, with the intellectual *formulæ* which represent portions of it to man "through a glass darkly," which has been the initial error of all heresy—from Gnosticism onwards. The heretics have treated single *formulæ* as though they were in themselves exhaustive, instead of being portions and aspects of the mind of the Church and of the *depositum fidei*. The realities which the Church represents by its *formulæ* transcend words, and words and intellectual conceptions can at best gradually approximate nearer to these realities.

The most immoveable *formulæ* would in fact quite fail by themselves to keep beliefs immoveable. Explaining away can be wrought to a high pitch of art. The Church therefore has from the first used words and symbolic rites, not dwelling on their intrinsic adequacy—often indeed expressly insisting on their inadequacy—but confessedly

as instruments of her own dogmatic principle. As such they have immense force. To offer incense to the "divinity of the Emperor" could in itself be justified by a clever equivocator—for God is the true divinity of all Emperors—the divine power by whom they live —he might say. But the Church takes the phrase, and the rite, and holds them up as representing a principle for the repudiation of which the Christian must be ready to die. So, too, with the *formulæ* against heresy—enforced by the condemnatory phrase "si quis dixerit, anathema sit." They are issued by the teaching Church as the peremptory insistance upon symbols in themselves inadequate, of Catholic truth against the heretical rationalism of a given time. As such they should be accepted and striven for to the death. No matter that in other circumstances, *formulæ* which seem to some logically equivalent to those now anathematised, may bear a good sense and be admissible.[16] The Church deals ultimately with things and not words. And words derive their immense importance from the importance of the things they effectively represent *at the time*. Here is another function of *intransigeance*—to put down the foot of authority at the point at which explanation must stop—to say this *formula* does represent truth or its denial as the case may be. "Dogmatism was in teaching what confession was in act," writes Newman. "Each was the same strong principle of life in a different aspect, distinguishing the faith which was displayed in it from the world's philosophies, on the one side, and the world's religions on the other." You can only die for maintaining a truth, by dying for the verbal symbol which by common consent among men represents it.

In point of fact a formula, or a rite, or a custom, with the authority of the Church at the back of it, is very strong; in itself it is very weak. The intellect can always, in O'Connell's phrase, "drive a coach and four through" any form of words. But if used by authority as the fixed symbols of transcendental truth not to be tampered with by one iota, words are immensely strong.

On the Definitions of faith the divine seal is affixed for ever—but this does not make even these *formulæ* necessarily adequate *intellectually*.[17] It means that they are permanently to be regarded as authoritative symbols of Divine truth, acceptance of which is obligatory.

[16]In St. Thomas Aquinas' phrase, the Reality "exceeds the terms used," when we use human language of God. "Not even the Catholic reasonings and conclusions as contained in the Confession and most thoroughly received by us," writes Cardinal Newman, "are worthy of the Divine Verities which they represent."

[17]St. Athanasius speaks of Christ having only "one nature."

Thus we are led from another side to recognise the fact (so strongly urged by Cardinal Newman) that the essence of heresy is not found wholly in the *formulæ* it defends—for words by themselves are too indeterminate to incur so grave a responsibility. It consists more fundamentally in the rejection of the dogmatic principle, and of that authority of the Church whereby the dogmatic principle is secured. To Irenæus the capital crime of the Gnostics is their rejection of the authority of Apostolic tradition. To St. Bernard, Abelard's contumacy is worse than his doctrine. The Donatists were regarded as heretics for maintaining a doctrine of baptism which St. Cyprian held without offence, because in the time of the Donatists authority forbade the doctrine—"because," as St. Augustine said, "the Donatists had broken the bond of peace and charity with the other churches which St. Cyprian had so carefully preserved." Inaccurate doctrinal expressions may often be used without offence by the orthodox;[18] and we have seen that valuable discoveries may be condemnable under the ægis of an heretical movement.

And now to apply these principles on which the Church has acted in the past, to her action at the present moment. It is said that the Christian Church is the enemy of progress, the enemy of science, the enemy of historical criticism, the enemy of modern thought, the enemy of the new civilization. The answer to this is—she professes to have the true creed, and she is the enemy of rival creeds, of rival theories of the meaning of life. She asserts her individuality—she upholds the Christian Creed as a creed, against the creed of science, and the creed of progress. The *creed* of Science came, like Gnosticism, professing to give an adequate account of all that can be known. If "a lie that is half a truth is ever the blackest of lies," the Church is rightly on her guard against a system which trades upon important new discoveries in order to father on us a philosophy of life which it has not really found. Like the anatomist who gave his word that a complete survey of the human frame had failed to find the soul, which therefore (he maintained) could not exist, the creed of modern science came first in the form of an assertion that "Naturalism" accounted for all phenomena, and God was unnecessary. Evolution could dispense, it was said, with Theism. Natural selection could account for all that our fathers ascribed to providential purpose. The investigations of Baur and Volkmar discredited the early Christian records. Men now in middle life remember how the modern creed

[18] *Apologia*, p. 265.

was ushered in in their youth. Agnostic polemics were placed before them disguised as the outcome of impartial criticism and scientific investigation. This aggressive character has diminished in England. But in Germany it is still visible. If science is ever based on the inductive method the *creed* of science is most certainly not so based. In its self-confident deductions it has rivalled Gnosticism itself. And Christianity, conscious of the reality it represents, has asserted itself and rejected the hostile creed as a whole, The assimilation of its true parts could only take place safely after its rejection as a whole. A little weakness among the orthodox, too much fairness to the true element where vigorous rejection of the false was the first thing needed, and Christianity would have been as completely swamped by the *creed* of science, as it would have been by the crowd of Hellenic speculations which the Gnostics would have thrown in pell-mell. Had the dogmatic principle been moribund, had the authorities shrunk from a certain *intransigeance*, evolutionists and critics would have broken into the church *en masse* and rifled it of its treasures. The dogmatic principle represented in the theological framework *as a whole*, had to protect itself from the intrusion. The bodily frame is not the personality. It is, however, mainly as the medium whereby the personality expresses itself and represents itself to others that it interests us. The same living soul could imaginably exist as informing quite another body. Still our only means of preserving the living soul, in this world, is to protect from violence the body in which it actually does energise. And so, too, with the whole system of dogmatic *formulæ*. It is not the spiritual reality as that exists in itself and in God's mind, but it is in part the *medium* through which that reality is represented to man and has relations with him. The assertion of the dogmatic principle in the Church, her occasional *intransigeance*, is the law of self-preservation. And it can only be effectively asserted by means of actually existing *formulæ* whether they be ideally the best or not. Had the evolutionists and critics been allowed to enter into Christian theology and work their will, had there been no dogmatic system to resist them, God would speedily have become "a stream of tendency" appearing in the consciousness. Historical Christianity would have descended to a level with Buddhism. Conscience would have lost its imperative character. Morality would have been resolved into these varying subjective moods and opinions which to the Church represent the disturbing or refracting *media* through which the eternal law is perceived by men. The creed of

Progress, with a slight Christian tinge, would have replaced the ancient faith. And such destruction of the sacred inheritance of tradition would have been irreparable. Criticism grown more conservative might eventually replace isolated fragments; but the divine stamp upon the whole handed down for nineteen centuries, could never have been restored. And indeed in quarters where the dogmatic principle has failed, Christianity has been dangerously tampered with. Socialistic theories which disparage that other-worldliness which was the primary support of the first Christians, have stepped in. Science and criticism (inevitably colored by the prejudices of their exponents) have been accepted as sole arbiters on the teaching of the Bible. Where the chain of continuous tradition had been broken, conservative views can only return as a transient fashion. Authority is gone as an effective principle. Where, however, the dogmatic principle has been strong the fortress has been held. Baur and Volkmar were kept out; the Agnostic evolutionists were held at bay. And what are we now witnessing? A revolution among scientists and critics themselves; a conservative reaction, which may be utilised by still living faith and tradition instead of ministering only to the regret of a Clough or an Arnold, and benefitting only the antiquarian student. Thomas Hill Green expelled Naturalism from Oxford; Huxley gave us his Romanes lecture before he died. Baur and Volkmar are replaced by Kuenen and Wellhausen. Harnack detects philosophical order in the development of dogma. The monuments are found by Professor Sayce to be more and more conservative in their testimony. Professor Ramsay and Bishop Lightfoot—in different departments—helped on the same cause. Döllinger, Bickell, Lagrange, are recognized by all schools as authorities in history or biblical criticism.

Thus the conditions for the assimilation of science and criticism by Christian theology are growing up. The attitude of *intransigeance* and *non possumus* is absolutely essential at times in the Church if she is to protect her life. She must keep the rival creed at bay and break its power as a creed. When this has been done effectively, she can consider its details on their merits in a philosophical spirit, and absorb truths which are valuable, instead of being herself absorbed by a system on the whole false and destructive of the living reality which she is bound to protect, though her human representatives so imperfectly understand it. She has done to the creed of scientific Agnosticism what she did in the first instance to Gnosticism, Montanism, Neo-Platonism, Abelardism. She has withstood it as a whole, and

rejected it as a whole. On each of these earlier systems she performed a second process—that of partial assimilation, after they had ceased to be actively hostile forces. That process in respect of modern science and criticism should, from the analogy of history, be the work of the Church of the future; though she must preserve in her very changes the unity of type which has characterised the Church of the past.

One other point must be noted. The conservative resistance to innovation is the special function of Rome itself. The Roman Church, in Newman's words, has ever been a "remora or break in the development of doctrine." The active investigation of new lines of thought and the suggestion of fresh theological adaptations, is the work of less responsible organs. "It is individuals and not the Holy See," Cardinal Newman writes, "that have taken the initiative and given the lead to the Catholic mind in theological enquiry."[19] That conservative

[19]And this is the place to note what I cannot here illustrate by detailed instances. A heresy called for an answer without delay. Those who answered were not inspired men. They were indignant. They felt—as in Irenæus' fancy-picture of Polycarp—its opposition to Christian tradition. But it did not follow that they infallibly put their hand on just those points, and those only, in which the statements of heretics were at variance with the true Christian faith. The analytic intellect ever lags behind the spontaneous judgment. They gave the best they could. But it might happen that the falsity of the heresy led to a too indiscriminate attack on individual propositions objectively tenable when interpreted *by the aid* of orthodox tradition. Or the falsehood of one proposition made another suspicious as held by the same man. The heretical *animus* was felt and not necessarily defined. And verbally in this or that instance the heretic might be defensible and the saint might be assailable. Time alone in the nature of the case could set right such incidental injustice. So, too, on the other hand, the truth and sacredness really belonging to the Church, and, too, the final truth laid up in the mind of the Church, attached itself, in the popular imagination, to the answers poured forth with holy zeal by her champions. Here was a possible cause of subsequent difficulty. All the loyalty which the indefectible Church called forth might attach itself to the statements of the orthodox. A halo naturally spreads around the holy or learned opponents of heresy, and their words are regarded as "the truth." This might become a great difficulty for this reason—that the subsequent assimilation of true and valuable discoveries of the heretic would have as far as possible to be made without prejudice to statements which, though they were really made in defence of the truth, were not themselves infallible or necessarily exact. Thus we must avoid condemning St. Augustine's statements concerning grace, although we cannot distinguish some of them, if viewed in isolation, from the views of Jansenius. And Pelagius may help us here and there, though we fully recognise the false excess of his doctrine. The heretical systems, practically false, might then, include the first statement of what was theoretically true. The orthodox defence, practically true, as preserving the truth against what was practically false, might be in various particulars theoretically inadequate. Yet both these difficulties contained a principle of progress. For a heretical system was not done with because it was condemned. Its condemnation, indeed, placed it exactly

Rome should act as a check on discussion and speculation, as a break on those sanguine specialists who would at once identify what is plausible with what is true, and should insist as did the orthodox Irenæus on the doctrine that has been handed down, is normal and natural—often necessary. Changes and adaptations in the official language of theology are far too serious to be made in deference to what may prove to be only a brilliant hypothesis. Consequently Rome urges every objection until the new point of view has made its case quite clear. A degree of *intransigeance* is the safe and prudent course which protects religion from the freaks of original genius.

This is the true function of Roman *intransigeance*. It has its parallel in any Ecclesiastical authority. The opposition of the Anglican authorities to *Essays and Reviews*, and to the views of Bishop Colenso was an instance of the same phenomenon. It is more marked in Rome than at Canterbury because Rome is more highly organized. Where the theological tradition has been broken, new ideas can enter more readily. It is easier to take possession of vacant ground than to settle a disputed claim with an existing tenant. But the danger must not be forgotten that instead of Christianity in such cases assimilating what is true in modern thought, it may be swallowed up by its excesses, having lost the machinery whereby its unchanging type is normally protected.

And here we come to the essential difference. The living authority of Rome can reform and reorganise Acceptance of new thought becomes *real* assimiliation and not merely fusion. Its rigidity may lead to temporary obscurantism—to blind instead of open-eyed *intransigeance*. But assimilation comes eventually and the new form lives as the old one did. This is far harder elsewhere. In the absence of a living authority obscurantism may be the only alternative to gradual disintegration. It was Protestants and not Catholics who framed the narrowest doctrine of "verbal inspiration." And it is a serious question whether the greater facility with which novelty is swallowed wholesale in our own day outside the Catholic communion is not a witness to the decay of the dogmatic principle and of organic

in the position in which it could aid in the development of Christian thought—in which it was no longer a dangerous living religious force or movement to be resisted, but a philosophical system to be dissected and in part utilised as raw material for Catholic theology. The practical error was condemned, the elements of speculative truth remained at the service of the orthodox. Neither was the original orthodox statement complete because it was approved. It represented a truth whose fuller intellectual expression was a matter of time.

religious life. If Rome for the moment remains too conservative, and appears to some to be blindly insistent on the traditional forms of Christianity, the excess is in the direction of preserving identity at a time when Christian ideals are very generally assailed, and are in real danger of destruction. It may be that the liberalism outside her communion, however wise and discriminating in individuals, witnesses in the separate bodies as wholes to a principle of decay.

WILFRID WARD.

Lotus, Dorking, England.

A CONTEMPORARY FRENCH SCHOOL OF PRAGMATISM

William Turner, D. D.

Let it be understood at the very outset that between the contemporary French philosophical movement described in this article and the tendency known in America and England as Pragmatism there exist points of contrast which are as strongly to be emphasized as the points of resemblance. The Pragmatism with which so much of our English literature of the present decade is imbued is interested, indeed, in the philosophy of Religion, and in one instance, at least,[1] does not hesitate to carry its method into the systematic examination of the significance and value of religious feelings. The French writers in whom the pragmatic tendency is prominent are also, and, one may say, primarily, interested in the application of their method to the study of religion. For them, however, religion has a restricted meaning. It means a definite body of supernatural truth, and a divinely instituted system of supernatural aids to salvation; it means Christianity in its historical identity; it means the dogmatic teaching and sacramental system of the Catholic Church. MM. Blondel, Denis, Mano, Laberthonnière and those who are associated with them and think as they do on philosophical subjects, are first, and above all else, Apologists for the truth and transcendency of Catholic dogma and Catholic institutions. So true is this that they are known to many as Apologists merely, and their body of doctrine is commonly described as *l'apologetique d'immanence*. However, when one considers their method and examines the fundamental principles on which they rely, one will find that both in the destructive and the constructive phase of their activity as thinkers they have many points of contact with the method and with the principles of philosophical pragmatism.

The School, and School it deserves to be called in the stricter sense of the word, may be said to date from the publication of M. Blondel's *l'Action* in 1893, in which, as the name implies, *action* and not *thought* is considered to be the starting-point of philosophical inquiry. Who the precursors of the movement were is a debateable,

[1]Professor James, *Varieties of Religious Experience* (New York, 1902).

and, as we shall see, a delicate question. This much, at least, may be safely said: men who, like Lachelier, kept alive the interest in Pascal's method and men who, like Ollé-Laprune, continuing the influence of Père Gratry, insisted that one should bring *one's whole self* to the study of philosophy, had their share in preparing the audience for M. Blondel's message, even if they did not directly contribute to the message itself. M. Blondel's book was received with unusual favor; in it some saw the evidence that a new Descartes had appeared, to revolutionize the established method in philosophy. Among the first to announce his adherence to the new method was Abbé Denis, who from 1895 until his death in 1905, was editor of the *Annales de Philosophie Chrétienne*. This review may, indeed, be said to be the official organ of the movement. Next to Abbé Denis, Père Laberthonnière, formerly of the Oratory, deserves mention as an exponent of the New Apologetic, as it is called. With him are associated Abbé Mano, Abbé Birot, and many others especially of the younger clergy. M. Brunetière, who has a method of his own (*une méthode autoritaire, psychologique, sociologique*),[2] is best described as a friend, and to a certain degree, a patron, of the New Apologists.

It is not necessary here to enter into the polemical phase of the movement or to try to unravel the tangled skein of accusations, denunciations, and condemnations in which the movement is involved. It is necessary, however, to remark that one definite charge has been made against the School, namely, that it was imbued with Kantism. The attempt on the part of the New Apologetic to found a defence of Christianity, not on intellectual formalism, but on some non-rational element in our nature, was, to use a phrase made famous by the title of a recent pamphlet, an *infiltration* of Kantian philosophy. Abbé Denis vehemently, too vehemently, it seems to us, rejects the charge of Kantism, and traces the "intellectual ancestry" of the movement back to Abbé de Broglie, Newman, Bautain, Portalis, St. Francis de Sales and St. Augustine. He goes even further; he finds that the method of the new school is essentially contained in the Gospel of St. John. He (and the same is true of the whole school) has not very clear ideas of the limits of philosophical enquiry, as when, for instance, he argues that the philosophical method of his school is contained in the Gospel, because Christ appealed to faith, and not to formal dialectical proof.[3] There were reasons why in 1903 the charge of Kantism

[2] *Annales de Phil. Chrét.*, Ser. 3, tome iii.
[3] *Annales*, Ibid.

should be rejected, although in 1901 Kant had been calmly enumerated by Abbé Denis himself among the ancestors of the movement.[4] Abbé Mano was better inspired when, in defending his Doctor Thesis at Toulouse in 1899 he met the charge of being "a disciple of Kant," by saying that, while he disclaimed the title in the adversary's sense, he could not ignore the new direction (*orientation*) which Kant had given to philosophical enquiry. Elsewhere he contends that in the presentation of supernatural truth to those who do not believe, we cannot choose the battle-ground. It is chosen for us. The modern world has taken its stand on a position which the weapons of intellectualism cannot reach. In such conditions, it is obviously the duty of the Christian Apologist to arm himself with weapons furnished by the study of our own vital action (*action vivante*). Let us suppose that an appeal is made to miracles. The intellectualist is met at every step with the crucial question of the determinism or autonomy of nature. On the contrary, the New Apologist, studying our own vital action, finds that, even in the natural order, our vital activity is not a law unto itself, that it admits a heteronomy, a law from without. In this way, the Apologist can lead the unbeliever to admit that the heteronomy of the supernatural is not in conflict with nature, but merely transcends nature. Nay more, the observation of our psychic life—not of our thought-processes alone—brings home to the unbeliever the truth that our nature is somehow tuned to harmony with the supernatural (*en puissance obedientielle et coordonnée vis-a-vis du surnaturel,*) and thus is full force and meaning given to St, Augustine's "*Fecisti nos Domine ad Te, et irrequietum est cor nostrum donec requiescat in Te.*" There is little in all this that has a distinctively Kantian flavor. The treatment of the fundamentals of Christian belief as resting not only on rational but on spiritual-emotional bases is to an extent Patristic and is unmistakably a legacy of the Traditionalist School. Traditionalistic also is the onslaught of the New Apologists on "puny reason": reason cannot furnish a basis for religion, science, morality, art, social institutions, because these were not created by reason but preceded it. A more modern ground of opposition to a purely rational system of Apologetic is that intellectualism has, in point of fact, been ruled out by modern science. Intellectualism pretends to a knowledge of the noumenon (*chose-en-soi*), whereas modern science knows nothing of noumena (*essences*). The Scholastic talks about the essence, for example, of gold:

[4] *Annales*, Oct. 1901, p. 77.

modern science knows nothing about gold except its color, size, shape, weight, chemical properties, and so forth, These alone are revealed by laboratory research; of these alone does the modern scientist speak, and when the intellectualist talks glibly about essences he is using language which the modern world does not understand. In so far, therefore, as the New Apologist, suiting himself to the conditions imposed by his adversary in the contest, adopts the Kantian doctrine of the unknowableness of noumenal reality, in so far is the charge of Kantism acknowledged to be true.[5] That accommodations of this kind imply a compromise with the adversary and a consequent yielding of principle is the contention of the opponents of the New Apologetic. The case of the Abbé Loisy affords a parallel; and in both instances ecclesiastical authority has sided with those who think that yielding a vital point, even for the sake of meeting the adversary on his own ground, can have none but disastrous consequences.

In its negative, or destructive, phase, the New Apologetic not only criticizes the prevailing method of defending the fundamental truths of Christianity by means of weapons furnished by Scholastic theology and philosophy, but also takes to task the Scholastic method, as such, and rehearses every objection that has been made against it from it the days of Roger Bacon to our own time. The sum of these objections is that Scholasticism is *intellectual formalism.* Scholasticism, writes Abbé Denis,[6] is based on the use of the syllogism, which has the disadvantage of proceeding only from given premisses and can, therefore, discover nothing new. The syllogistic process, he continues, recognizes between dogma and the human soul only the logical nexus, which is the simplest but, at the same time, the weakest. To the exclusive use of this intellectual method he traces "that dialectical dogmatism which is up in arms against facts, as soon as the facts (physical, psychological or historical) contradict so-called self-evident principles or the conclusions derived therefrom." In similar strain Abbé Mano inveighs against the modern representative of Scholasticism[7] who from the *a priori* principle "The less cannot contain the greater," argues against evolution! This false method, he is careful to add, is not to be ascribed to St. Thomas, but to his degenerate followers: the Philosophy of St. Thomas will always be, and should always be, considered a great system of Christian Philosophy; that,

[5] *Annales*, Ser. 2, tome xliii, pp. 230ff.

[6] *Annales*, Ser. 2, tome xxxviii, p. 110.

[7] *Annales*, Ser. 3, tome i, p. 559.

however, does not mean that we should look upon it as a "hieratic and intangible collection of sacred formulas, but rather as a broad, living system vivified by the true spirit of Christianity." The mental attitude of the undiscriminating adherent of Scholasticism had already been characterized by Ollé-Laprune as "*psittacisme*," and, when the facts in the case are viewed calmly and critically, it is recognized that undue deference to authority is no more a part of Scholasticism than it is of any other *system*.

In an age long since gone by, men rated a certain popular textbook of logic so highly as to argue its claims thus: Whoso does not understand the *Isagoge* cannot understand Aristotle's *Categories*; he who does not understand Aristotle's *Categories* cannot reason rightly; he who does not reason rightly cannot act rightly; but he who does not act rightly cannot attain salvation; therefore, he who does not understand the *Isagoge* cannot attain salvation![8] The modern world is neither convinced nor edified by such an array of demonstrative force. Whatever it thinks of Porphyry's *Isagoge*, it certainly hesitates at the assertion "whoever does not reason well cannot act rightly." If any men ever took the chain of argument seriously those men were not Scholastics of the type of Albert the Great and St. Thomas of Aquin. This much, however, is true, the Scholastics, especially in the early centuries of the Scholastic movement exaggerated the importance of Dialectic. It may be said, and this is to some extent true of the greatest of the Schoolmen, that they had merely a dialectical concept of morality, volition, emotion. They were intellectualists; they inclined to formalism. But which of them, when put to the test would affirm that reality, especially the Supreme Reality, God, can be adequately expressed in any one intellectual formula or series of formulas? They would, indeed, insist on attempting to express all things, including God, in rational categories, such as Substance, Cause, Actuality, etc., but did they not, one and all, confess the inadequacy of such categories when applied to the Infinite? And if, in their philosophical enquiries they, the heirs of preceding centuries in which Dialectic reigned supreme, insisted on the logical nexus between God and the human mind, did they not, as saints and the heirs to all the traditions of monastic piety, insist on the all-important emotional and volitional nexus between God and the human soul? The whole Scholastic movement was rational, or intellectual, which is certainly *a* phase of philosophical activity. They, and they alone,

[8]Prantl, *Gesch. der Logik*, Bd. i, Absch. xi, Anmerk. 125.

incur the censure of the New Apologist who, looking on the philosophy of the thirteenth century as final, consider that the rational or intellectual is *the only* philosophical phase of human activity, to the exclusion of the emotional and volitional. No thinking person to-day would define man as "a rational animal," except, indeed, for the purely didactic purpose of Formal Logic. But, if we do recognise that man is emotional, volitional, endowed with non-rational vital force, that is no reason why we should deny that he *is* rational, or that he can by his reason lay hold of reality, although in an inadequate and imperfect manner.

As a positive, constructive system, the New Apologetic may be said to start with the principle that reality is to be formulated in terms of *action* and not exclusively in terms of *thought*, that, consequently, truth and especially religious truth, is to be expounded and rendered acceptable by an appeal to *facts* and not by an appeal to *principle* alone. M. Blondel's book, *l'Action*, is an elaborate exposition of the method, which may be said to substitute *"Ago, ergo sum"* for the Cartesian *"Cogito, ergo sum."* In the Introduction—and few even among M. Blondel's admirers have succeeded in following his more lengthy exposition in the body of the book—the starting-point is clearly defined as follows: Immediate evidence tells me that *action* is a fact, the most general, the most constant of facts: action is often an obligation, but always a necessity, for as long as we live we must act. Can I determine my actions by my thoughts? No, because I cannot postpone action until I have subjected my thoughts to analysis, or until I have reached a point at which I can think clearly about my action. I must act before my ideas are cleared up. *In every action, therefore, there is implied an act of faith.*[9] Consequently, instead of trying to construct a science based on clear and distinct ideas, as Descartes did, we must endeavor to construct a science of action, since action is more elemental than clear and distinct ideas. But a science must be universal and necessary, in the sense that the reasons which it furnishes must be valid not only for me but also for others, and must, moreover, be above what is merely fortuitous, or accidental, in the action studied. The aim and scope of philosophy must, therefore, be to find in human action universal and necessary forms, not of thought, but of action. Thus does the purpose of philosophy come to be a kind of Kantian quest of action-categories, without a Categorical Imperative on which one can fall back as a refuge from

[9] *L'Action*, pp. viii, ix.

universal criticism: *tout est mis en question, meme de savior s'il y a une question.*[10] In this quest one must beware of the phantoms (*idoles*) imposed on the mind by intellectual formalism. "Nature," "Natural Laws," "Species," "Atom," "Chemical Affinity," are so many delusive shadows that impede, rather than aid, the human mind in its effort to attain the ultimate reality of things. The time has gone by when one could turn to physical and mathematical sciences for assistance. Those sciences have no bearing on philosophy; they cannot conflict with philosophy, they cannot agree with philosophy. Take, for instance, the question of miracles. Is a certain miraculous event a fact? The intellectualist approaches the problem through the (to him) necessary preliminary consideration of Nature's Laws. The New Apologist goes directly to the consideration of the divine-human beauty and spiritual truth of the event. This is, indeed, as M. Blondel himself confesses, like taking refuge behind a canvas of Raphael to escape the merciless sword of the dialectician. The truth is—and this is where the method of the New Apologetic breaks down—that no amount of inner adaptation, need, want or desire (*un besoin intime et comme un appetit imperieux*) can enable one to decide whether an event is or is not a fact. Nay, the more one desires that an event should be a fact the less competent is he to decide whether it is so in reality. What would it avail a Catholic in controversy with a Unitarian to argue that the Catholic interpretation of the Gospel Narrative is emotionally and esthetically richer than the rationalistic interpretation? That which is possible may be merely possible, that which is desirable may be merely desirable: to prove it to be a fact we must go outside the range of subjective experience.

What is new in M. Blondel's method is the articulate expression which it gives to the pragmatic principle: it transfers the center of philosophical enquiry from thought to action. The generic principle of Immanence,—not the transcendental immanence of God in the Universe, but the pyschological immanence of something in us which is attuned to the Divine,—is not by any means new. The *heart, sentiment, instinct, appetitus Dei,* are different names for an immanent faculty by which the mind or the soul is prepared to accept supernatural truth. *Un bon esprit et surtout un coeur droit* are, according to De Bonald, the qualities without which a man is incapable of attaining a knowledge of the higher truths. With voluntarism, or non-rationalism, in that form the intellectualist has no quarrel. God,

[10] *Op, cit.,* p. xxii.

who created reason, is the Author of the emotional and volitional faculties as well, and the latter are in some temperaments more conducive to the attainment of religious truth then the purely intellectual faculties.

When one turns from the New Apologetic to that philosophical tendency which is known in America and England as pragmatism, one finds here as well as in the French movement (1) a protest against the attempt to interpret all reality in terms of intellect, and (2) an insistance on action, conduct or activity-crises, as the center of philosophical enquiry. "The real, whatever it is, is a great deal larger than can be stated in any formula or series of formulas."[11] "Thought and the products of thought are to be interpreted, and, hence, are valid only with reference to certain crises, or tensions, that arise in action."[12] "Our only realities are functional realities. If there are others we know not of them."[13] "The *ultima ratio* of every creed, the *ultima ratio* of truth itself, is that it works."[14] In English-speaking countries the protest against intellectualism has been less acrimonious than in France. In its positive phase, too, pragmatism, among us, has been more moderate in its claims. Mr. C. S. Peirce who first formulated the principle of pragmatism in 1878, writes as recently as April, 1905, that "if the pragmaticist really made Doing the Be-all and the End-all of life, that would be its death. For to say that we live for the mere sake of action, as action, regardless of the thought it carries out, would be to say that there is no such thing as rational purport."[15]

The French School of pragmatism, or the New Apologetic, as it is called, has taken no account of recent American and English pragmatism. It has, however, appealed to the authority of Newman's name, and, as we have seen, enumerated Newman among its "intellectual ancestors." The influence of the great English Tractarian was, indeed, exerted against intellectualism; but it must be remembered that the intellectualism which Newman had in mind was that of the Liberal, not that of the Scholastic. "Resolve to *believe* nothing," he wrote, "and you must prove your proofs and analyze your elements, sinking further and further, and finding 'in the lowest deep a lower

[11] *The Monist*, April, 1905, p. 249.

[12] *Ibid.*

[13] *Ibid.*, p. 256.

[14] *Man's Place in the Cosmos*, (Andrew Seth), pp. 3, 7.

[15] *The Monist*, April, 1905, p. 175.

deep,' till you come to the broad bosom of scepticism." It has been remarked that Newman does not once quote St. Thomas of Aquin, nor does he refer to any treatise of Aristotle's except the *Ethics;* by "intellect" as opposed to "faith," he meant the "wild, living intellect," the "universal solvent." It is true that in the *Grammar of Assent* he questions the validity of the syllogistic process as a means of attaining religious truth, he relegates "paper logic" to the region of mathematical abstractions, and insists that in all ratiocinative processes which have to do with the "real" we must "begin with the individual and let the so-called universal come second." He relies on the Illative Sense and defines Reasoning as "a living, spontaneous energy within us, not an art." But, in all this, Newman is writing from the personal point of view. A recent writer has described him as a "sublime egotist," in the sense that he was not by nature or inclination fitted to found a school, but thought and spoke and wrote from the point of view of one whose own salvation was his chief concern. "Were it not for this voice, speaking so clearly in my conscience and my heart, I should be an atheist, or a pantheist, or a polytheist, when I looked into the world." "Shall I be saved, if I die to-night?" was his ruling thought, the question constantly before his mind.

In so far as the French Apologists have demanded a more general recognition of Newman's influence, they have, it seems to us, done a service to Catholic education, especially to Catholic clerical education. Young men trained in the Scholastic system should be, and the best of them are, capable of appreciating and developing abstract principles and arguments of the dialectical type. Those of them, however, who are trained in the Scholastic method without any supplementary training, are defective in the power to appreciate facts, to apprehend the concrete, to examine a text critically, to perceive the evidential value of historical events, to allow (in their examination of documentary evidence) for the personal factor. The Scholastic age was strong in its understanding of principles, but weak in its appreciation of facts; it excelled in the logical faculty, but was lacking in historic sense. To supply this defect, to develop the mind of the young theologian in the direction of the concrete, there is no writer in English whose influence would be more productive of the desired result than Cardinal Newman. His *Apologia,* his *Grammar of Assent* and his *Essay on the Development of Christian Doctrine* would supply a defect that is inherent in the Scholastic method, but is not necessarily inherent in Catholic theology.

It is not too much to say that many of Newman's admirers among the New Apologists in France have escaped the influence of Newman's moderation, of that sublime serenity of spirit which enabled him even under the stress of the most powerful personal feeling to write with that *just* sense of the meaning of each word which has made him a master and model of English style. No one will question the lucidity of the French prose of the *Annales de Philosophie Chrétienne* under the editorship of Abbé Denis. Still, one feels in reading it, that the word often expresses more than a philosophical writer should feel. Indeed, the point at issue has been so obscured by the introduction of purely personal feeling, and so many hares or controversy have been started without any hope of hunting them down, that one is at a loss to discover what, in simple terms, the New Apologists have in view. One thing is certain: the *Apologie d'immanence* has no future, as a system. It may, as a tendency, be productive of good. The truth is, Intellectualism as applied to Scholastic Philosophy and Theology has never had a fair field in France; it has always been hindered by fideism, traditionalism or Cartesianism, and no matter how much one may approve the aim of the New Apologists one would like to remind them, in all kindness, of Fenélon's saying, "*C'est la raison que nous manque, plus que la foi.*"

William Turner.

ABRAHAM: A HISTORICAL STUDY

Francis E. Gigot, D. D.

The great ancestor of the Hebrews is designated in the Bible under the two names "Abraham" and "Abram," whose exact relation to each other and precise origin are alike unknown. The former: "Abraham" means "the father of a multitude," according to Genesis xvii, 5, where it is connected with the two Hebrew words "abi" (father) and "hamon" (multitude). The latter: "Abram," possibly an earlier form of "Abraham," is a contraction for "Abiram," a fairly common name in ancient Israel. Its traditional meaning is "a lofty father" or "the father is exalted." The name itself, under the form of "Abu-Ramu," appears as a personal name on a Babylonian tablet of the Reign of Apil-Sin (about 2320 B. C.)

According to the account of Genesis, Abram was a son of Thare. He lived in Ur of the Chaldees, a city six miles distant from the right bank of the Euphrates and 125 miles northwest of the Persian Gulf. He had already married Sarai, his half-sister,[1] when, under the guidance of his father, and in company with Lot, his nephew, he left his birthplace to go into the land of Chanaan. His father settled for a while in Haran, some 550 miles northwest of Ur, and died there. After his father's death and in compliance with a divine command, Abram parted from his country and kindred, and accompanied by Lot, entered the land of promise. He was then 75 years old. While traversing the whole country, he built altars to the Lord at Sichem and Bethel, his halting places. In the Negeb, or southern district of Chanaan, he was driven by a famine into Egypt, the granary of the ancient world. Fearing lest the Egyptians should slay him to secure his wife, he said that Sarai was his sister, and in consequence, she was taken by Pharao's order into the royal household, while Abram himself was loaded with presents on her account. At this juncture, divine scourges befell Pharao and his house, so that the Egyptian monarch, summoning Abram, charged him with deception and banished him from Egypt with his wife and all his belongings.[2]

---

[1]Gen. xx, 12.

[2]Gen. xi, 26; xii, 20.

Abram then returned into the land of Chanaan which God had already twice promised him as his possession.[3] Together with Lot he settled in the district of Bethel. But as its pasture-land proved inadequate for his increased flocks and herds and for those of Lot, and as this entailed a dispute between their respective herdsmen, the uncle and the nephew agreed to separate. Availing himself of Abram's unselfish offer Lot chose the richest portion of the land, departed for the lower valley of the Jordan, and settled in Sodom. Abram, on the contrary, remained in the place where a divine promise of the land had been vouchsafed to him, and moved from it only after God renewed for him that glorious prediction, and expressly bade him "arise, walk through the land in the length and in the breadth thereof." His next place of sojourn was under the terebinths of Mambre, near Hebron, where he built an altar to the Lord.[4]

While Abram was encamped there a war broke out in the vicinity. Quite recently, Sodom, with four neighboring towns, Gomorrha, Adama, Seboim, and Bala, had thrown off the yoke of the Elamite dynasty, which then ruled in Babylonia. The revolt was headed by the king of Sodom, and to put it down, the Elamite king, Chodorlahomor, invaded the country with his vassals, and crowned his victorious march with a crushing defeat of the king of Sodom and his allies. The conquerors plundered Sodom and Gomorrha, and then withdrew in the direction of Damascus. Lot was among their captives, and as soon as Abraham heard of this he armed his 318 trained slaves and summoned to his aid the chieftains of the district of Hebron, his Amorrhite confederates. The combined force overtook the victorious kings at Dan, in the north of Chanaan, defeated them in a night attack, and recovered both the captives and the spoil. On his return, Abram was blessed by Melchisedech, the priest-king of Salem, to whom he gave a tenth of the booty, in recognition of his priestly office, while he refused for himself a share of the spoils, and accepted it only for his Amorrhite allies.[5]

But although Abram had thus prospered in peace and in war, he had no son, as Sarai, his wife, was barren. He therefore feared lest his possessions should be inherited by Eliezer, his servant. To reassure him God told him again in a vision that he would have a numerous posterity. Abram believed God, but yet requested a sign. Where-

[3]Gen. xii, 1, 7.
[4]Gen. xiii.
[5]Gen. xiv.

upon he was bidden to offer a sacrifice, and after dividing the victims, to place the several pieces opposite each other. At sunset, he fell into a deep sleep, and then learned the future destiny of his descendants. In the darkness he saw a flame passing between the pieces, whereby God ratified His covenant with him. Thus did the Almighty pledge Himself to give eventually the whole land of Chanaan to Abram's posterity. Gen. XV.

To secure this posterity so solemnly promised, Sarai gave to Abram her handmaid Agar, an Egyptian, who conceived by him. Agar finding herself with child became insolent towards Sarai, who thereupon treated her most harshly. To escape this treatment Agar fled into the desert, and only returned by command of an angel who appeared to her and foretold the child's name and destiny. She bore Ismael to Abram who was then 86 years old.[6]

However dear to the patriarch, this child was not the heir of promise, as Abram was expressly told in a vision granted him thirteen years after Ismael's birth. After bidding him to walk in holiness of life, God declared that He would make him the father of many nations, and He symbolized this by the change of Abram's name into Abraham. He renewed His promise to give him and his seed the land of Chanaan, and invested the practice of circumcision with a religious significance making it the sign of His covenant with the house of Abraham. He also changed the name of Sarai into that of Sara, and distinctly announced that she should bear a son who would be called Isaac, and who would become the head of the covenanted race. The vision over, Abraham lost no time in circumcising himself, his son Ismael, and all the male members of his household.[7]

Subsequently, three celestial visitors,—the Lord and two angels,—appeared to Abraham, as he sat before his seat, by the oaks of Mambre. While they partook of the meal which Sara had prepared for them, the patriarch was assured again that she should bear him a son, despite Sara's laugh of incredulity at the announcement. On their departure Abraham accompanied his guests and received of God the intimation that Sodom and Gomorrha would be destroyed for their wickedness. Then followed his wonderful, but unavailing prayer in behalf of the doomed cities. Sodom and the other towns of the lower valley of the Jordan were consumed by fire, and Abraham had from afar a glimpse of their entire overthrow. However, his nephew, Lot, was

[6]Gen. xvi.
[7]Gen. xvii.

miraculously and safely led out of Sodom, and in his place of refuge begot the two ancestors of the Moabites and the Ammorites.[8]

Abraham next journeyed once more to the south-land or Negeb, and dwelt in Gerara. There the Egyptian episode anent Sara was repeated. To save his life from the jealousy of Abimelech, the king of Gerara, Abraham passed her off as his sister, whereupon she was taken into the royal harem. Her honor was again saved through God's intervention, and Abraham cleared himself of Abimelech's charge of deception by saying that Sara was in fact his half-sister. She was therefore given back to her husband together with substantial presents, and Abraham, as a prophet powerful in his intercession with the Almighty, obtained release for Amibelech and his house from the divine chastisement inflicted upon them on Sara's account.[9]

At the appointed time Sara bore a son to Abraham, who circumcised him on the eighth day and named him Isaac. The patriarch was then 100 years old. Some time later Sara took offence at the sight of Ismael playing with her child and requested Abraham to cast him out with Agar, his mother. To this Abraham agreed only after God had bidden him to do so and had promised, for his sake, to make Ismael the father of a great nation. He then dismissed the bond-woman and her son, giving them a modicum of provision for their journey.[10]

Abraham's prosperity induced Abimelech to seek alliance with him, and Abraham readily consented to it. The covenant, however, was not struck before the well which the king's servants had taken by force,—and which, from the oaths exchanged on the occasion of the covenant, received the name of Bersabee,—had been restored to the patriarch. Abraham lived a considerable time in Philistine territory, encamped near Bersabee.[11]

Next came the supreme trial of Abraham's faith. "The patriarch's only son is now grown into a lad, when he receives the command to offer him to God in sacrifice. Obedient and devoted, he makes the necessary preparations, and betakes himself to the appointed place of sacrifice, resolved to satisfy even this extreme demand. His hand is even raised to slay his son, when he hears the divine voice, clear and distinct, saying that God does not desire the completion of the sacrifice, but is satisfied with the proved willingness of the patriarch

[8]Gen. xviii, xix.
[9]Gen. xx.
[10]Gen. xxi, 1-21.
[11]Gen. xxi, 22-34.

to surrender even his beloved son to Him. The animal which is to be substituted for Isaac stands there ready by Divine Providence, and is offered in his stead. The reward for his perfected obedience is a solemn renewal of all the divine promises hitherto given him. Thus (1) Abraham's faith is triumphantly established in the face of the most severe test of all; (2) his son is a second time granted to his faith, and reserved to become the foundation of the future people of God; (3) above all, in contradistinction to Chanaanite practice, the knowledge that God does not demand human sacrifices, is acquired and secured for all time to come."[12]

The great trial over, Abraham went back to his encampment at Bersabee.[13] Subsequently to this, Sara died at the age of 127 years. She was buried in a place near Hebron, which Abraham had formally purchased as a family burial-ground, from the sons of Heth.[14] As the aged patriarch felt his own days drawing to an end, he caused his trusty steward, Eliezer, to swear that he would not take for wife to Isaac one of the daughters of Chanaan. He also sent him to Haran, where lived Bathuel, the son of Nachor, Abraham's brother. There Eliezer found Rebecca, and brought her back to be Isaac's wife.[15] Finally, shortly before his death Abraham left all his possessions to Isaac, bestowing simply gifts on the children of his secondary wives, and sending them away from their Palestinian home into Arabia. He died at the good old age of 175 years, and his sons Isaac and Ismael buried him beside Sara in Machpelah, near Hebron.[16]

As might be naturally expected, the other writings of the Old Testament refer to most of the events narrated in the book of Genesis concerning Abraham's career. These writings do not aim at giving an account of the life of that great patriarch, and speak of him only occasionally. And yet, when their various references to Abraham are put together, they form a picture of his life and character which agrees closely with that drawn in Gen. xi, 26-xxv, 10, as can be readily seen from the following summary of the particulars to which they allude.

They distinctly mention Abraham's father, Thare,[17] and state that God chose Abram and brought him out of Ur of the Chaldees.[18]

[12]Dillmann, *Comm. on Gensis*, vol. ii, p. 138 sq. (Engl. Transl.).
[13]Gen. xxii.
[14]Gen. xxiii.
[15]Gen. xxiv.
[16]Gen. xxv, 1-10.
[17]Josue xxiv, 2; I Paralip. i, 26.
[18]II Esdras ix, 7.

His two names are given,[19] and the change of "Abram" into "Abraham" is directly ascribed to the Lord.[20] He lived for some time beyond the great river Euphrates, apparently in Haran, wherefrom God took him and led him throughout all the land of Chanaan.[21] God's blessings upon him, upon his race, and upon all the nations of the earth through him are explicitly mentioned.[22] Abraham's seed was multiplied as the dust of the earth and the stars of heaven,[23] and his faith in God's promise was reputed to him unto justice.[24] The covenant whereby the Almighty pledged Himself to give the whole land of Chanaan to the patriarch and his posterity is prominently brought forward.[25] Abraham's beloved sons, Isaac and Ismael, are mentioned by name,[26] and Isaac is expressly said to have been given him by the Almighty.[27] He bore the mark of God's covenant (circumcision) in his flesh,[28] and in his heart was faithful to the Lord.[29] His faithfulness caused him to overcome the severest trials,[30] and thus he proved himself the servant of God,[31] and the worthy father of the Hebrews.[32]

Besides these and similar references to the data of Genesis the other writings of the Old Testament contain several interesting particulars about Abraham. Thus Isai. xxxix, 22, apparently alludes to special tribulations of the great patriarch from which God *redeemed* him; Josue xxiv, 2, informs us that Abraham's father was an idolater; Ecclus. xliv, 21, states that the Lord promised to His faithful servant the possession of the whole country "from the river Euphrates to the ends of the earth;" Ps. civ. 6, 42, speaks of him only as the servant of God, but other passages[33] give him the more glorious title of His friend; Daniel iii, 35, shows that the ancient Jews firmly believed in his power of intercession in their behalf; Ecclus. xliv, 20, declares

[19] I Paralip. i, 27.
[20] II Esdras ix, 7.
[21] Josue xxiv, 3.
[22] See Tobias vi, 22; Isai. li, 2; Ecclesiasticus xliv, 21.
[23] Ecclus. xliv, 22, 23.
[24] I Machabees ii, 52.
[25] I Paralip. xvi, 16; II Paralip. xx, 7; Baruch. ii, 34; II Esdras ix, 8; IV Kings xiii, 23; Psalm civ, 9; Ecclus. xliv, 20; II Machabees i, 2.
[26] I Paralip. i, 28.
[27] I Paralip. i, 34.
[28] Ecclus. xliv, 20.
[29] II Esdras ix, 7.
[30] Ecclus. xliv, 20; II Mach. ii, 52; Judith viii, 22.
[31] Ps. civ, 6, 42.
[32] Isai. li, 2; Ps. xli, 10; Jeremias xxxiii, 26; etc.
[33] II Paralip. xx, 7; Judith viii, 22; Isai. xli, 8; Daniel iii, 35.

that "there was not found the like to him in glory;" and finally, Isai. lxiii, 16, proclaims that Hebrews unfaithful to their calling are disowned by Abraham.

In several respects the books of the New Testament deal with Abraham in the same manner as do the writings of the Old Covenant apart from Genesis. First of all, they do not contain a detailed record of his life. On the other hand, their occasional references to his words and deeds are in constant harmony with the account found in Genesis xi, 26-xxv, 10. Thus the expression "he that is called Abraham" in Heb. xi, 8, while giving the ordinarily received name of the patriarch, suggests that he had another name "Abram"; God's apparition to him in Ur of the Chaldees is mentioned in Acts vii, 2, as is also his sojourn in Haran;[34] it was after his father's death that in compliance with a divine command he moved into the land of Chanaan,[35] not knowing exactly whither he was going;[36] it was through an oath that a covenant was made with him and his race;[37] He became the father of Isaac and Ismael,[38] and through faith was willing to offer up Isaac;[39] the promise of the release of his race from Egypt is distinctly mentioned,[40] as is also the important prediction that in him all nations should be blessed;[41] not only did he believe in God,[42] but his faith was reputed to him unto justice;[43] he is the father of the Jews,[44] and his formal purchase of a family burial-ground is recorded in Acts vii, 16; the incident of Abraham's meeting with Melchisedech is dwelt upon at length in Heb. vii, 4 sqq.; etc. Furthermore, like the writings of the Old Testament distinct from Genesis, those of the New Law speak repeatedly of God as the God of Abraham,[45] and reflect the Jewish belief that none could be considered greater than Abraham,[46] for he enjoys the greatest glory in paradise[47] where he welcomes his children after death into his bosom.[48]

[34]Acts vii, 2, 4.
[35]Acts vii, 4.
[36]Heb. xi, 8.
[37]Luke i, 55, 73.
[38]Gal. iv, 22.
[39]Heb. xi, 17.
[40]Acts vii, 17.
[41]Gal. iii, 8, 14.
[42]Gal. iii, 6; James ii, 23, etc.
[43]Rom. iv, 9.
[44]Mt. iii, 9; John viii, 56; Acts xiii, 26; James ii, 21.
[45]Mt. xxii, 32; Mk. xii, 36; Lk. xx, 37; Acts iii, 33; vii, 32.
[46]John viii, 52, 53, 58, 59.
[47]Lk. xiii, 28.
[48]Lk. xvi, 22, 23.

Side by side with these references to Abraham which are common to the Scriptures of both Testaments, we notice in the sacred writings of the New Covenant other references which stand in the relation of a true religious development with regard to those we have thus far pointed out. As Jesus is the Messias foretold in the Old Testament, so is He the "Seed" of Abraham to Whom the promises truly refer.[49] Again, as He is pre-eminently Abraham's Son,[50] the patriarch's joy on the day of the birth of Christ, the new Isaac, is distinctly mentioned in John viii, 56. Abraham is the spiritual father of all those, whether Jews or Gentiles, who share in his faith,[51] and descent from him through the flesh is of no avail unless the Jews live in a manner worthy of Abraham;[52] such a descent without holiness of life cannot make men children of God.[53] In Abraham's casting out of the bond-woman Agar, and her son Ismael, St. Paul sees a type of what was to happen later to the Law, and to all men remaining under its yoke.[54] Lastly, although Abraham is the ancestor of Christ according to the flesh, yet Jesus, as the true Son of God, existed before, and is far superior to that patriarch.[55]

When we pass from the Biblical account of Abraham's life to the writings which embody the Jewish tradition we find that the latter stand in the same general relation to the former as the Apocryphal Gospels do to our evangelical records: they presuppose the Scriptual data and aim at completing and interpreting them, by means of what is usually a childish and fanciful narrative. Thus from the fact mentioned in Holy Writ that Abraham received God's call in Ur of the Chaldees, and that *ur* in Hebrew meant "flame," the rabbinical story was invented,—a trace of which is still found in St. Jerome's translation of the Sacred Scriptures in II Esdras ix, 7,—that the great partiarch was cast by Nemrod into a fiery furnace from which he was miraculously delivered. The story once framed naturally assumed different forms, all in honor of Abraham and of the God whom he worshipped. Again, to the fact that it is recorded that Abraham went down into Egypt it was added that when there, he disputed with all the Egyptian priests and wise men, winning some to his higher

[49]Gal. iii, 16.
[50]Mt. i, 1.
[51]Gal. iii, 7, 29.
[52]John viii, 39.
[53]Romans ix, 7, 8; John viii, 40, 41.
[54]Gal. iii, 22-31.
[55]John viii, 53, 58.

views of the Godhead, and that he imparted to them the knowledge of arithmetic and astrology. According to one opinion, Abraham obtained the knowledge of the true God when he was only three years old; according to another, when he was ten years of age; while according to another he was already forty years old. The ram to be offered in the place of his son, Isaac, had stood on the mount ready, prepared from the beginning of creation. The facts that Abraham won his great victory over the Eastern kings, near Damascus, and that Eliezer, his servant, was a native of that city, were completed by the story that he came with an army out of the land of Babylon, conquered Damascus and reigned there. In fact, nearly all the incidents of Abraham's life are thus embellished, or, rather, distorted, by marvelous additions. About his death, we have the rabbinical statements that the angel of death had really no power over him, and that the men of his time expressed their grief at his bier, in the following words: "Alas for the ship which has lost its captain! alas for mankind which has lost its leader!"

The Koran and the later Arabic writings contain very little about Abraham that is not derived from either the Bible or the rabbinical sources. But further, what is original in these Arabic documents cannot for a moment claim a right to be considered as of any historical value concerning the venerable ancestor of the Hebrews. This is clearly the case, for instance, with Mohammed's story that Abraham along with Ismael built the Caaba, or holy house of Mecca; with the Koran's statement that the great patriarch went every year as a pilgrim to that city; with the legends that he left his foot-print on the black stone of the temple at Mecca, and bequeathed the religion of Islam to his children, etc. These, and similar narratives are practically of the same order as those which we have referred to above as contained in the so-called Jewish traditions. They all alike prove the utter lack of historical and critical sense on the part of their Oriental authors, and show no less conclusively the superiority of the Biblical account of Abraham's words and deeds and place in the history of Revelation, over such merely human inventions. Hence, one can readily see why critical students of ancient history desirous of securing a judicious estimate of Abraham's life and character have discarded altogether these stories and centered their efforts, during the last century, in duly appreciating the data supplied by our sacred records.

Passing now to the investigations of Modern Criticism, its best ascertained results concerning Abraham's life and character bare (1) on

the sources embodied in Gen. xi, 26-xxv, 10; and (2) on the career of that great patriarch as it comes out of these records.

As regards the first point, critical students of the Old Testament agree generally that the account of Abraham's life given in Gen. xi, 26-xxv, 10, is traceable to three chief sources of information which are usually called the Judean, the Ephraimite, and the Priestly narratives, and which were finally combined by an unknown writer into their present form. The existence of these main documents,—which are commonly denoted by their respective initial letters: J., E., P.,—is rendered antecedently probable by the fact (1) that the author of the book of Genesis lived centuries after the events narrated in Gen. xi, 26-xxv, 10, and therefore necessarily depended on earlier sources of information; and (2) that Hebrew historians usually employed documents for the composition of their works. It is ascertained by a careful examination of the peculiarities of style, vocabulary, mode of representation, etc., which can even now be discovered in the chapters of Genesis which record Abraham's life; for it is admitted, on all hands, that Oriental writers of history are essentially *compilers* or arrangers of pre-existing documents and preserve carefully the various literary features of the excerpts which they combine together to make up a book. In fact, it is this actual combination of different sources in Gen. xi, 26-xxv, 10, which accounts best for most of the difficulties and discrepancies which may be noticed in the present narrative. Only a few instances of this need be given here. The use of different sources explains naturally how in one case,[56] "Ur of the Chaldees" is given as Abraham's own country, while in another,[57] "Haran" is named as such. It accounts naturally also for the twofold narrative of Sara's seizure, once in Egypt,[58] and a second time in Gerara.[59] Again, the number of times that the promises made to Abraham appear in Gen. xi, 26-xxv, 10,—they appear not less than eight times,—"is due to the compilers having selected this as the most conspicuous feature in the narrative of Abraham in each of the sources of tradition. The seemingly strange fact, that the narrative in chapter xvii should take no notice of the mention of the same promise in chapter xv, is at once accounted for when it is seen to be an instance of the manner in which the different narratives overlap one another. The promises,

[56]Gen. xi, 31; see also xi, 28.
[57]Gen. xi, 32; xii, 1.
[58]Gen. xii, 10 sqq.
[59]Gen. xx.

contained in different traditions seemed to the compiler so important in view of the general purpose of his book, that, at the risk of considerable repetition, he has incorporated them all."[60]

As regards the manner in which Abraham's life and character are appreciated by most critical students of the sources embodied in Gen. xi, 26-xxv, 10, it may be described as conservative in its general tenor. At the present day, but few scholars venture to regard the great patriarch as a pure mythical creation, or as an impersonation of a Semitic tribe. Modern criticism distinctly feels that for such bold assertions there is no real ground in the sources imbedded in Abraham's life as told in Genesis; that, on the contrary, these sources when carefully studied afford material evidence—even apart from the inspired character of the narrative,—for the views that Abraham was a historical person, with a definitely marked religious character. The following are the principal reasons for regarding the Judean and Ephraimite as historical narratives, which, although they exhibit a picture of Abraham somewhat idealized, contain trustworthy information concerning him. Their variations with regard to certain details tend to confirm their reliability as to the main features of Abraham's life upon which they agree. Again, the supernatural occurrences which they record are marked by great sobriety of statement and representation, and thus stand in the strongest contrast with the fantastic extravagances of the Jewish and Arabic stories of a later date. Throughout their description of natural events, they are truthful to Eastern life even in modern times, and constantly set forth the facts of Abraham's career as moving on by the orderly sequence of natural cause and effect. Abraham remains, from the beginning to the end of his life, a wandering sheik, whose name is a distinctly personal name, and whose character is sketched with both its moral good traits and its blemishes. Besides these, three other important remarks go far, in the eyes of most modern critics, to show that the narrative of Abraham's life in Gen. xi, 26-xxv, 10, contains a substantially correct picture of his career: (1) the history of religion shows that a great religious advance such as Genesis said was made by Abraham, has always an individual character and experience as its starting point; (2) the documents embodied in Genesis agree in setting forth as the divine purpose that Abraham shall provisionally take possession of the land of Chanaan, yet they never represent him

[60]H. E. Ryle, in *Hastings Dict. of the Bible*, vol. i, p. 15.

as actually possessing the whole: Abraham dwells in the South, pasturing alternately in very limited districts. Now, if the patriarch had never lived in Chanaan, if his abode there and his very personality had belonged merely to the realm of legend, it might have been confidently expected that later legends would have provided a firmer and more lasting foundation for the Israelite's claim to the whole land than this mere partial possession by their great ancestor; (3) had not positive historical recollections forbidden it to do so, Israelite tradition would have naturally concentrated all the glory of founding the national Church and State upon Moses. Now since, in spite of the great deliverance undoubtedly achieved by Moses, Hebrew tradition nevertheless goes back of him, and finds in Abraham the primary source not only of the possession of the land, but also of the people's higher worship of God, this can be reasonably accounted for only by the assumption that memory had retained a hold of the actual course of events.[61]

The foregoing survey of our various sources of information concerning Abraham suggests a few important conclusions.

In the first place, despite the undeniable fact that some of these sources contain much of the legendary and fictitious, yet they all presuppose a great patriarch whose actual life and individual features have supplied matter for history and legend.

In the second place, the source which affords most, and also best historical information, is, as might be well expected, the oldest which has come down to us, viz.: Gen. xi, 26-xxv, 10.

Lastly, modern criticism far from doing away with the historical character of Abraham, has rather confirmed it by showing that our oldest source of information is based on earlier documents which it has faithfully transmitted with their varying particulars of style and representation.

Francis E. Gigot.

[61]See Driver, *Commentary on Genesis*, p. xlvii.

LUCIAN OF SAMOSATA AND THE ASIATIC AND SYRIAN CHRISTIANITY OF HIS TIMES

Ernesto Buonaiuti, D. D.

In the following study, we propose to analyze the ideas and attitude of Lucian, with reference to the events, currents of thought and social conditions of his times. Hence, after making a rapid survey of the writings of the Christian Fathers who were his contemporaries, especially the Asiatic and Syrian ones, we propose to determine the limits of his real aversion to Christianity, and to examine the psychological reasons thereof. A patient examination of the Dialogues in which the rhetor of Antioch has exhautsed the hilarious and petulant humor of decadent paganism, causes us to suspect that the difference between his ideas (we are not speaking here of his morals) and those of the Syrian Christians of the end of the II century, are not so deep nor so wide as has been commonly supposed.[1] Our essay, therefore, is not of a character exclusively critico-literary. We are

[1]Some of his Dialoaues (amongst others *De Morte Peregrini*) were placed on the Index by Alexander VII in 1664, but were afterwards taken off. We wish here simply to give a basis for estimating the very summary and rather superficial judgment which Harnack has pronounced upon the works of Lucian in general and upon *De Morte Peregrini* in particular: "In *Peregrinus* Lucian has overwhelmed the Cynics with the bitterest scorn, whereas he has shielded the Christians. . . . His motive, however, as is quite evident, is far from being a friendly one. But it is significant that he treats them not as swindlers, not as lawbreakers, not as revolutionaries, but as blind believers, capable of becoming enthusiasts for self-sacrifice and for the common good. The one word "Sophist" as applied to Christ has sufficed, in the eyes of posterity, to stamp Lucian as a blasphemer not to be trusted even in the reports wherein he, as an historian, bears witness to the purity of Christian life and customs." See *Realencyklopadie*, vol. xi, p. 665. Cf. Freppel, *Les Apologistes*, vol. ii. Cotterill, in his *Peregrinus Proteus*, Edinburgh, 1879, has attributed *De Morte Peregrini* to a forger of the V century. But his opinion was never followed up. H. Kestner, in his *De Agape*, Jena, 1819, wrote concerning the conversion of Lucian, but his arguments are not very conclusive. Others (such as Scholaste and Volateranus) have said that Lucian was an apostate. Bernays, in his *Lucian und die Kyniker*, Berlin, 1879, has maintained that *De Morte Peregrini* was directed solely against the Cynics. This thesis is demonstrably one-sided. Cf. the article by L. Tonetti, "Il *Peregrinus* di Luciano e i christiani del suo tempo" in the *Miscellanea di St. e Cult. Eccl.*, for Dec. 1904, pp. 72-84.

not here concerned to know just what degree of historical reality must be attributed to the protagonist of *De Morte Peregrini*, nor to determine what verisimilitude there may be in the rare notes left by the Epicurean dialogist concerning the organization of the Christians; neither shall we ask what personal relations Lucian may have had with the religious community from which there went forth one day to Rome and to martyrdom Ignatius the Bishop; nor shall we inquire which were spurious and which authentic amongst the Dialogues.[2] Our essay, on the contrary, is of an historico-psychological character; and, presupposing the solution of all these critical problems, we put the question: Concerning the character of Lucian in his social and intellectual surroundings, do we not notice at the bottom of the spirit of this sceptical scouter of religious beliefs, an affinity with the Christians ridiculed by him; an affinity which was arrested in its natural evolution only by exterior circumstances? And again, can we not verify here, the oft-occurring moral paradox by which individuals, working under the most diverse circumstances, may conceive of life under aspects substantially parallel? Let us endeavor to get a clear notion of the problem, which is liable to be misunderstood: we do not say that Lucian had once been Christian, or that he became one in later life; upon this obscene author, who, with sarcasm upon his lips, and not a ray of ideality regarding the future, seems to lean over the open tomb of the old world and to croon over it the most idle of funereal chants, surely the Good Tidings never took any hold, but fell as amongst the thorns of the Gospel parable; still, under these thorns, thick as they were by nature, and doubtless forced into an exuberant growth by a mistaken education, did there not lie a magnificent soil, eager to be dug by some beneficent husbandman? This is the case of conscience which we propose to resolve from the pages of a writer who, eighteen hundred years ago, constructed the caricature of the world about him: a world that had, in those times been slowly disintegrated by the new spirit of the Christian life. This research seems to us interesting, because all critical inquiries are vain which do not strive to resolve problems of the soul and attitudes of thought.

[2]The traditional judgments on Lucian have always been of an extreme severity. Prescinding from the examinations instituted by modern writers, amongst whom we must number Voltaire, it will suffice to recall the long-standing contempt which has obscured the figure of Lucian, from the time of Suidas, who called him a blasphemer, down to the anonymous vituperation of the mediæval Mss., which abound in marginal exclamations of: accursed Lucian . . . impious . . . execrable. . . . Cf. Martha, *Les Moralistes sous l'Empire Romain*, Paris, Hachette, 1881.

First of all, a few biographical notes. Lucian was born at Samosata towards the year 120. As a boy he was sent by his father to study sculpture with a relative. Then he became a lawyer, practicing his profession in the courts of Antioch, and displaying the brilliant and eccentric qualities of his genius. But he abandoned his legal career in order to follow that of rhetor and sophist. He travelled throughout Asia, Greece, Gaul and Italy, delivering his entertaining discourses and his poisonous declamations. About his fortieth year, impatient of routine, he renounced this frivolous, though popular art, and became engrossed in the delicate questions of his time; and, at Athens, followed, amongst others, the lessons of the philosopher Demonax—but merely as a dillettante and a "superman," ready to seize upon the contradictions of his masters, and to deride the differences between their theories and their practices. Caressed by polite society and applauded by all the malcontents of the great cities under the Roman dominion, he was appointed by Marcus Aurelius, about the year 180, through clever political play, to the administration of a part of Egypt. He profited by his position to enrich himself. Pursued by the accusations of his subjects, he defended himself in an Apologia; and died about the year 200.[3] As fruits of his literary activity, there remain a large number of Dialogues, written in the purest Hellenic tongue, not very deep, but always racy of the liveliest satire.[4]

The life of Lucian falls within that period of the Roman Empire in which it seems as if the destinies of the Roman fatherland must flourish anew, under the wise and energetic government of the Antonini. And the most intense period of his activity coincides with the long reign of Marcus Aurelius (161-180), who, bringing to the throne the rigid doctrine of the Stoa, seemed to wish to prove what were the limits of the powers of the human mind, when abandoned to its own unaided strength, and how poor they were in point of practicability and efficaciousness, when compared to the forces of the Christian propaganda. The contemporaneous existence of the only sane philosopher among the Emperors, and of the most atrocious scoffer of philosophy and of the gods, that Paganism

[3]Cf. M. Croiset: *Essai sur la vie et les œuvres de Lucien*, Paris, Hachette, 1882; Planck, *Lucianus und das Christentum.* (Stud. u. Krit, 1851, Part IV.)

[4]The edition of Lucian which we have used is that of Dindorf, in Didot's collection, which gives the Greek text with Latin translations, and in which the spurious works are carefully pointed out.

has ever produced, must not be lost sight of; for it throws a flash of light upon the innermost texture of the empire, to discover that the philosopher-emperor elevated Lucian to a high beaurocratic dignity, and that the author of *Piscator* and *Nigrinus* indulged in such heartless sarcasm, during the very reign of him who had changed the purple into the rough mantle of the Stoic, and had learned from philosophers the art of government.[5] In the mind of Marcus Aurelius, the pagan faith was tempered by a mystical veil of fatalism, and the poverty of moral criteria was compensated by an exquisite nobility of conscience: "Thou shalt work and think and speak as if thou wert immediately to depart from this life. If the gods exist, thou shalt by no means fear death; for they will not abandon thee to misfortune; if, on the other hand, they do not exist, or do not watch over the affairs of men, what boots it to me to live in a world devoid of divinity and of providence? But they do indeed exist, and do care for human things: and they entrust to the power of man the task of delivering himself from real evils. . . . Death and life, honor and ignominy, pain and pleasure, riches and poverty, all these befall indifferently the just and the unjust, because they are things neither honorable nor dishonorable, and therefore neither good nor bad."[6] The philosophy which Marcus Aurelius endeavored to reconcile with the Roman aristocratic tradition, if it may for a time seduce us by the quiet serenity of its formulas, cannot deceive us as to its fundamental character, so essentially and mistrustful of all novelty in the domain of the government and of life, both civil and religious.[7] And therefore it is of the most singular interest to note that, in the fierce struggle in defence of the whole classical patrimony both moral and theological, Lucian and the Christians are found to agree. The arms used in this battle, and the limits of the opposition, the positive ideas of reconstruction, ethical

[5] *Pensées*, Didot's edit.: "A Frontone didici intelligere, qualis sit tyrannorum et invidentia et versutia et simulatio: studiosi, et, ut opinantur, ex philosophiæ prescriptis negotia gerentes homunciones! Quam plena muco! Mi homo, quid tandem? Fac quod nunc natura abs te postulat. Aggredere rem, si tibi datur, neque circumspice, an quis cogniturus sit; et noli sperare Platonis rempublicam, sed sufficiat tibi, si vel minimum res procedit, et cogita, hunc ipsum eventum non parvi quid esse. Decreta enim eorum quis mutare potest? Sine horum mutatione, quid aliud, quam servitus ingemiscentium et persuasum habere simulantium? . . . Simplex est et verecundum philosophiæ opus: noli me ad fastum, gravitate tectum, abducere."

[6] ii, 11.

[7] ix, 29: "Torrens est rerum omnium natura: omnia rapit. Quam viles quoque civilis peritiæ."

and social, are, of course, diverse in the one and in the others: but, in the negative aspect of a critique irreconcilable to the organization of the Roman world, the identity is complete, and reveals to us an affinity of spirit worthy to be taken into consideration.

* * *

The arguments which Lucian unfolds in his numerous Dialogues (nearly one hundred) are of the most diverse: from the fine discussions of the gods, to the most immoral extravagances of the fifteen Ἑταιρικοὶ Διάλογοι. A detailed study of these same might lead to brilliant observations on the diverse ways of conceiving and relishing satire in the II and XX centuries. There were three themes upon which Lucian loved especially to exercise his sarcasm: against the gods, against the philosophers and against the social conditions of his times. Against the mythological gods he did not make war in the name of a complex system of metaphysics, like that of Seneca or Lucretius; nor did he stimulate the facile and foolish petulance of the people, as did Aristophanes. He despoiled of their literary dress, the beautiful traditions which, sung in verse, had excited the enthusiasm of the older Greeks and Romans, and presented them in a species of prose both simple and at the same time full of underlying meaning. In order to exhibit the ridiculous absurdity of the polytheistic theology, he refrained from sapient argumentation and from the creation of grotesque situations: but he exposed mythological episodes with candor and fidelity, in such a way that the intrinsic and ridiculous folly thereof became visible at a glance. Martha has well said: "He adopted the procedure of those politicians who, in order to cast discredit upon a monarch, made common news of the *chronique scandaleuse* of the palace. Lucian was the Saint-Simon of the court of Jove."[8] Here, for example, are two fragments of celestial dialogues:

VULCAN—What have I to do, Jupiter? For I am come, as you ordered me, with my sharpest axe—sharp enough to cut through a stone at one stroke.

JUPITER—Well done, Vulcan; now bring it down hard so as to split my head in two.

VULCAN—Do you take me for a madman? Order, pray, anything else which you want done to you.

---

[8] *Op. cit.*, p. 345.

JUPITER—Only this and nothing else—to have my skull split open. If you disobey me, it will not be your first experience of my anger. But really you must come down with all your strength, and that without delay; for I am simply dying with the pain which racks my poor brain terribly.

VULCAN—Take care, Jupiter, that we do no mischief; for the axe is sharp. . . .

JUPITER—Come now, bring it down boldly, Vulcan; I know what is best.

VULCAN—I shall do so but unwillingly; for what is not to be done when you command it? Ha! what's this? An armed virgin! Surely you did have a mighty pain in your head, Jupiter.[9] . . .

And a little further on:

NEPTUNE—May one speak with Jupiter just now, Mercury?

MERCURY—By no means, Neptune.

NEPTUNE—At all events tell him I am here.

MERCURY—Don't bother him, I tell you; for it is not a convenient moment for you to see him at present.

NEPTUNE—Is he with Juno?

MERCURY—No, it is quite another affair.

NEPTUNE—I understand: Gannymede is with him.

MERCURY—Not that either. He is rather indisposed.

NEPTUNE—How is this, Mercury? For this is alarming news.

MERCURY—I am ashamed to tell it, such is its nature.

NEPTUNE—But you should not be ashamed to tell me, your uncle.

MERCURY—He has just now been brought to bed, Neptune.[10]

Thus, Lucian, with a mocking laugh, destroys, as he explains them in the simplest of prose, the amiable fancies of his Hellenic forbears. Far more aggressive is Lucian's tone when he wishes to cast discredit upon philosophers, whom, by the way, he is always careful to distinguish from philosophy itself. Here his satire suffers no longer any restraint, and he exhausts all his resources in order to deter the cultivated and elegant society whom he diverted by his writings, from following the masters who were then opening schools in all the large cities of the empire. In his *Eunuchus*, he imagines a dispute between two philosophers, Diocles and Bagoas, each trying to get possession of a body of students, and, because the latter is a

[9] *Dial. Deorum.* viii.

[10] *Dial. Deorum*, ix.

eunuch, the competitor hales him before the courts in order to prove that, according to the law, it is not proper to confide youths to him for instruction. In his *Hermotimos sive de Sectis*, he demonstrates the impossibility of embracing one opinion rather than another, when good arguments are wanting and the lives of the philosophers belonging to the various schools are always stained with vices.[11] Here, too, he describes with evident satisfaction, a philosopher who, not having received from his pupil the fee agreed upon, violently drags the latter before the court of justice.[12] In his *Convivium*, he describes a philosophical discussion which degenerates into a fight.[13] Finally, in his *Piscator vel Reviviscentes*, he imagines a court of philosophers who sit in judgment upon himself for his anti-philosophical mania. The culprit defends himself by distinguishing between the noble philosophers who are judging him and those who are philosophers only in name and whom he has persecuted with his irony.[14]

[11]Audiebam quoque omnes dicere, Epicureos quidem delicatos esse et voluptarios; peripateticos vero divitiarum amantes et contentiosos; platonicos denique inflatos gloriaeque cupidos. Edit. Dindorf, p. 214.

[12]The masters of philosophy in the free schools were paid directly by the scholars. Vid. Boissier, *La fin du Paganisme*, vol. ii. "Illum ipsum quum mercedem puto in tempore non solveret, rapuit nuper ad magistratum, obtorto collo, vociferans et irarum plenus, et nisi familiarium quidam eripuissent ipsius manibus juvenem, crede mihi, correptum morsu nasum homini abstulisset senex: adeo indignabatur." Edit. cit., p. 211.

[13]Heri in coena apud Aristænetum, (dixit) philosophos quosdam sermones habuisse, et contentionem non parvam super iis ortam, ac si non mentita est Charinus, ad vulnera usque rem processisse, ac tandem sanguine dissolutam disputationem. Edit. cit., p. 321.

[14]Quem vero viderem multos non amore philosophiæ captos, sed sola, quæ ab illo negotio sperari potest, gloria ductos, promptis istis et palam gestis, quæ imitari unicuique facile est, satis bene referre viros bonos, barbam dico incessum et amictum; vita vero et actionibus contradicere habitui, et contraria vestris studia habere, dignitatemque professionis corrpumere, indignabar equidem; videbaturque mihi negotium illi simile, si quis actor tragicus mollis ipse atque effeminatus, Achillem aut Thesea ut ipsum Herculem agens, neque incessu utatur neque voce heroica, sed sub tanta persona fractas delicias faciat; quem neque Helena quondam, neque Polyxena ferret ultra modum sibi similem; nedum ille decorus victoriis Hercules, qui videtur mihi mox eum ipsa persona actorem talem sua clava elisurus, a quo ignominiose adeo in feminam fractus esset. Huic trioniæ turpitudinem, simios hosce heroum personas induere ausos, et Cumanum illum asinum imitari: qui leoninam indutus, postulabat ipse leo esse, quum apud ignaros eius rei Cumanos asperos terribilisque ruditus ederet, donec illum peregrinus, qui et leonem sæpe et asinum vidisset, redargueret, et fustibus dolatum abigeret. Præter cetera vero indignum hoc mihi, O Philosophia, videbatur quod nemo non hominum, si quem horum prave aut indecore aut libidinose quicquam facere videret, ipsam statim philosophiam accusaret, et Chrysippum aut Platonem aut Pythagoram, aut cujuscumque se cognomine peccator ille ferret, disputationesque imitaretur. Itaque ob male illo vivente, male de vobis

Under the convenient guise of the writer of dialogues, Lucian, while never posing as a social reformer or as a champion of the rights of the humble, nevertheless shows constantly that he deplored the too strongly marked economic differences which he saw all about him, and that he dreamed of a judicial state of things, under which conditions of life less harsh and degrading might be afforded to the suffering people. Lucian, of course, did not offer any program of civil redemption, neither did he incite the crowds to rebellion: he wrote for the upper classes, to whom he dispensed with a generous hand subjects for laughter and for solace: the people in the street never had him with them, and never succeeded in stirring up within his superficial and merry soul any effective sense of pity. Precisely on this account, the calculated extravagances in which Lucian, usually under some paradoxical and hilarious form, treats of social conditions as he saw them on all sides, take on a great significance, and show, better than any other of his writings, the profound character and quick sympathy of the writer. All the more so, as we have often noted the psychological fact that, when certain men are elevated by their genius to a position and a social order to which they were not born, while they, of course, wish to establish themselves firmly in their surroundings, nevertheless, they delight in assuming in that state certain attitudes quite at variance with it. Lucian's idea of society is full of pessimism: "Videtur mihi hominum vita pompæ cuiusdam longæ similitudinem habere; administrare vero atque ordinare singula, fortuna, diversos ac varios pompam ducentibus habitus attribuens: hunc enim oblatum, si fors fert regali cultu instruxit, tiara imposita, satellitibus additis et capite diademate coronato:

---

coniectabant, olim mortuis: neque enim ad vos viventes exigebatur, sed vos discesseratisse medio; illum vero aperte videbant omnes indigne et inhoneste se gerentem. Ita quasi disserto vos vadimonio cum illo damnati, et in simile cum illo crimine pertracti estis. . . . Eo usque unusquisque eorum amicus est, quoad argentum vel aurum in medio positum non fuerit; si quis vero obolum unum ostenderit, ilicet rupta pax, ut nec jam foederi locus, nec præconi sit securitas: libri deleti, fugit virtus, cuius rei simile quiddam usu venit canibus: quis os in medios illos projecerit, exsiliunt, mordent invicem; eumque qui os præcipuit, allatrant. Dicitur autem res aliquis Aegyptius simios quondam docuisse saltare pyrricham, easque bestias (facillime autem humanas imitantur actiones) didicisse celeriter, et saltasse in vestibus purpureis, et personatas, diuque probatum spectaculum: donec spectator aliquis festivus, qui nuces sinu gereret, proficeret eas in medium: tum vero simii, visa re, obliti saltationis, repente pro pyrrichistis, simii, quod erant scilicet, facti, larvas contrivere, laceratisque vestibus, de fructibus invicem repugnarunt: illa autem pyrriches institutio dissoluta est risui spectatoribus. Talia igitur hi quoque faciunt. Edit, cit., vx, 31, p. 163.

alteri servilem schemam circumdedit: alium quemdam formæ decore ornavit: illum deformem ac ridiculum finxit: ex omnigenis enim puto, formis decet componi hoc spectaculum. Sæpe vero per mediam pompam immutare solet nonnullorum habitum, haud sinens ad finem usque pompæ interesse quo collocati fuerant ordine: atque adeo detracto priore vestitu Croesum coegit servi captivique ornatum suscipere; Macandrio contra, qui hactenus in pompa erat immixtus, Polycratis tyrannidem induit, eoque ad aliquod tempus permisit uti habitu. Verum ubi pompæ tempus præteriit, tunc unusquisque, reddito ornatu exutoque habitu cum corpore, qualis erat ante, fit, nihil ab alio quolibet diversus.[15] But the contrast which most sharply struck the observant mind of Lucian was the difference of the classes, the economic abyss which divided society into two antagonistic groups. He puts into the mouth of a priest of Saturn a protest against this intolerable state of things; and, considering the difficulties of life, he seems to pray that the fabulous times of Saturn may return once more to revive the waning powers of the human race: that all things may become common, and that it be no longer licit for one man to have unlimited enjoyment whilst the other is in the agonies of starvation.[16] Inequality dominates the world: you must be either an ant or a camel, says the proverb.[17] Humanity seems to go lame, because she has one foot shod and the other bare. But, beyond the platonic desire to restore communism upon earth, Lucian has no practical notion; he does not court reform, neither does he favor any compensation for conditions so arbitrarily heterogeneous. He places

[15] *Menippus* sive *Oraculum Mortuorum Consultum*. Edit. cit., p. 125.

[16] Hæc nos maxime, Saturne, angunt, et rem esse intolerabilem arbitramur; istum quidem jacentem in purpura tot in bonis delicias agere, ructantem, et beatum prædicari a familiaribus, perpetuos dies festos agentem: me vero ac mei similes hoc ipsum per quietem etiam et in somnis curare sicunde quatuor confieri possint aboli, ut pane certe aut pulse oppleti, adhibito nasturtii aut porri aut cepæ obsonio, ire cubitum queamus. Aut igitur immuta, Saturne, et reduc ad æqualitatem, aut, quod extremum est, ipsis, illis divitibus impera ne soli fruantur bonis illis, sed de tot modiis auri chocuicem certe in nos omnes spargant: de vestibus autem tantum, quantum a tineis corrodatur, ægre non ferant; hæc ergo omnino non peritura, et quæ futurum sit ut corrumpantur a tempore, nobis uti dent induenda potuit, quam in arcis ac cistis multo situ computrescant. *Saturnalia*, Edit. cit., p. 715.

[17] Ib. c. xix. Decebat te, Saturne optime, sublata prius illa inæqualitate, bonis in medio omnium positis, deinde imperare dies festos. Ut vero nunc habemus, formica aut camelus, ait proverbium. Quin tu tragicum mihi actorem cogita, altero quidem pede alte calceatum quales sunt cothurni tragici: alter vero eius pes discalceatus sit. Eo igitur habitu si ingrediatur, vides necesse illi esse ut modo excelsus sit, modo humilis, prout hoc vel illo pede procedat. Tanta est etiam in vita nostra inæqualitas.

the reward of the humble and the punishment of the rich beyond the tomb, imagining that the latter will be transformed into asses and the former into drivers.[18] In this life, however, the rich bethink themselves to succour the poor, since without these latter, their pomp and luxury would be useless and inglorious because deprived of spectators. They offer food to the indigent, because otherwise these latter would go and get food for themselves; in short, they make to themselves friends of those who might become terrible enemies.[19] When Lucian wrote these things, during the severe reign of the Antonini, there was in the air a thin veil of mysticism, and philanthropy was all the fashion.[20] But philanthropic sentiments, when they are not upheld by a broad and tolerant doctrine, when not accompanied by an upright ethical conscience, when not founded on deep religious faith, are, as a rule, but a deception of self-love and a cloak to egotism. Although Lucian exempts himself from a detailed study of the causes of social troubles, he nevertheless goes very deep into the problem, reveals the gravity of it, and carefully examines the more general lines and solvable questions thereof. In this matter he occupies a singular place amongst the writers and thinkers of his times. Under the smiling placidity of his sardonic speech there lurks an ill-repressed hatred of the Roman social order and its forms. In his *Nigrinus*, for example, he establishes a comparison between Rome and Athens,

[18]Quandoquidem multa et iniusta divites perpetrant in vita, rapiendo, vim inferendo, omnibusque modis pauperes despicatui habendo, visum est senatui Populoque, ut quum obierint, eorum corpora pœnas subeant non secus atque aliorum improborum: animas autem sursus remissas in vitam demergi in asinos, usque dum in tali statu transegerint bis centum et quinquaginta millia annorum, asinis prognati, onera ferentes, atque a pauperibus acti: exinde demum ut liceat ipsis mori. . . . Philippum quidem macedonem quando contemplabar, plane me continere non poteram: scilicet ministrabatur mihi in angulo quodam mercede resarcians attritos calceos. Multos præterea alios videre licebat in triviis stipem petentes, Xerxes, inquam, Darios et Polycratas. *Menippus*, Edit. cit., p. 127.

[19]Saturnus divitibus salutem. Interrogabo vos, si clausis oculis incederent pauperes, nonne vobis id molestum esset? non habentibus nempe quibus ostenderetis vestes purpureas, et pedissequorum turbam, aut magnitudinem anulorum. Omitto dicere fieri non posse quin insidiæ et odia contra vos concipiant pauperes, si vivere in deliciis soli velitis. Quæ enim se vota contra vos facturos minantur, abominanda sunt: et absit ut in necessitatem vovendi talia deveniant: nam neque farcimen tum gustabilis neque placentam, nisi si quid forte canis reliquerit: lenticula vobis saperdæ tabem habebit; aper et cervus interea dum assuantr, fugam de culina meditabantur in saltum; et gallinæ, ilicet, contentis alis etiam implumes ad ipsos pauperes avolabunt, &c. *Saturnalia*. Cf. Guignebert: *Tertullien. Etude sur les sentiments a l'égard de l'empire et de la société civile*. Paris, Leroux, 1901.

[20]Cf. Pliny the Younger. *Ep.* ix, 30.

anything but flattering to the capital of the empire, which he describes as the throne of vice and of luxury, of unnamable corruption and of fraud. In another dialogue,[21] a young girl refuses her favors to a soldier: "At impiatus homo es, stillavitque in te sanguis de capite barbari, quod ferebas in sarissa. Deinde talem ego hominem amem? Absit hoc, O Gratiæ, Nihil enim hic homo carnifice melior."

Meanwhile, what did the Christians of *his native land* think of all these questions?[22]

Lucian speaks but rarely of them. In his *Alexander*, narrating an uprising of the people, he reports a cry in which are strangely coupled these two antithetical terms: "Foras Christianos, foras Epicureos!" In the same dialogue, he informs us incidentally that: "Atheis atque Christianis plenus erat Pontus." Finally, in his *De Morte Peregrini*, summing up all the episodes in the story of this semi-legendary personage, he exposes what was, doubtless, the common opinion concerning the new religion; and, while recognizing the virtue, the righteousness, the spirit of abnegation and of brotherly love thereof, he concludes: "Bona cuncta pariter contemnunt, et arbitrantur communia, de idoneo nullo et exacto argumento recepta hac doctrina." The generic manner in which Lucian speaks of the Christians, the error into which he falls in describing their organization and their duties, the confusion which he allows between them and certain philosophical schools, all go to show that he had no precise information concerning them, and that he spoke according to the commonly received ideas.[23]

The sources of information concerning the social and scientific ideals of the Christians of Asia in the II century, are not very copious. But, fragments of apologetic writings, some small ascetical works, a few acts of martyrs, suffice to indicate that, between the characters described by Lucian in the above mentioned work, and the Christian doctrine of the time, there are many points of affinity. We need

[21]One of the Ἑταιρικοὶ Διάλογοι.

[22]Within this geographical limitation, we do not intend to consider the general doctrine of the Church concerning property and wealth, but only the ideas prevalent in Syria and Asia.

[23]Tonetti (in the article quoted above) expresses the opinion that the prototype of Peregrinus Proteus was furnished by the Montanists. To tell the truth, the characters described do not seem to warrant such an assumption: the less so, as that Montanism is a state of exaltation of mind, rather than a heresy or sect: and all the faithful of Asia in the II century were slightly Montanistic, at least enough so to have inspired in Lucian's mind the type which he describes of a Christian enthusiast desirous of martyrdom.

hardly insist upon their common contempt of the gods. The whole life of a Christian was a standing protest against polytheism, much more efficacious and significant than mere sarcasm. As against the Greek philosophers we have the burning words of all the apologists whose works have survived and come down to us. Tatian, who was of Syrian nationality,[24] points out the weaknesses of the Aristotelian doctrine concerning human happiness, and does it in terms which are often very ironical.[25] Erusia, whose nationality, by reason of the differences of the extrinsic arguments, is uncertain, but who, by reason of the internal character of his writings, seems to come from Syria,[26] and who, without doubt belongs to the II or III century, exposes very fully and brilliantly, in his "Irrisio Gentilium Philosophorum," the contradictions of the various systems, concluding as follows: "Hæc itaque enarravi, ut contrarietatem, quæ in eorum est opinionibus patefacerem, et inquisitionem rerum quam suscipiunt, vagari, et nullo termino contineri, eorumque finem esse inexplicabilem atque inutilem: quippe qui nulla re evidenti et oratione perspicua confirmetur.[27]" These Syrian Christian writers are, moreover, distrustful of the speculative and systematic forms of the Greeks, and do not like, in their demonstrations, to make use of dialectical arguments borrowed from the school of rationalistic speculation. Theophilos, seventh Bishop of Antioch,[28] a contemporary of Lucian, writes:[29] "Sed si dicas: Ostende mihi Deum tuum, dicam tibi: ostende hominem tuum et ergo tibi ostendam Deum meum. Proinde ostende an oculi mentis tuæ videant, et aures cordis tui audiant. Quemadmodum enim, qui vident oculis corporis, perspiciunt quæ in hac vita terrena peraguntur, ac ea quæ inter se differunt explorant, lucem et tenebras, album et nigrum, deforme et formosum, concinnum et inconcinnum, apte dimensum et inepte, partibus excedens et mutilum; quod idem etiam de iis dicendum, quæ sub aures cadunt, acutis sonis aut gravibus aut jucundis: ita etiam se habent aures cordis et oculi mentis, ut Deum videre possint. Videtur enim Deus ab his qui eum videre possunt, siquidem oculos mentis apertos habent. Omnes enim habent

[24]Clem. A. *Strom.* iii, 12, 81. Epiph. *Hær*, 46, i, Cf. Bardenhewer. *Patrologia*, p. 73.

[25]*Apol.* c. ii, in Migne's *P. G.*, v.

[26]V. Intr. to the German translation by Leitl; Kæmptem, 1873.

[27]Cf. *A. Harnack, Gesch. d. altchristl. Lit.*, i, 182, H. Diel's edit., *Doxographi Græci*, Berlin' 1879.

[28]Eus. *Hist. Eccl.* iv, 20.

[29]*Libri ad Antolicum*, i, 2 et seq.

oculos, sed quidam caligine suffusos, ac solis lucem non videntes. Neque ex eo quod cæci non videant, ideirco lux solis non lucet, sed sibi ipsis assignent et suis oculis. Sic et tu mentis tuæ oculos caligine suffusos habes, ob peccata et malas actiones tuas. . . . Ut speculum renidens, ita animam hominis puram esse decet. Cum igitur aerugo in speculo extiterit, non potest hominis vultus in speculo conspici: ita cum peccatum in homine fuerit, non potest quisquam huiusmodi Deum videre. Ostende igitur teipsum an non mœchus sis, an non scortator, an non fur, an non prædo, an non spoliator, an non puerorum stuprator, an non contumeliosus, an non maledicus, an non iracundus, an non invidus, annon arrogans, an non superbus, an non percussor, an non avarus, an non filiorum tuorum venditor; hæc enim qui agunt, iis Deus non apparet, nisi prius se ab omni labe expurgaverint. Hæc igitur omnia tenebras tibi injiciunt, velut si obstet humor in oculos trajectus, quominus in lucem solis defigi possint: ita et tibi impietatis tenebras offendunt, quominus Deum videre possis,"[30] Tatian, too, holds that faith in God depends rather upon righteous living than upon mere reason. He says: "Mundo morere, eius insaniam rejiciens; vive Deo, *per tuam ipsius comprehensionem*.[31] veterem generationem repudians." Later on, he tells of a philosopher named Crescentius, and narrates his dishonorable acts and his frauds, in a style closely resembling that of Lucian.[32]

---

[30]L. Paul. "Die Glaube Theoph., etc.," in *Jahrb. f. prot. theol.*, 1875, iv.

[31]Vid Migne, in a variant: Ζῆθι τῳ θεῳ, διὰ τῆς ἑαυτοῦ καταλήψεος Ed. Schwartz's edit., however, T. u. U. iv, i, *Tatiani Oratio ad Græcos*, p. 125) has αὐτοῦ ipsius (mundi) without even noticing the above-mentioned variant. The edition has some errors in the text and in the indexes. The variant recalls certain words of one of the Logia recently discovered at Benhesa:

The kingdom of Heaven is within you; and whatsoever knoweth himself shall find it. Then it continues:

If you know yourself well, you are sons and daughters of the Almighty Father, and you will perceive that you are within the city, yea, ye are the city. Cf. Swete, in *Expos. Times*, 1904, p. 488 et seqq. "The new Oxyrinchus Sayings."

[32]Vestri philosophi (O Græci) tantum absunt a studio veritatis, ut quotannis nonnulli a Romanorum rege (there is disdain in this phrase) sexentos anulos accipiant, nullam ad rem utilem, sed ne gratis barbam promissam gerant. Crescens quidem ille, qui in magna urbe nidum posuerat, puerorum amore superabat omnes, et omnino pecuniæ studio attentus erat. Iste autem mortis contemptor ita mortem metuebat, ut eam Justino non secus ac mihi, veluti modum aliquod, machinationibus inferre conatus sit, quia veritatem prædicans, gulæ et fraudibus philosophos arguebat." See concerning the anti-philosophism of Tertullian, which offers so many points of likeness with the Syrian writers, E. Buonaiuti, "Clemente Al. e la cultura classica." *R. d. sc. teol. Anno* i. j. 6.

Finally, an affinity is to be noticed between the Christian tradition of the Orient and Lucian, in the constant manner of considering the social world and the hardships of the rebellious slaves. We will not discuss here the general doctrines of the church on the difficult questions of possession and private riches. We wish to touch briefly upon and to revive the most ancient attitude of the Syrian and Asiatic Christians towards the economic problem. Without doubt there went towards the determining of this attitude, manifold and imponderable co-efficients which it were impossible for us to re-evoke even with remote approximation. How far did not the expectation of the *parousia*, silently alive in the Oriental Christian conscience of the first two centuries, detach the hearts of the faithful from the affections and interests of earth, and sustain them in their contemplation of the imminent mirage? Or, to what point were they not stimulated by the memories of the Church at Jerusalem, to renounce earthly goods and to hold them in common? The *Didache* says: "Noli extendere manus tuas ad accipiendum, ad dandum vero contrahere. . . . Non dubitabis dare neque murmurabis cum das; cognosces enim quis sit bonus mercedis. Non repudiabis indigentem, *communicabis autem omnia cum fratre tuo*, nec dices tua esse; nam si in immortalibus consortes estis, quanto magis in mortalibus?[33] The words are, of course, not to be taken literally; but they give proof of the existence of a widely diffused and profound sentiment of fraternity. Tatian in his *Ratio* shows that rather proud indifference to the various states of life, which reveals also, in its own way, the contempt for riches and the desire for equality. "Regnare nolo, ditescere non libet, prætura recuso, scortationem odi, navigare ob insatiabilem avaritiam non cupio, de coronis consequendis non dimico, liber sum ab insana gloriæ cupiditate, mortem contemno, quovis morbo genere superior sum. Si servus sum, servitutem sustineo; si liber ingenuinitatem non ostento. Soleri video omnium eundem, unam omnium mortem, sive in voluptate vivas, sive inedire labores. Dives seminat et pauper eodem semente perfruitur. Moriuntur ditissimi, eundem vitæ exitum habent mendici. Pluribus rebus indigent divites, quamvis fides illis et honos habeatur. Pauper autem et modestissimus quisque id quod sibi satis est desiderans, facilius consequitur." How often do we not find in the mouths of judges, especially in cases where Oriental

[33]The proof of this is to be found in periodically reviving mystical manias of the Encratists, Montanists and Millenarists. Cf. N. Bonwitsch: *Die Geschichte des Montanismus*. Erlanger, 1881.

Christians appear before them, words of astonishment when the condition of the accused is noble and wealthy.[34] Having come into the world with a vast plan of restoration individual and collective, ethical and social, the Christians had simply inverted the ancient estimate of life and had set on high, according to the precepts of their Founder, the gifts which heretofore had been despised. Ostentation had appeared to their eyes as a sin, and they had bitterly combated it. In certain parts of the empire, where the Roman dominion had weighed most heavily upon men, and where the most squalid misery prevailed, superinduced by over-taxation and slavery, the Christians had, perhaps, platonically dreamt of a new economic order;[35] and within the narrow boundaries of their community, they encouraged the most advanced practices of beneficence. In their serene minds, the aversion to Rome and to the world, was fused with the placid dream of the proximate conversion of the world. Lost in remote corners of the tumultuous cities, these souls had despised in their retirement, the rumors that were bruited without, and the passions which were swirling in the open. From society mad with vice came the ferocious persecution; a persecution inspired by profane might and cunning. And yet, in that fervid stirring up of conscience which characterizes the dawn of the III century, more than one spirit must have found itself compelled to come into agreement with that Christianity it had despised, in the course of that destructive analysis and criticism which was devouring the agonizing world. Lucian seems to us to have been one of these spirits. Like the Christians who moved about him, he derided the silly polytheistic beliefs, he mocked at the sterile philosophy, now incapable of really resolving the problems of life, in his heart he strongly felt the sad injustice wherewith the social body was afflicted. But the surroundings in which he persistently lived, distracted him from reflection upon the real condition of his soul, and suffocated within him the germs of spontaneous maturity.

* * *

[34]Let us select an example from Ruinart. *Act. SS. Phileæ et Philormi*: . . . Culcianus præses dixit: si scirem te indigere et sic in hanc amentiam venisse, non tibi parcerem. Sed quia multam substantiam habes, ita ut non solum te, sed prope cunctam provinciam alere possis; ideo parco tibi et suadeo te immolare."

"[35]Whether consciously or not, in spite of his protests, and however good his will, Tertullian is substantially a revolutionary and an enemy of the Roman empire." Although somewhat exaggerated, this judgment of Guignebert is, at bottom, true. Vid. *Op. cit.*, p. 145. The ecclesiastical notion of property was not clearly and completely formulated till St. Augustine's time. Ep. cl. iii, 23. *ad Hilarium*.

He has, indeed, often been compared to Voltaire. Writers, both of them, poor in moral sense, discouragers of all ideality, incapable of courageous purpose, eager to destroy with the most potent arm of derision, without distinction, whatever surrounded them, whether wholesome or perverse.

Still, Lucian's humor hides a sentiment by no means ignoble, and reveals a soul not unfit to play an honorable and memorable part in history. He lived in that Syria, in which, together with Asia Minor, the Gospel was, from the very beginning, so extensively preached. Christianity often came within easy reach of him; and he knew it but ill. So imperfectly did he know it, that we cannot suspect him of any studied avoidance of it, as of a dangerous enemy which, if it came too near to him, might subjugate him, and constrain him to a mode of life too diverse from that which he had so joyfully embraced. In his *Dream*, he relates how having been educated as a sculptor, he "was at once disgusted with that art, and preferred the sumptuous and suggestive mistress Erudition."[36] This episode throws a vivid ray of light upon the psychology of the fine dialogist. Risen from the depths of obscurity and misery, he made the most of his brilliant and versatile genius; welcomed, caressed and prized by high society, still pagan and oriental as it was, Lucian must have satisfied their jaded and sceptical tastes; his literary works show the influence of the class in whose interest they were composed. His sarcasm was spent upon religious ideals which pagans no longer held in esteem; upon intellectual speculations which, while they still followed them, they really despised; upon the Christians, innocuous victims of the ferocious derision of their persecutors. And yet, in the bottom of his heart there must have been at times a sympathetic beat for the purity of those humble ones who realized fraternity amongst men. In general, it is vain to imagine the various destinies of a great man of genius supposing him to have followed a path different from that which he actually took; and still more vain is it to put to oneself such a question regarding men who lived so long ago. But, if it be licit to draw a conclusion from this evocation of the principal ideas of Lucian, and from their comparison with those prevalent among the Christians of his country, we should say that the author of *De*

[36]Hæc quidem adhuc quum daret, ego, non expectato sermonum fine, surgens litem decrevi; atque deformi illa et operaria spreta, conferebam me ad Eruditionem valde lætus: maxime quandoquidem in mentem mihi venit scutica, et plagas statim non paucas inchoanti mihi hesterno die fuisse impositas. *Somnium*, c. xiv.

Morte Peregrini, whilst striking with the same astire the cynics and the followers of the Gospel, was not perfectly consistent with himself, and dissimulated, by promiscuously applying to all their attributes the most degrading adjectives, the real contradiction that he bore within himself. Perhaps, had he not been poisoned and misled by a false education, by a worldliness so exaggerated and so vicious, Lucian might have become an apologist of the Christ.

E. Buonaiuti.

THE HIGHER CRITICISM OF THE BIBLE:

NATURE OF ITS PROBLEMS.*

Francis E. Gigot, D. D.

The Higher Criticism of the Bible deals with most important questions anent the sacred writings of both Testaments. Its precise object is not to restore to its primitive form the text of Holy Writ, by pointing out the erroneous readings which have crept into the inspired books, and by determining the original reading by means of the ordinary canons of criticism. This work it willingly leaves to the care of that branch of Biblical Introduction which is usually called the *Textual* or *Lower* Criticism. Its special province is of a higher order, for it comprises all such problems as bear directly on the authorship, date, literary form, integrity, reliability, &c., of the canonical writings.

When the treatment of these difficult and important topics is clearly seen to form the distinct object of the Higher Criticism, it becomes easy to realize that although the name of that branch of Biblical study is of comparatively recent origin, yet the problems it agitates are of old standing. These are the problems which *Literary* criticism has freely dealt with for centuries in reference to the ancient productions of Greek and Latin literature, but which for a variety of reasons, most Christian scholars of the past did not feel at liberty to handle with regard to the sacred books of the Old and of the New Testaments. In the eyes of many of them to examine with an equal freedom these questions anent both the inspired and the non-inspired writings of antiquity would have seemed to place both sets of works on one and the same level, and therefore to lack seriously in the respect due to the divine Scriptures alone. In fact, according to a most ancient, and for a long time most prevalent, view of Biblical inspiration, the very words which make up the canonical books were dictated by God himself, so that questions regarding the human authorship, date,

* In the wording of this paper, the writer has freely utilized what he has already set forth in his *General Introduction to the Study of the Holy Scriptures*, 3d edition, p. 166 sq.

and literary form of an inspired work appeared them quite secondary, while that of its reliability was ruled out as a matter of course. Even after this mechanical conception of inspiration had given way to one corresponding better with the actual features of the sacred writings, Christian scholars generally continued to regard the questions of the Higher Criticism of the Bible as not forming the subject matter of a scientific investigation. In the eyes of their faith, it was sufficient that a book of Holy Scripture should apparently claim to have been written by Moses, David, or Solomon, &c., for admitting at once this authorship, and for taking as granted that the authorship extended to all the integrant parts of the book in question. It is true that at times, they appealed to external evidence, in the shape of the Jewish and the Christian traditions, to confirm the data of Holy Writ concerning authorship. But this was rather an appeal to authority than to scientific inquiry: the appeal was made simply because those traditions were in harmony with the data of the Bible, and altogether regardless of the fact that the traditions themselves had been founded mostly on the passages of the Scriptures, or at least on the titles inscribed to the inspired writings.

On account of the same implicit belief in the written Word of God, it never occurred to the minds of most Christian scholars of the past centuries that the scientific and the historical reliability of the sacred books could be the object of searching criticism. As nearly all their knowledge of ancient history and of the physical sciences was drawn from the inspired volume or from traditions grounded on its contents, they had practically no extrinsic means of testing the accuracy of the scientific and the historical statements found in Holy Writ. With regard to the historical facts recorded in several books, or in several parts of a book, of the Bible, either they did not notice the variations existing between these accounts, or, if they noticed them, they were not at a loss to point out many theoretical ways in which the variations could be disposed of.

Again, as long as they knew by the infallible teaching of the Church that all the books of the Bible were inspired it imported little in their eyes to determine what was the special literary form of any one of them. Finally, they took it as a matter of course that a book should be considered as pure history whenever it wore the appearance of a historical record, as strict prophecy if it apparently referred to future events, &c.

It is plain, therefore, that the questions pertaining to the Higher Criticism of the Bible have been commonly viewed in the past from

the standpoint of authority and considered as matters which belong to the domain of theology, not to that of criticism. And it is because of this general attitude of past generations of Christian theologians and apologists, that many contemporary writers on Biblical topics, appeal still to the data of Holy Writ, and in particular, to the words of our Blessed Savior in the Gospels, as decisive in matters relative to the authorship, historical character, &c., of certain books, notably of the Pentateuch and of Jonas. It seems, however, that the tendency among Catholics and Protestants alike, is towards a different frame of mind, towards deciding the questions of genuineness, literary form, date, integrity, reliability, &c., of the sacred writings, not by way of authority, but chiefly by that of scientific investigation. For, during the whole quarter of a century, men whose thorough belief in the inspired character of the Bible is unimpeachable, have in increasing numbers adopted this view of the nature of the Biblical problems treated by Higher Criticism.

According to them, all such problems cannot seriously be considered as belonging to the body of doctrines actually revealed to the Church of God; and further, to present them all indiscriminately as directly and necessarily connected with the dogmas of the Catholic faith, would be a fatal mistake from the point of view of modern apologetics. They also think that the principle" that the questions concerning the Author, Redactor, Composition, Origin, History of the inspired books, in a word the questions of Higher Criticism, are of their own nature and under certain restrictions, not theological, but secular (profanwissenschaftliche) questions, is a welcome key to the solution of critical difficutlies."[1] In fact, they look upon a thoroughly scientific investigations of three problems, as the only means of meeting Rationalistic Higher Critics on their own ground. Again, they can point to the critical work done by such great Christian scholars as Origen, St. Jerome, Eusebius, and by others of a later date, as proving that the scientific study of the problems now dealt with by the Higher Criticism of the Bible, is no novelty in the Catholic Church, and as conferring upon them a right to tread, however humbly, in the footsteps of the careful and able critics of past centuries. Lastly, they can even quote in their favor no less an authority than his Holiness, Pope Pius X. For in his very recent letter to Bp. Le Camus, a learned French critic, the Sovereign Pontiff speaks in the following explicit

[1]Franz von Hummelauer, S. J., *Exegetisches zur Inspirationsfrage*, p. vii. The earned Jesuit is a member of the Roman Biblical Commission.

terms: "As we must condemn the temerity of those who, having more regard for novelty than for the teaching authority of the Church, do not hesitate to adopt a method of criticism altogether too free, so we should not approve the attitude of those who in no way dare to depart from the usual exegesis of Scripture even when, faith not being at stake, the real advancement of learning requires such departure. You follow a wise middle course, and by your example show that there is nothing to be feared for the sacred books from the true progress of the art of criticism, nay that a beneficial light may be derived from it, provided its use be coupled with a wise and prudent discernment."[2]

Thus, then, for the defense of the sacred writings of both Testaments, it is right not to consider the questions of criticism as decided once for all by the authority which may appear to be attached to the "usual exegesis of Scripture." It seems to be right likewise to examine these same questions with that open-mindedness which befits scientific investigation, and which alone causes one to be fully ready to gather up whatever particles of truth Higher Criticism may have discovered. In point of fact, it would be difficult to imagine a frame of mind more becoming an apologist of revealed truth, since he has nothing to fear for the solidity of defined belief. At the same time, it must be granted that throughout his scientific study of the problems of the Higher Criticism of the Bible, a Catholic worthy of the name will feel in his heart that respect due to the teaching authority of the Church of God, which should always accompany him in the pursuit of any branch of knowledge which borders on the domain of divine Revelation.

FRANCIS E. GIGOT.

---

[2]The Papal document is dated Jan. 11, 1906. Its original text is printed in full in THE NEW YORK REVIEW for April-May, 1906, pp. 796, 797.

STUDIES

THE IDEA OF LIGHT IN THE OLD TESTAMENT*

Leon Gry

The Hebrews, like the other Semitic peoples, considered light as something mysterious and incomprehensible. A knowledge of its abode, of the place to which it withdrew when darkness settled down upon the earth was beyond mortal ken, nor could any man however audacious, pretend to a knowledge of the path leading to that abode.[1] On the authority of Holy Writ it was held that a separation had been made by Yahweh between light and darkness, and that the line of demarcation dividing one from the other had been drawn over the waters of the primitive chaos.[2] Whence came this idea? Was it imported from without? And in particular does this last passage from the book of Job contain an allusion to certain ancient Babylonian rites?[3] These questions are beyond the scope of the present study. One thing, however, is to be remarked in this connection, viz., that this representation of things was in no wise looked upon as mythical, nor was it a concept adopted because of its poetical affinities and possibilities. For the Hebrew it was simply the embodiment of a traditional historic

* The selection of Scripture texts and their arrangement in groups in order to study these groups and note the characteristics of each, is a process which should presuppose as already accomplished, the exegetical study of each text, together with a clear notion of the ideas that the original writer wished to express. It is hardly necessary to say that this work of analysis is yet far from being accomplished to the satisfaction of all. Moreover, the texts to be studied with reference to a given topic are generally few in number, and, on that account, often susceptible of very divergent explanations. Thus the synthesis of ideas in the study of the Bible is a particularly difficult and delicate task, and we should not be surprised if certain views and conclusions have to be presented tentatively and with reserve. Only through patient careful discrimination can scientific results be achieved that are worthy of the name. The writer thinks it opportune to make this general remark before taking up the present subject.

[1] Job xxxviii, 19.

[2] Job xxvi, 10.

[3] Gunkel, *Schoepfung und Chaos*, pass. ad h. l. 36.

truth. This is clear from the first account of the Creation (P) wherein it is stated that light was made the first day, and that when God beheld the goodness of this first creature he separated it from the darkness.[4] In other words, light was created in the bosom of the chaotic darkness that hovered over the face of the abyss and following upon this creation it was separated from the regular darkness which constitutes night. Though light was created on the first day, it was only on the fourth that the sun and the moon were made.[5] These are designated in the Biblical text as מאורת a term which is naturally associated with the equivalent one used occasionally to designate the liturgical candlestick. Thus the two celestial bodies formed by God were conceived of as light-bearers. In them was located a portion of the light created on the first day, and their function was to diffuse it throughout the extent of the heavens and upon the earth. By means of these bodies it would be easier to distinguish day from night, but they were not looked upon as causing that distinction.[6] The latter indeed existed from the moment when the light had been separated from the darkness and when, according to the divine command, they began to follow each other regularly in succession. From the first day in fact, there had been an evening and a morning. How explain this reiterated notion of light enjoying a distinct existence, an existence independent of the celestial bodies through whose instrumentality it is diffused here below? If we recall the fact that the science of the Hebrews as of primitive peoples generally, consisted in a superficial observation of natural phenomena, followed by very simple and crude explanations of the constant laws which were observed in connection with the recurrence of these phenomena, it will not seem improbable that the observation of the regular uninterrupted succession of day and night even when the heavenly bodies were hidden by clouds, was to a large extent responsible for the distinction made between light and the heavenly luminaries—suggesting the possibility or even the fact of a separate creation for each.[7]

[4]Gen. i, 3 s.

[5]Gen. i, 16 s.

[6]The expressions in Gen. i, 14, should not therefore be taken in a strictly rigorous sense. Such an understanding of them renders simply unintelligible the "evenings" and "mornings" as well as the "days" mentioned in the preceding verses.

[7]It is hardly necessary to point out here the futility and shortsightedness of the apologetic policy that would fain recognize in this affirmed independent existence of light, an anticipation on the part of the sacred writer of certain recent scientific discoveries. Most of our readers are aware that the various concordistic systems so laboriously constructed during the last century each upon the ruins of its predecessor

Light being the first of God's creatures, it was quite natural that it should take on a signification synonymous with existence itself. Thus, to those who are yet unborn, Yahweh has not given light.[8] and the same has been withdrawn by Him from those who are dead.[9] In some poetical passages the term is employed alone, but in other places mention is made of the "light of the living." In either case the sense is the same, only in the latter the context shows that it was the intention of the writer to mark more distinctly the opposition between the life of this world and the condition of the dead in the grave or in Sheol.[10]

As in poetical language Sheol was darkness, it was only natural by way of extension to designate also as darkness whatever was of a nature to cause the loss of existence and precipitate one into the abode of the dead; viz., dangers of all kinds, famine and the sword, etc., as also the feelings of anguish occasioned by them.[11] But the term was found particularly apt to describe the situation of those who pass away without leaving behind them anyone to perpetuate their memory amid coming generations. Such persons are said to be "thrust from the light into darkness." From the day of their death they are forgotten—their portion is everlasting darkness.[12] It is possibly along this line of thought that we should seek the explanation of the term "lamp" sometimes used by the sacred writers to signify "Son," mostly the eldest son who inherits, as it were, the public life of his father.[13] His was especially the mission to bear aloft the "light" of the father's memory, to cause his name and his glory to survive through coming generations. Indeed this view would be very probable if it could be shown that the expression "lamp," in the sense of "son"

---

have now little or no interest for the biblical student. The Bible is in no sense a repertory of scientific knowledge, nor have the sacred writers anything in common with our modern astronomers and physicists. Are we to look upon the series of successive creations in the order in which they are described in Genesis as being beyond question, because the narration seems guaranteed by divine authority? Such a position would indeed be precarious. From the theological standpoint it would involve a confusion of inspiration with revelation, and practically it would be to enter upon an apologetic course beset with grave difficulties. Besides, it will be remembered that the encyclical *Providentissimus Deus* speaks as if Biblical concordism had already ceased to exist.

[8]Job iii, 20 seqq.

[9]Eccli. xxii, 11 seqq.

[10]Job xvii, 12; xxxiii, 30; Ps. lvi, 14 seqq.

[11]Job xv, 22; xviii, 5, (11 seqq.)

[12]Job xviii, 17 seqq.

[13]The term is used especially in connection with the person of David.

belongs to the poetical style; but the fact that though occurring frequently in the narratives, it appears only once in the Psalms (in a psalm, too, which borrows not a little from prose narratives)[14] should make us cautious in our inferences. Another explanation of the term is suggested by Schwalby. With a view to honor their ancestors the ancient Israelites may have had the custom of placing small lamps before the teraphim which symbolized their presence around the hearth, and hence the "paterfamilias" of the present generation, on whom devolved the duty of looking after this detail of filial piety, and to whom his forebears had looked forward for its fulfilment, may have been conceived of by them as the "lamp" on which they were counting.[15] But however ingenious this explanation, it can hardly be made to cover such a passage as I Reg. xi, 36, where in favor of David is promised not simply *a lamp*, but a *perpetual lamp before Yahweh in Jerusalem*. It would be preferable here to understand the expression as referring to a whole line of descendants who will continually recall to Yahweh the memory of David and the glorious promises made to him. All things considered, the first explanation seems to us more satisfactory and more probable.

While before all else light stands for existence, it is also used metaphorically to signify that which makes existence desirable and happy, that which gives assurance of its continuation, and generally the fortunate happenings of this life.

> I form the light, and create darkness
> I make peace and create evil.
>
> Is. xlv. 7.

Parallelisms of this kind are frequent, and not only is prosperity in general identified with light, but also this or that particular event.[16] Thus too the dawn which announces that light is about to take the place of darkness, becomes the graceful symbol of a happy era which is going to follow a period of tribulation.[17] And not only the happy event itself is thus poetized in terms of light, but also the joy resulting therefrom in man's soul and which causes his countenance to beam with charming radiance.[18]

In other instances the poetical figures are more tame and reserved. They do not go so far as the bold identifications noticed above, and

[14]Ps. cxxxii, 17; cf. I Reg. xi, 16; xv, 4; II Reg. viii, 19.

[15]Schwalby, *Leben nach dem Tode*, p. 40.

[16]Cf. Is. lx, 9 seqq. (the deliverance of the people from a distressing situation).

[17]Is. viii, 29. (The similitude is extensively drawn out); cf. also Ibid. lviii, 8.

[18]Ps. xcvii 10 seq.

it is with pleasure that we come across beautiful and discreet comparisons between celestial light and the man whom Yahweh has made happy. Thus the righteous king is compared to the morning light when the sun shines and the sky is cloudless. (II Sam. xxiii, 4); the great hero, Simon Maccabaeus, is likened to the sun which from the horizon sheds its rays upon the Temple of God. (Eccli. iv, 7) The glory and the happiness thus so beautifully described are dependent upon man's faithfulness in carrying out the commendments of Yahweh. Fidelity in the observance of the Torah is itself compared to light, and quite naturally so, since it leads to the possession of the divinely appointed recompense of which light is made the symbol.[19] At times the sense of such texts is purposely ambiguous. Thus Job speaks of certain persons who are enemies of the light. (Ch. xxiii). The obvious sense is that assassins and other malefactors naturally shun the daylight and choose the night for the perpetration of their crimes. But there is also another more subtle meaning, viz., that all such persons studiously avoid the path of light marked by the *Torah*. In this play of ideas there is already more than a germ of the twofold meanings of the Fourth Gospel: "Everyone that doth evil hateth the light" (Jo. iii, 20). Righteousness, which of course, consists in submission to the will of Yahweh, is likewise poetically identified with light:

> "Woe to you that call evil good, and good evil:
> That put darkness for light and light for darkness."[20]

From this it was easy and natural to pass to the application of the same figure to the divine precepts,[21] and even to paternal advice, since all that should be taught by a father to his children, could in last analysis, be reduced to the fear of Yahweh, together with the knowledge and observance of His law.

This metaphorical use of the idea of light leads directly enough to a semi-poetical, semi-philosophical adaptation of the same notion in the Sapiential books, or, to speak more accurately, in the Book of Wisdom. What in fact is wisdom if not the faithful fulfilment of

[19]We have erred from the way of truth,
And the light of justice hath not shined unto us,
And the sun of understanding hath not risen upon us.
Wisdom v, 6.

[20]Is. v, 20.

[21]"Thy word is a lamp to my feet
And a light to my paths." Ps. cxix, 105.

[22]Prov. vi, 23.

the divine precepts? Or, in other words, it is these divine precepts themselves which, as already stated, were symbolized by light. Like unto light, wisdom shines and its radiance makes it discernible from afar to those who love and seek it.[23] Its brightness cannot be extinguished because with it all other good things come to man.[24] In a word, it is "the brightness of eternal light", [25] for it is something immanent in God, the prototype doubtless of the divine works, the original idea that God wished to realize in time.

Here one feels himself entering upon theological ground and it will be necessary to tarry there for some little time. There was indeed no need to await a period so late and the influence of Greek culture in order that the notion of light might serve to illustrate the current notions concerning God and the beings standing in more or less direct relation to Him. The more simple these ideas the more natural it was to illustrate them by means of this notion so easily within the reach of the humblest and rudest minds, and which suggested to all the idea of the immaterial and the wonderful. Even at an early date, light must therefore have been employed as a theological symbol. But at bottom was it always merely a symbol? Thus far only poetical texts have been examined, and whatever care might be necessary to point out the process of thought whereby the sacred writer was led more or less consciously to use the concept of light in such or such a particular sense, one had at least the assurance that only metaphors were being dealt with. But the relations established in the Bible between light and supernatural beings are found expressed in the prose narratives as well as in the poetry. Rather they are assumed to be already known to the readers for whom the Bible was intended, and for that reason they are never explicitly characterized or defined. There is consequently reason to ask if the references to light in the prose portions should be understood metaphorically or taken in their literal meaning. Here we touch upon the difficulty of a study such as this, but herein also lies its great importance with regard to the history of theological ideas among the Hebrews.

In the earliest times what idea was entertained concerning the relation between Yahweh and light? Is there not reason to suspect in this connection an influence derived from some pagan source and

[23]Sap. vi, 12.

[24]Sap. vii, 10 seqq.

[25]Sap. vii, 26.

to see in Yahweh a solar divinity or the god of the tempest?[26] Of this, let it be said once for all, there is not the least trace in our present Bible.[27] If the various texts be compared and submitted to a careful theological analysis, the conclusion must be that in the minds of the earliest sacred writers Yahweh was essentially the God of Israel—the war-god of a warlike nation. As to the essential localization of His being in the light of the sun or in the lightning of the tempest, none such appears. The account which is given in I Kings (xix, 11 seqq.) of the theophany on Mt. Horeb is quite suggestive in this connection. While Elias miraculously warned stands at the entrance of the cavern, Yahweh appears before him. First there was a violent wind that rent the mountains and shattered the rocks, then an earthquake, then a fire; in a word all the constituent elements of the tempest distinct from one another pass successively before the cavern of the vision. Yet none of them contain the divinity. It is explicitly stated: "and Yahweh was not in the fire, "etc. It is true that after the commotion a gentle murmur is heard: it is the majesty of God that is passing. In our opinion the greatest importance should be attached to this narrative. From the standpoint of our religious education and ideas it looks very strange, and for that very reason it recommends itself as being probably if not primitive, at least very ancient. Its influence will be found later on in the apocalyptic visions of Ezechiel,[28] and the same influence affords a key to a fuller explanation of the imagery found in certain psalms.[29]

Nevertheless the originality of this account has been impugned, and it has been asserted that the narrative "has been worked over in the interests of a spiritual meaning and that in the process it was divested of its heteroclitical elements." The critical scholar will not be guilty of rashness in thinking that the author of this assertion would be not a little embarrassed were he called upon to prove it. If, however, the flavor of originality that attaches to this account is not sufficiently pronounced to warrant us in making it the basis of a solid argument, other proofs can be alleged of sufficient cogency

[26]It is needless to remark that this conception of God identifying Himself really with light and with the storm, and thus materializing Himself, as it were, is, if it be supposed primitive, incompatible with the doctrine of a primitive revelation, and by the same is contrary to Catholic dogma.

[27]Sun-worship appears only at a late date, and being derived from the ever-growing influence of Babylonia, is looked upon with horror by the faithful Jews.

[28]See below.

[29]Cf. Ps. xcvii, 3; l, 3.

to establish at least a serious probability in favor of our conclusions. That the sun-god was worshipped in Chaldea together with the other astral divinities, and even in the first rank among them, need not be matter for surprise. On the other hand it is very difficult to suppose that the Hebrews adopted Yahwehism (i. e., the worship of a sun or storm-god[30] at a time when they themselves were wandering in the desert, and naturally were often exposed to suffer from the heat of the day. Adoration is not given to a divinity whose chief characteristic is the infliction of pain; and if it be said that Yahweh may first have been conjured as a maleficent deity,[31] how then, we ask, could he later become the one God, meriting alone all the homage of the Hebrews when they passed over to henotheism? A deity whose only efficiency was to inspire fear, could never have become the tutelary god of the nation: such a distinction could only be bestowed on one who was able and willing to protect as well as to punish. Hence we may dismiss the theory that in the beginning Yahweh was essentially a storm-god. Nothing in the Bible account gives any ground for assuming in the minds of the Hebrews a naturalistic conception of the being of Yahweh, nor is it possible to find elsewhere any solid or sufficient basis for such an assumption. That the word יהוה is kindred with the Arabic *hawa*, air, atmosphere, and that this etymology cannot be otherwise explained than by connecting Yahweh originally with the storm; or that it is necessarily akin to *hawa*, fall (taken in the causative sense) and thus involves the idea of a similar connection; these and such like are conjectural arguments which we may well hesitate to accept as convincing. The etymology of the divine name is by no means clear and it is likely to remain a mysterious exegetical question for a long time to come. It would therefore be rather hasty and premature to accept simply and without discussion the affirmation of Winckler[32] that the Canaanitish Bel Hadad, which was doubtless a storm-god, since he was surnamed Ramman, the thunderer, bore the name Yahu (יהוּ) among the Habiri of Tell-el-Amarna.

That Yahweh was not originally and essentially a storm-god is far more than probable, and very few scholars of to-day would

[30]In this reasoning it is assumed that light did not become an essential element in the theophanies until after the station at Sinai and the adaption of Yahwehism. This point will be discussed later on.

[31]In this connection it may be remarked that it is precisely the opposite sentiment that prevails amongst the Israelites. They are anxious that Yahweh withdraw not from them during their wanderings. Cf. Exodus xxxiii, 16.

[32]*Geschichte Israels*, II, 78.

venture to maintain the contrary. But it is none the less true that Yahweh is often and with complacency associated with light and with the great pertubations of nature. In the realm of awe-inspiring physical phenomena His power and other attributes find their strongest manifestation. A simple comparison of two poetical fragments, both of which are ranged by the common consent of critics among the most ancient specimens of Hebrew literature, will serve to indicate sufficiently the relation recognized by the Israelites between the deity and the light of the sun, or the lightning of the storm. The first is a passage of the book of Yashar which found its way into the First Book of Samuel (viii, 12) and which, following Wellhausen,[33] Cheyne[34] has succeeded in reconstructing.

"Yahweh has established the sun in the heavens."

Doubtless this "construction" or "building" (הכין) of the sun by Yahweh appears rather materialistic to the modern theologian, especially preoccupied with the abstract notion of creation; but it expresses very clearly the belief in an essential distinction between Yahweh and the orb of day—in an entire dependence of the sun upon the efficient power of God; and that is all that is needed to cover the present issue.

"Yahweh when thou wentest forth out of Seir,
When thou marchedst out of the fields of Edom.
The earth trembled, the heavens also dropped,
Yea, the clouds dropped water."
Judges v, 4.

According to Deborah the coming of Yahweh coincides with the coming of the storm; it is a representation which occurs frequently in the Bible.

In every age, even the most cultured minds have felt at times the need of constructing for themselves a more human conception of God, giving up for the nonce the continual abstraction from the elements derived from human experience and the data furnished by the imagination. Much more is such a need felt by peoples who are yet, as it were, in a state of childhood. Such was the case with the ancient Hebrews. For them God was like a man; He was eminently so, and thus they understood His goodness and His providence towards Israel, His anger against His enemies. They conceived of Him as coming with the storm and thus formed for themselves a vivid idea of His

[33] *Composition des Hexateuchs, ad h. loc.*
[34] *Origins of the Psalter*, p. 212.

power and majesty. This general view of the Old Testament theology no one will venture to deny, but to set it up as a principle and pretend to explain solely according to the sentiments attributed to Yahweh by His worshippers the form wherein He chose to manifest Himself[35] is a evident exaggeration. Perhaps, however, an examination of the texts of the Hexateuch, taking into account the distinction of the sources, will enable us to arrive at a satisfactory result with regard to the conceptions formed by the people of that remote age concerning the form of the theophanies.

According to the testimony of the Biblical texts it may be said that prior to the revelation on Sinai God appeared to men in human form. More than once, it is true, He or His angel spoke from heaven, but there is no indication that on these occasions the speaker was made visible, or was manifested under the form of light. It is a fact worthy of note that the various documents of the Hexateuch—even J in which the knowledge and worship of Yahweh is represented as going back to the time of Enoch[36]—are at one in not chronicling in the entire Book of Genesis a single luminous theophany. An objection might perhaps be raised against this statement in connection with the burning furnace seen in vision by Abraham, and the flame of fire that passed as a sign of divine assurance between the divided portions of the victims. (Gen. xv, 17). But in this passage no mention is made of an apparition of the divinity, and the prodigy may be considered as simply a seal put upon the divine promise and alliance. It appears not precisely as a theophany but as something following upon a theophany the form of which has not been otherwise determined.

Beginning with the revelation on Sinai the divinity manifests itself under the form of light or in the storm.[37] If we confine our attention to the narratives it would seem that the theological use of light and its application to the divinity, were contemporaneous with the beginnings of Yahwehism. Furthermore, J, differently from E, magnifies the splendor of the divine refulgence and in the same measure also the representation of Yahweh's glory. Thus it is Moses alone who will approach the divinity (Exod. xxiv, 1, 2), and even he is unable to gaze upon the apparition and live. It is not a little that

[35]Stade, *Geschichte des Volkes Israel*, i, 441.

[36]Gen. iv.

[37]The episode of Gedeon at Ophra (Judges, vi, 11-24) shows that this rule still admits exceptions.

he be able to look upon the manifestations of Yahweh from behind after He has passed. (Exod. xxxiii, 20). Assuredly the apparitions of the Deity in human guise so naively described, and which hitherto had obtained a generous place in that same document, have been lost sight of,[38] and one perceives thus what an immense progress with regard to the idea of God's majesty begins, even according to J, with the revelation on Sinai. The splendor of the theophany appears less dazzling in E and this document still continues to retain traces of anthropomorphic representations: "And Yahweh spoke unto Moses face to face, as a man speaketh unto his friend." (Exod. xxxiii, 11). We have here precisely a case of that too strictly human conception of God which, a few lines further on will be rectified by a redactional insertion of the known text of J concerning the impossibility for any mortal to look upon the face of Yahweh and live. The opposition of this last text to the ideas prevalent in E is confirmed by other passages; thus not only Moses, but also Aaron, Nadab and Abihu with the seventy Elders of Israel are represented as beholding the lumnous vision, nor is it necessary that God stretch forth His hand to protect them against His deadly splendor: "And upon the nobles of the children of Israel he laid not his hand: and they beheld God, and did eat and drink"[39] (Exod. xxiv, 11). The same idea is met with elsewhere, v. g. "With him (Moses) will I (Yahweh) speak mouth to mouth, even manifestly and not in dark speeches; and the form (תמנה) of Yahweh shall he behold" (Num. xii, 8).

If after the thoroughly anthropomorphic representations of God in the primitive period, the sacred books begin to describe the divine apparitions as occurring under luminious forms—forms so luminous that according to J no mortal can withstand the splendor thereof—it may be asked to what sentiment does this new representation correspond, and what attribute of God is thus more clearly revealed to the Israelites. According to the accounts themselves it is the sanctity of God understood in the sense of inaccessibility, His physical transcendence above all human beings. Once the Law promulgated on Sinai, a limit was fixed beyond which the Israelites might not go, and

[38]To be more accurate, it should be said that we have here a mingling of the two representations: Yahweh appearing doubtless in human form, (since mention is made apparently without metaphor, of His face, hand and back) but appearing in the midst of a most dazzling light which is centered in His countenance, and it is this circumstance that is absent in the accounts of the previous apparitions.

[39]This passage is ascribed to E by nearly all the critics with the exception of Dillman and Bacon.

none of them would have the audacity to transgress the orders of Moses on this point.[40] The Tabernacle that is set up is to be full of the glory of Yahweh and even Moses himself cannot come nigh unto it.[41] Later the same divine glory will fill the Temple built by Solomon and on that account the priests will be obliged to interrupt the services and withdraw.[42] At bottom the idea is ever the same. God wishes to show in a striking manner to the people His supreme transcendance over all the faithful. His manifestations take place amid the thunders of the storm or in an overwhelming refulgence of light, in order, as the author of Exod. xx, 20, justly remarks, "that his fear may be before you, that ye sin not." The prophets of Israel and the poets will continue the same tradition, threatening the enemies of Yahweh and of Israel—they are one and the same—with the avenging power of God as manifested in the thunderstorm.[43] Hence the phrase "the fire of the wrath of God"[44]—which is not merely a metaphor. How often has not God sent fire from heaven, either as a mark of his pleasure, to surround the victims offered to Him,[45] or to avenge Himself for offenses against His majesty by devouring the culprits?[46] Sometimes the light of Yahweh is spoken of in an accommodated sense, as we speak of the light of man, to indicate the existence of God,[47] or His satisfaction, and hence His inclination towards a kindly distribution of His favors;[48] but these are poetic figures used only in quite special cases; the rule remains that Yahweh manifests Himself in the midst of light to impress upon the spectators His transcendence and His holiness.

The use of "light" in a theological sense, as a symbol of the majesty of Yahweh and as a manifestation of His presence, is governed by the development of the idea of God in the course of ages. Ezechiel perceived following one another in his apocalyptic vision, the same phenomena as Elias had seen long before on Horeb; with this sole

[40]Exod. xix, 18, et alibi passim.

[41]Exod. xl, 34. The text belongs to P.

[42]I Reg. viii, 10.

[43]Job xxxvi, 32; Ps. civ, 7 (the waters of chaos); xviii, 14; Hab.iii, 4; Is. x, 16 (the Assyrians); etc.

[44]Dt. xxxii, 22; Job xx, 23; Ps. xxi, 10; lxxix, 5.

[45]Lev. ix, 24; Jud. vi, 21; I Kings xviii; II Chron. vii, 1.

[46]Num. xi, 2; xvi, 35; xxvi, 10; II Kings i, 10. Mention of this belief: Ps. lxviii, 3; Is. xxvi, 11; xxix, 6.

[47]With thee is the fountain of life:
By thy light we see the light. Ps. xxxvi, 9.

[48]Ps. iv, 7; lxxxix, 16.

difference, however, that a thick cloud takes the place of the earthquake;[49] some other minor details are added which recall the theophany of Exod. xxiv, 10.[50] But this light no longer manifests Yahweh Himself, nor the תמנה; it is "the vision of the likeness of the glory of God" (Ezec. ii, 1). The same care to avoid the least shadow of an anthropomorphic representation of God or the slightest point which could lessen His absolute transcendence is also found in the Priest's Code. On Sinai, the Israelites saw "like a devouring fire the vision of the glory of Yahweh." (Exod. xxiv, 10). The roundabout expressions and qualifying phrases are used to mitigate the concept of God manifesting Himself in light. This also leaves a greater liberty to the author if he is going to ascribe a share in this glory to the elect individual who has relations with the Divinity: a reflection remained on the countenance of Moses, and his face shone so brightly that he had to cover it with a veil. (Exod. xxxiv, 33.)

Light, therefore, in the Biblical texts where it is connected with God, is either directly, or indirectily, through the intermediary of the Kabod, an attribute of Yahweh. It would be difficult to consider it as a distinct *theologumenon*, a living and acting substitute for Divinity. It is in this sense, however, that Duhm has at least a tendency to interpret Ps. xliii, 3.[51] It must be acknowledged that this text is one of the most difficult. If Light be here personified, it must be considered as taking the place of the Glory of God, and hence of God Himself; we would then have the translation: "Send forth thy *Glory*—let it lead me and bring me to thy holy mount and to thy tabernacle." This is not very satisfactory,[52] and we have yet to take account of a still more embarrassing term: אמתך. One is almost tempted to adopt the reading which Lagarde believes to be

[49]I. Kings xix, 11—the great wind . . . the earthquake . . . fire.
Ezec. i, 4—the great wind . . . the cloud . . . fire.

[50]Cf. the firmanent in its splendor (Ezec. 1, 22; Exod. xxiv, 10 b); the sapphire-stone (Ezec. i, 26; Exod. xxiv, 10 a).

[51]Licht und Treue werden, wie Jes. v, 11, das Wort Jahwes als Engel gedacht, die mit einer gewissen Selbstandigkeit in die Welt ausgehen und bestimmte Aufträge ausrichten." *Psalmen*, 125.

[52]Some may be inclined to see in this an allusion to Is. ii, 1-5. The elect are to reach the mount of the Eternal, and His house. But the Prophet has in mind the thought of the last days, which is quite foreign to that of the Psalmist. Moreover he conceives the divine light as a beacon lifted up on the mountain top, not as a torch which is carried along before the traveller to lead him to his destination. If the Psalmist had in mind the figure of Isaias, he has certainly modified it, being perhaps affected by the thought of the pillar of fire which led the Israelites through the desert.

primitive אוריך ותמיך: "Send forth thy *Urim* and thy *Thummim*, etc." At any rate, the personification of Light is not certain from this text; and, if it were certain, it would be the only instance of it in the whole Bible.

Yahweh manifests Himself to men under the appearance of fire and light; to a certain extent these representations belong also to the heavenly beings who surround Him. A Psalmist says that Yahweh makes the flames his messengers (Ps. civ, 4). It is thus perhaps that we should conceive the Seraphim[53] of Isaias vi, 2. It would be wrong, however, to attempt to draw any argument from the current etymology of the name; this etymology is none too certain; and moreover, שרף signifies "to burn" (cf. the burning coals, Is. vi, 6) and not "to shine." As for the Cherubim of Ezechiel, they are clearly spoken of as beings of light and flame. (Cf. Ezech. x, 19, 20, explained by i, 13): "their appearance was like burning coals of fire, and like the appearance of lamps." It is because they are in the fire which accompanies the Divinity that they themselves present "the appearance of the glory of Yahweh."

When it came to treating of eschatology in general, the idea of God symbolized by light was naturally brought into service. On the Day of Yahweh all the stars shall be darkened[54] as one of the punishments of guilty humanity. When the new Jerusalem comes, there shall be no need of sun or moon;[55] Yahweh appears, and behold! with His glory comes a light which lights up the city, scatters the darkness, and spreads itself afar. This is the splendid idea so magnificently presented in Isaias lx.

As for the lot of individuals in the new creation, it seemed evident that Yahweh would give each of them a share in the general distribution of supernatural light. Were not the heavenly beings of Ezechiel's vision brilliant by reason of the Glory of the Eternal which rested upon them. The elect will shine in like manner, since they will have drawn nigh to the Glory of the Eternal. The germ of this idea that even mere mortals when they draw near to Divinity, share in a reflection of His glory, is found in the Priests' Code: the

[53]It is hardly necessary to say that this article cannot go into the discussion of the primitive representation of celestial beings, any more than it was possible in the preceding pages to give a careful study of the development of the idea of God, or than it will be in those to come to treat the evolution of views on eschatology. The article aims merely at showing how the idea of light was made to do service for this and that theological concept in different phases of development.

[54]Amos viii, 9; Is. xiii, 10.

[55]Is. lx, 19.

face of Moses when he came down from the Holy Mount, bore the dazzling reflection of light divine.[56] The formal expression[57] of this same idea is found in Dan. xii, 3: "They that are wise shall shine as the brightness of the firmament, and they that do good as stars forever and ever." But might it not be that the Seer has embraced in his thought the whole assembly of the just? and are not his expressions conditioned by the verse preceding? However that may be, there are no reservations in the statement of the author of Wisdom: "On the day when He (the Eternal) shall visit them . . . the just shall shine (ἀναλάμψουσιν = יזהרון) and shall run to and fro as sparks among the reeds." (Sap. iii, 7). This latter image is found in Abdias, 18, but if we consider it, we shall find that the thought it conveys is new. It is because of the visit of the Lord that the just will shine, and it is because they shine, because they have a fire which belongs to them, that they become sparks and can propagate fire. The elect here spoken of have, by participation and in their own degree, that brightness which at first was attributed directly to God, and with it the power to reduce their enemies by fire. No doubt there is a poetic element in this; but it is not all poetry and metaphor. The matter will be made clearer by referring to an historical account—the apparition of Jeremias to Judas Machabeus (II Mach, xv, 13:) "And after this appeared a man admirable for his age and his majesty, and he had about him a certain grandeur (ὑπεροχήν) wonderful and superb." What is this (ὑπεροχή) which surrounds the figureof the Prophet? The author distinguishes it from the gloss of his white locks (πολία) and from the majesty of his person (δόξη); it is something within Jeremias, and something wonderful and impressive. This is all we are told, but is there need for anything more? What can this "something" be which wondrously wrapped him round except the shining reflection of glory? Compare this apparition with that of Samuel in the cave of the witch of En-Dor (I Sam. xxviii, 14), and it will give a better view of the road traversed in the application of the idea of light. The two cases are in some points the same: a great Prophet comes back from the dead to address a hero. Samuel, it is true, is called an *Elohim*, but remark that it is only in the deutero-canonical book that allusion is made to the radiant majesty of the vision.[58]

[56]Exod. xxxiv, 30.

[57]We do not count Eccli. xlviii, 1, where Elias is compared to a fire. This is, at least to a great extent, a poetic metaphor.

[58]This is all the more noteworthy since the extacy of Judas probably took place

To sum up, at the time of the composition of our later canonical books, light is not purely and simply a poetic adaptation; it is a reality. And this reality is no longer, at least with any frequency, connected directly with God Himself, who is now conceived as too transcendent and supramundane; but rather with the saints who are dead, and who will appear at the end of time, glorified by Yahweh. Light has been taken into the service of eschatology.[59]

LEON GRY.

---

while he was awake, and hence probably in the daytime (if with Fritzsche and Bissel, we adopt the reading ὕπαρ τι, l. c. 11), while the apparition of Samuel took place at night.

[59]This conclusion will be corroborated by an examination of the extra-canonical Apocalypses of the time. We may mention in passing the radiant metamorphosis of the just at the time of judgment (Bar. Syr. li, 1); such expressions as "the generation of light" (Hen. cviii, 11), "the spirits of light," i. e., the angels and just men in glory (Hen. lxi, 12), etc. Here we are told explicitly the source of this supernatural brightness. It is the reflected light of God, which remains on the conutenance of the blessed until the end of time. "Henceforth those who will possess the earth will no longer be able to look upon the faces of the saints, for the Lord of Spirits will make His Light to Shine on the face of the saints and the elect. (Hen. xxxviii, 4).

THE DOGMA OF THE TRINITY IN ST. AUGUSTINE

Joseph Turmel

At the close of the fourth century the dogma of the Trinity had been for a long time in the Church in a practically settled state. Two things, however, were yet lacking to it: a philosophical theory to adapt it, at least in a measure, to the categories of reason; and a formula which could pupularize it and imprint it on the minds of the faithful. The first of these needs was filled by St. Augustine; the second by the Symbol *Quicumque*, commonly called the "Creed of St. Athanasius."

Almost immediately after his conversion St. Augustine was led to discuss the difficult problem of the Trinity. His letter written about 389, makes known to us the manner in which the young convert, as yet a layman, conceived the mutual relations of the three divine Persons.[1] During a great part of his life he had to return to the subject sometimes as a controversialist, sometimes as a preacher, sometimes in order to reply to the questions which his friends addressed to him. His views upon the Trinity are spread throughout a great number of his writings. In order to know them one should consult in his correspondence, besides his letter to Nebridius already mentioned, his letter to Conventius and to Evodius.[2] In his preaching, six sermons or homilies deserve special attention.[3] It will be necessary to study also his book entitled *Contra Sermonem Arianorum*,[4] the two writings against Maximinus,[5] and above all, the vast treatise *De Trinitate*.[6]

At the end of the fourth century, there still remained in Africa some belated partisans of Arius, who wished to see in the Son nothing more than a creature of the Father, and in the Holy Ghost merely a

---

[1] *Epis.* 11. Migne, xxxiii, 75.

[2] *Epis.* 120, 169. Migne, xxxiii, 452, 742. Cf. also *Epis.* 238 ad Pascent. Migne, xxxiii, 1038.

[3] Serm. 52, 71, 126. Migne, xxxviii, 354, 445, 698; *in Joan. Tract.* 20, 39, 77 Migne xxxv, 1556, 1682, 1833.

[4] Migne, xlii, 683.

[5] Migne, *ibid.*, 709, 743.

[6] *Ibid.* 819 ss.

creature of the Father and the Son. Augustine had many discussions with them, and we have an echo of these discussions in some of the writings we are to consider.

It goes without saying that he rejects the Arian thesis. He rejects at the same time the doctrine that subordinates the Son to the Father and considers him as carrying out the orders of the Supreme God.[7] According to him the Son and Holy Ghost are not inferior in aught to the Father. He does not ignore the text *Pater major me est*; he cites it, on the contrary, time and again, but with the explanation that this text applies to the human nature taken by the Son and not to the Son considered in himself.[8] The divinity, the absolute equality of the Father, the Son, and the Holy Ghost, are in his eyes truths which belong to the Catholic faith. But how can the three divine Persons participate in the same divinity? How can the Trinity be reconciled with the unity of God? It is to this point that the researches of our holy Doctor were directed. There is the problem whose solution he sought.

It is true that St. Basil and St. Gregory of Nyssa had already broached the same problem. They themselves had sought to reconcile the Trinity with monotheism. But their sole preoccupation had been to put in relief the distinction of the divine hypostases. The danger they feared was that of lowering the barriers which separated the Persons, and they faced this danger without any fear of putting in jeopardy the unity of the divine nature. Quite different was the question uppermost in the mind of Augustine. True, he proclaimed the distinction of the Father, the Son, and the Holy Ghost. "Our faith," he says in a letter, "consists in believing and confessing that the Father, Son, and Holy Ghost are only one God, but we must avoid confounding the Father with the Son, the Son with the Father, and the Holy Ghost with the Father and the Son."[9] But what he sought above all, was to safeguard their unity of nature. The Doctors of

[7] He alludes to this doctrine in the following text (*De Trinit.* 2, 20): "Illi qui dicunt et priusquam de Virgine nasceretur per suam substantiam visibilem Filium, quid aliud quam ipsum clamarent? Quoniam de Patre, inquiunt, dictum est, invisibili soli Deo." Tertullian seems to be here referred to. Cf. Turmel, *Tertullien*, p. 72.

[8] *De Trinit.* 2, 3. "Quædam vero ita (ponuntur) ut minorem ostendant Filium propter formam servi, id est propter assumptam creaturam mutabilis humanæque substantiæ, sicuti est quod ait: Quoniam Pater major me est." Cf. also *De Trinit.* i, 14; *In Joan. Tract.* 78, 2; *Epis.* 238, 10. In his earlier years Augustine underwent the influence of Greek theology. Cf. *Histoire de la Théologie Positive*, i. 43.

[9] *Epis.* 238, 14. Cf. also *Serm.* 52, 6; *De Civitate*, xi, 10, 1.

Cappadocia had accentuated the Trinity of the divine Persons; Augustine accentuates their unity. The Cappadocians had defended the theology of the East; Augustine defended the theology of the West, The following passage, borrowed from one of the homilies on St. John, shows the broad lines of his conception of the Trinity. "The Trinity is only one God, only one eternity; only one power, only one majesty. . . . What are these three that they are called Father, Son and Holy Ghost? Are they three gods? No. Is the Father omnipotent? Yes, certainly. And the Son? He is equally so. And the Holy Ghost? He is not less so. Are there then three omnipotent beings? No, there is only one omnipotent."[10] We read in a letter that the Trinity possesses the same nature, the same substance; that this is not lesser considered in each Person, than it is in the three taken together; and that the three Persons together are not greater than any One.[11] Hence we see that according to St. Augustine the nature of the divine Persons is *numerically* the same. But the Cappadocians attributed to their hypostases only a *specific* unity.

Being concerned with maintaining the substantial unity of the three divine persons, St. Augustine took up the task of solving the objections made against it. The objections came from different sides. First of all, must one not admit a difference of substances or natures when there is difference in the several principles of operation? And since each divine Person has His own activity, must we not conclude that He has a distinct substance? Furthermore, the divine Persons have, on different occasions, manifested themselves separately. Could this be the case, if they had the same substance; on such a hypothesis, would it not be absolutely impossible for One of them to separate Himself from His peers? And the divine missions! How are they reconciled with the unity of substance? How explain that, with a nature numerically the same, there may be found two beings, one giving a mission, the other receiving it? Moreover, is not the existence of three Persons in the same substance of itself a tremendous difficulty? If the divine Persons have the same substance, the same

[10] *In Joan. Tract.* 39, 3, 4. Cf. also *De Trin.* 5, 9. " . . . non tamen tres deos sed unum Deum dicimus eam ipsam præstantissimam Trinitatem. Ita maguns Pater, maguns Filius, maguns Spiritus Sanctus; non tamen tres magni sed unus magnus . . . Et bonus Pater, bonus Filius, bonus Spiritus Sanctus, sed unus est bonus . . . itaque omnipotens Pater, omnipotens Filius, omnipotens Spiritus Sanctus; nec tamen tres omnipotentes sed unus omnipotens."

[11] *Epis.* 170, 5. Cf. also *Collatio cum Maximino*, 14. Migne xlii, 722; "Quando dicitur unum sunt, etsi non dicatur quid unum, intelligitur una substantia."

perfections, whence then does their distinction come? In short, the question was to reconcile with the unity of the divine essence, on the one hand, the activity of the Persons possessing this essence; and on the other, their apparitions, their missions, and finally their very existence. These four problems St. Augustine endeavored to solve.

The problem of the activity of the divine Persons was solved with comparatively little difficulty. No doubt the unity of the divine essence would be seriously endangered if each Person acted separately. But St. Augustine rejects this hypothesis energetically. Over and over again he proclaims as an axiom that the Trinity acts always inseparably. "Catholic faith," he says in a homily, "teaches that the works of the Father and of the Son are inseparable. . . . And this principle does not apply merely to the Father and the Son, it extends equally to the Holy Ghost. . . . Catholic faith does not say that the Father did one thing, and the Son another; it says that what the Father has done, the Son has done, and the Holy Ghost likewise. . . . The Father made the world, the Son made the world, and the Holy Ghost made the world. If there were three gods there are three worlds; but if the Father, the Son, and the Holy Ghost are only one and the same God, only one world has been made by the Father, the Son and the Holy Ghost."[12] We learn also in *De Trinitate* that the action of the divine Persons is not only inseparable but unique.[13] Hence the activity of the divine essence has nothing to fear from the activity of the Persons. Of course the Bishop of Hippo knew well that certain scriptural texts seem opposed to his view. But he submits them to the general law; when, for example, he reads in St. Paul that the Spirit divides his gifts to men according as he wills, he explains that this text is not to be taken literally, and that the Holy Ghost does nothing without the Father and the Son.

The problem of the divine apparitions was a more delicate one. According to the received doctrine of the second and third centuries the Theophanies of the Old Testament had had as their author the Logos and not the Father, who could not without compromising His majesty, put Himself in touch with men. Moreover do we not read in the Gospels that the Father and the Holy Ghost had taken part

[12] *In Joan. Tract.*, 20, 3-9. Cf. also *Serm.* 52, 4; 71, 26; 126, 10 and *passim.*

[13] *De Trinit.* 5, 14: "Et ideo quum dicimus et Patrem principium et Filium principium, non duo principia creaturæ dicimus, quia et Pater et Filius simul ad creaturam unum principium est, sicut unus creator, sicut unus Deus."

personally in the baptism of Christ in order to give solemn assurance of His celestial origin? And who was Christ but the second Person of the Trinity clothed with a body and become visible to our eyes? How then do we find a numerical unity of essence in Persons who appeared separately? St. Augustine resolutely broaches this objection. He is especially occupied with it when treating the circumstances of the baptism and of the Incarnation.

The Gospel account of the baptism of Our Lord seemed to attribute to the divine Persons an undeniable separation. In the course of a sermon St. Augustine puts into the mouth of his interlocutor the following objection: "They are not in the same place, they do not fulfil the same functions, they do not do the same work. Show us then the inseparable Trinity!" And this is the solution that he offers: "It is the Trinity which made the flesh of Christ, although this flesh belongs only to Christ. It is the Trinity which made the dove, although this dove belongs only to the Holy Ghost. It is the Trinity which had the voice which made itself heard, although this voice belongs only to the Father."[14] Since the three divine Persons concurred in forming the voice which was heard, the dove which appeared, and the body of Christ, the realization of these divine objects has not broken their union, and the objection is partly solved. There remains, however, a further difficulty. If the Father, the Son, and the Holy Ghost were united in producing these things, were they not in the after event separated? Is it not the Father alone who dwells in the voice? Is it not the Holy Ghost alone who dwells in the dove? The reply we have just received seems to warrant this conclusion, since it says that the voice belongs to the Father alone, the dove to the Holy Ghost alone. One would then be tempted to believe, that according to the Bishop of Hippo, the Father alone dwelt in the voice, and the Holy Ghost alone in the dove. This would be an error. The great Doctor teaches in another passage that the voice as well as the dove were simply symbols used to present the divine Persons under

[14] *Serm.* 52, 2, 21. Cf. also *De Trin.* 4, 30; *Serm.* 71, 27; *Epis.* 169, 6. In this latter we read: "(intelligatur) nullam esse creaturam qua vel solus Pater, vel solus Filius, vel solus Spiritus Sanctus demonstretur, quam non *simul Trinitas operetur* quæ inseparabiliter operatur: ac per hoc nec vocem Patris, nec animam et carnem Filii, nec columbam Spiritus Sancti esse factam *nisi cooperante Trinitate*." This applies to the Theophanies at the Baptism, and to the body of Christ. As for the Theophanies of the Old Testament, St. Augustine believes that they were effected by means of Angels, in the name of one or more of the divine Persons. Cf. *De Trin.* 3, 20 ss; 4. 31, etc.

forms suited to the needs of our intellect.[15] He even adds that these symbols are with the divine Persons in the same relation as the names that serve to designate them. It must then be recognized, that in his mind the Father, the Son, and the Holy Ghost existed simultaneously under each of the sensible objects in question, and that the special bond which united each Person with its object was purely conventional. "Do not be astonished," says St. Augustine a propos of this, "at seeing the symbol bear the name of the thing symbolized. We read that the Holy Ghost, taking the form of a dove, descended upon Christ, and rested upon Him. But we also read elsewhere, that the rock was Christ, that is that it symbolized Christ."[16]

This interpretation of the circumstances of the baptism, St. Augustine extends to the Theophanies of the Old Testament. Who is it that spoke and walked with Adam? Who was manifested to Abraham, to Moses, and to the Prophets? Is it the entire Trinity or one of the divine Persons? And if it is a particular Person, is it always the same one? Is it now one, now another? Could the Father have revealed Himself under certain circumstances, or must this hypothesis be rejected *a priori* as impossible? The greater part of the second book *De Trinitate* is devoted to discussing these questions.[17] After a lengthy treatment, the following conclusions are arrived at: that it is difficult to state precisely in a given instance the name of the divine Person who was manifested; that some of the apparitions could have been made in the name of the entire Trinity,[18] but that each Person, even the Father Himself, could have appeared.[19] However we are carefully warned that what appeared was only a symbol of the Person Himself. "The apparitions," we read, "have been realized, by means of a changeable creature, submitted to the un-

[15] *De Trin.* 2, 32; *Epis.* 169, 5, 9.

[16] *Epis.* 169, 9. Cf. *De Trin.* 2, 32; 4, 30.

[17] *De Trin.* 2, 12 ss.

[18] He passes in review the principal Theophanies and gives a solution for each: (n. 19) "Neque hic ergo evidenter apparet utrum aliqua ex Trinitate persona, an Deus ipse Trinitas . . . visus fuerit Abrahæ"; (n. 23) "Non satis elucet quam in Trinitate personam et utrum aliquam an ipsius Trinitatis gerebat ille Angelus . . . "; Cf. n. 24, 35. It has been held, but incorrectly, that he ascribes the appearances in Paradise to the whole Trinity. The mistake arises from the fact that a question is taken for an affirmation (n. 17, 18); "An omnino Deus indiscrete ipsa Trinitas in forma hominis homini loquebatur? . . . res tamen . . . quantum existimo occulta est."

[19] *De Trin.* 2, 32: " . . . ut nimis temerarium sit dicere Deum Patrem nunquam patribus aut prophetis per aliquas visibiles formas apparuisse."

changeable divinity, and they have shown God not as He is, but only in symbol."[20] St. Justin and Tertullian thought it unbecoming for the Father to place Himself in touch with men; they reserve this function to the Logos. St. Augustine seems, at first sight, to have a broader and less formalistic theology. He allows, in fact, the three divine Persons to descend upon earth at their will. But it is only in appearance. The ancient theologians take the Theophanies in a realistic sense; they regard them as true descents of the divinity upon the earth; and it is for this reason that they reserve them to a subordinate god, that is to say the Logos. St. Augustine sees in the Theophanies only symbols to which usage of speech gives the name of the divinity. He can therefore without difficulty ascribe them to the different Persons of the Trinity. The indissoluble union which binds the Father, the Son and the Holy Ghost, does not suffer any hurt.

But why does the evangelist say that the voice of the Father was heard at the baptism of Jesus, when this voice, the common work of the three divine Persons, had no particular relation to the Father? Why does he say that the Holy Ghost appeared under the form of a dove, when this dove owed no more to the Holy Ghost than to the other divine Persons? Why in a word, does he attribute to any divine Person a work in which this Person had no preponderating part? St. Augustine foresaw this objection and answered it. According to him when Scripture attributes an apparition to a special Person, its end is to aid us to understand the Trinity by putting it within our reach. The divine Persons, having the same nature, can do nothing separately; but our intellect, which is limited, needs to consider them apart, to isolate them one from another. Scripture taking account of our weakness assigns to each of the divine Persons a characteristic symbol to help us to recognize and distinguish them.[21] So speaks the Bishop of Hippo; so too will the Schoolmen speak.

It might have been remarked that in the passage where he treats of the scene of the baptism, St. Augustine seems to liken the status of the body of Christ to that of the two other sensible objects, and to say that the humanity of Jesus belongs to the Son, just as the voice

[20] *Ibid.* loc. cit. Cf. *ibid.* 2, 16; 2, 24: "... per subjectam sue potestati creaturam."

[21] *Epis.* 169, 5: "Multa autem etiam separatim in Scripturis de singulis dici, ut insinuetur quamvis inseparabilis Trinitas, tamen Trinitas." Cf. *In Joan. Tract.* 77, 2; *De Trin.* 1, 19; 2, 10, 11; *Epis.* 11, 4.

which was heard belongs to the Father, just as the dove which appeared belongs to the Holy Ghost. We have here for solution a question of considerable importance. We have just seen that, according to St. Augustine, the voice and the dove of baptism, as all the Theophanies of the Old Testament, are the works of the entire Trinity, that they have in reality no special relation with any one Person, and that it is only by a fiction that we attribute one to the Father, the other to the Holy Ghost. If then he has asserted a complete similarity between the status of the body of Christ and that of the voice and of the dove, he has placed the three divine Persons without distinction in Jesus, and has reduced the Incarnation of the Son to the level of a fiction. What was his mind on this point? Did he confound the apparition of the Son upon the earth with the other Theophanies; and, in order to maintain indissoluble the union of the three divine Persons, did he suppress the Incarnation?

St. Augustine's views on this point varied. In his letter to Nebridius he acknowledges without difficulty that the three divine Persons have had an equal part in the Incarnation. "If a thing," he says, "can have existence without being determined to be this or that object, and without possessing permanence in its specific kind; or if it can have the determination without the existence or, finally, if it can have the permanence without the existence or determination,—then it is also possible that in the Trinity one Person can do something in which the others have no part. But if you see that whatever exists must forthwith possess determined individuality and permanence in generic form, you see also that these three do nothing in which all have not a part."[22]

How is the Incarnation of the *Son* reconciled with these principles? Instead of advancing this problem, St. Augustine puts the following question: why is the assuming of manhood *attributed* to the Son? And to solve it he is satisfied with an appeal to a rule of language and to a fact. The rule of language is that when an object is designated, account is not taken of all the elements included in it, but only of the element which predominates. The fact is that the mission of Christ has been to teach us by His doctrine and by His example how to live virtuously. Here St. Augustine shows the relation between the work accomplished by Christ and the distinctive character of the second Person of the Trinity. Christ has come to do the work of a teacher.

---

[22] *Epis.* 11, 3.

But the distinctive character of the second divine Person (species Filii) is knowledge. The mission of Christ has, then, an affinity with the Son that it has not with the two other Persons. The rule of language which has just been mentioned finds its application here and the assumption of human nature, though an action done in common by the three divine Persons, has been legitimately attributed to the Son.[23] It is evident that at the beginning of his conversion, and while yet a layman, Augustine viewed the Incarnation of the Son as a mere attribution based on analogy. At bottom he considered Christ as the temple in which the Father, Son, and Holy Ghost dwelled equally and with equal rights. Thus conceived, the Incarnation of the Son does not create any difficulty in the dogma of the indissoluble union of the three divine Persons.

Later, St. Augustine presents a view of the Incarnation of the Son of God, which better maintains the reality of that event. He proclaims as beyond doubt that the body of Christ was the common work of the Father, the Son, and the Holy Ghost, just as the voice which was heard and the dove which appeared at the baptism. But he takes care to remark that the comparison is not perfect. We read in the second book of the treatise *De Trinitate*: "The creature, then, in which the Holy Spirit should appear was not so taken, as that flesh and human form were taken, of the Virgin Mary . . . the Holy Spirit did not beatify the dove . . . and join it forever to Himself. . . . We cannot call the Holy Spirit both God and a dove . . . in the same way as we call the Son both God and man."[24] Elsewhere the same observation is applied to the voice of the Father.[25] In fine, St. Augustine learned early to distinguish between the appearance of the second Person in Christ and the other Theophanies either of the Old or of the New Testament. He recognized that the bond which united the body of Christ to the Son had a particular character, and this character consists in the unity of Person.

With this conception, the dogma of the Incarnation was fully safeguarded; but what became of the principle of the indissoluble union of the divine Persons? If the body of Christ has been really united to the Person of the Son, if it is the body of the Son and not

---

[23] *Epis.* 11, 4: "Quoniam per illam susceptionem hominis id actum est ut quædam nobis disciplina vivendi et exemplum praecepti, sub quarumdam sententiarum majestate ac perspicuitate insinuaretur, non sine ratione hoc totum Filio tribuitur."

[24] *De Trin.* 2, 11.

[25] *De Trin*, 4, 31.

the body of the Father or of the Holy Ghost, it follows that there is between the human nature of Jesus and the Son an agreement in which neither the Father nor the Holy Ghost participate—which agreement, in whatever manner it be conceived, supposes on the part of the second Person a work in which the two others have not shared. But is not this hypothesis irreconcilable with the doctrine of the absolute unity of the divine Persons? He had here a singularly delicate and knotty problem. This problem St. Augustine did not discuss; he did not even propose it. It is the Son," he tells us, "and not the Father who is born of the Virgin Mary; but the Father and the Son are the cause of the Son's birth. . . . The Father did not suffer, it was the Son; but this passion of the Son is the operation of the Father and the Son. The Father did not rise from the dead, it was the Son. But the resurrection of the Son was the operation of the Father and the Son."[26]

If, in this passage, the Father alone is mentioned as an agent working with the Son in order to produce various events in the life of Christ, it is only on account of the context. In the main, our holy Doctor associates the Holy Ghost in the common work of the Father and the Son, and he is convinced that the three divine Persons have worked equally to produce the birth, the passion, the resurrection, in a word all the acts of the life of Christ. However, the Son alone was born, suffered, died and rose again! This was the place to explain to us how the works, produced by the common, or rather unified, action of the three Persons belong only to the Son. Neither here nor elsewhere does St. Augustine give us the explanation that we seek. He states, on the one hand, that there is a difference between the manifestation of the Son in Christ and the other Theophanies; that the Son is truly incarnate; that the Son was made man, and not the other two divine Persons; while the other Theophanies were works of the entire Trinity and are referred to some one of the divine Persons only by convention. He states on the other hand, that even in the Incarnation the principle of the unity of action of the three divine Persons has remained unchanged. He closes his eyes to the at least seeming contradiction which confronts him. He believes in the Incarnation of the Son and in the Trinity without trying to reconcile one with the other.

---

[26] *Serm.* 52, 8. Cf. *In Joan. Tract.* 20, 6: "Ambulatio illa carnis supra mare a Patre fiebat, per Filium fiebat. Ergo illa ambulatio opus est Patris et Filii inseparabile."

We have just seen by what processes St. Augustine has reconciled the action of the divine Persons in the world and their apparitions with their substantial unity. But it may be remembered that this principle was found to conflict with facts; namely, the divine Missions and the very existence of the divine Persons. We shall now see how the Bishop of Hippo escapes from these new difficulties.

During the three first centuries the divine Missions had been the main support of the theory of subordination. Those ante-Nicene writers who placed the Father above the Son and the Holy Ghost, relied chiefly upon the scriptural texts which present to us the Son as sent by His Father, and the Holy Ghost as sent by the Father and the Son. If the texts forbid the equality of the divine Persons, much more do they forbid the numerical unity of these Persons. St. Augustine succeeded in reducing them to silence, but this result was not attained without much labor. He sometimes explained that the word Mission was not used with reference to the divine Persons considered in themselves, but to the sensible objects under which They had appeared.[27] According to this theory, when the Scripture spoke of the Mission of the Son, it had in view only the human nature taken by the Son at the moment of the Incarnation. And when it spoke of the Mission of the Holy Ghost it referred to the dove of the baptism and the tongues of fire on Pentecost. At other times he endeavors to show that the idea of Mission was identical with the idea of Procession or that it was in some manner a sensible symbol of it.[28] This

[27] *De Trin.* 2, 9: "Quum itaque hoc a Patre et Filio factum esset ut in carne Filius appareret, congruenter dictus est missus ille qui in ea carne apparuit, missise autem qui in ea non apparuit; quoniam illa quæ coram corporeis oculis foris geruntur, ab interiori apparatu naturæ spiritualis existunt, et propterea convenienter missa dicuntur . . . Pater invisibilis una cum Filio secum invisibil. eundem Filium visibilem faciendo misisse eum dictus est . . . (n. 10). Si ergo missus dicitur in quantum apparuit foris in creatura corporali . . . jam in promptu est intelligere etiam de Spiritu Sancto cur missus et ipse dicatur. . . . Hæc operatio visibiliter expressa . . . missio Spiritus Sancti dicta est." Cf. *Contra Serm. Arianorum*, 4. Migne, xlii, 686: "Hic autem etiam hoc potest intelligi ut eo ipso a Patre Filius missus esse dicatur quod Filius hominibus apparuit in carne, non Pater."

[28] *Contra Serm. Arian.* 4. Here "mission" is identified with "procession," and illustrated by the analogy of rays sent forth by fire. But we are speedily informed that the metaphor is an imperfect one. Being dissatisfied with it, St. Augustine finally rejects it. In *Contra Maximinum*, 2, 14, 8, we read that the mission of the Son "non est inæqualitas substantiæ sed ordo naturæ, non quod alter prior esset altero, sed quod alter esset ex altero." Here we find the idea of mission-procession, but it is taught only in passing. *De Trinit.* 2, 7, comments on the text: *I came forth from the Father and am come into the world*: "Ergo a Patre exire et venire in hunc mundum, hoc est mitti." But this formula, which seems to connect the pro-

second explanation did not seem well qualified to safeguard the two principles of the equality of the divine Persons and the numerical unity of their substance, and St. Augustine was not very well satisfied with it. In the first interpretation the unity and the equality of the Persons had nothing to fear. But here another objection presented itself. If the sending of the Son and the Holy Ghost was constituted by the sensible object under which these two Persons had appeared, why was it that the Father could not be sent? But St. Augustine, who saw no difficulty in attributing some of the Theophanies of the Old Testament to the Father, regarded the idea of the first Person's being sent as an absurdity.[29] And when he sought the reason of this impossibility he found it precisely in the dogma of the Processions. "The Father," he said, "was never sent, because He does not proceed from another Person."[30] If it is because He does not proceed that the first Person was not sent, then it is because They do proceed that the other two Persons received Their Missions. Thus brought back in spite of himself, to the Mission-Procession theory, Augustine felt an embarrassment which he did not always conceal: "The Mission of the Son," we read somewhere, "is absolutely ineffable and surpasses our reason."[31]

Of all the problems to which the Trinity gave rise, the most considerable lay in the very center of this dogma, the problem, namely, of the existence of the three Persons. Of what use was it to prove that in Their works, in Their appearances and in Their Missions, the Father, the Son and Holy Ghost acted as a single substance, if nevertheless they were made up of different substances? But how can

cession and the Incarnation with the idea of mission, has no importance in the eyes of St. Augustine, who says further on (n. 8): "Ostendit eo ipso missum Filium quo factus est ex muliere."

[29]*De Trin.* 4, 32: "... etiamsi voluisset Deus Pater per subjectam creaturam visibiliter apparere, *absurdissime* tamen ... missus diceretur."

[30]*Contra Serm. Arian.*, 4.

[31]*Ibid.*: "Quum igitur hæc a Patre missio Filii prorsus ineffabilis sit, nec capi ullius cognitatione possit. ..." In *De Trin.* 4, 27, the theory of mission-procession is at first presented: "... id est, ut non tantum homo missus intelligatur ... sed et Verbum missum ut homo fieret." Follows the comparison with the rays which we noted in *Contra Serm. Arian.* (See note 28 supra). Then (4, 28) we read: "Et tunc unicuique mittitur quum a quoquam cognoscitur atque percipitur ... (n. 29) mitti est Filio cognosci quod ab illo sit. Et Spiritui Sancto ... mitti est cognosci quia ab illo procedat." We have here a third theory according to which the mission is identified with the knowledge which we have of the divine processions. Evidently St. Augustine did not have a clearly defined explanation of the missions to offer us.

numerical unity of substance be found in three distinct Persons? St. Augustine, however, had no doubts on this point. He was so convinced of the numerical unity of the substance of the Father, of the Son and of the Holy Ghost, that he purposely employed in exposing this doctrine, the most aggressive formulas. We read in *De Trinitate* the following phrase: "The Father, the Son and the Holy Ghost, taken together are no longer the Father only, the Son only, or the Holy Ghost only; these three substances or Persons, whatever name we call them, are equal to any one of them."[32] We read in another passage of the same book that in the august Trinity, one Person is as much as the three Persons together and that two are no more than one.[33]

But these bold expressions could only confuse the intellect without enlightening it. St. Augustine understood this. So in order to give body to his doctrine he had recourse to comparisons and analogies. In order to explain to his friend Nebridius the unity of the divine Persons he observed that, in each object, there is necessarily an existence, an essence and a duration or permanence; that each of these entities is distinct from the two others, but that nevertheless no one of them can exist without the other two; that, for example, there is neither existence nor duration without an object which exists and endures, no real object deprived of existence and duration.[34] When Augustine wrote this letter we know he had just received baptism. It is then upon the type of existence, essence, and duration, as three entities united in the same object that he represents at first the Trinity of the divine Persons. It must be acknowledged that this analogy safeguarded fully the unity of substance of the Father, the Son, and the Holy Ghost. Nevertheless, the Bishop of Hippo soon abandoned it. He preferred to seek in man for some traces of the mystery, and in man he applied himself, if not exclusively, at least by preference, to the soul.[35] It was, then, in the soul especially that he looked for light upon the Trinity; it was in it that he sought the reflection of the mysterious union of the three divine Persons.

[32] *De Trin.* 8, 2.

[33] *Ibid.*, 6, 12. Cf. 6, 9; 7, 11, etc.

[34] *Epis.* 11, 3.

[35] In *De Trin.* 12, 5, 6, he rejects the comparison drawn from the family. *Ibid.* 11, 2-5, he proposes an analogy with sight, in which he distinguishes: (a) body as the object of sight; (b) the act of seeing, stimulated and, so to speak, begotten by the body; (c) the will which applies the sense of sight to the body, and, after a fashion, unites the two.

The human soul furnished St. Augustine with many images of the Trinity with all of which he does not seem to be equally satisfied.[36] The analogy which he prefers, the one which he somewhere calls "the most evident,"[37] is borrowed from the presence in the soul of memory, intelligence and will. "In order to help us understand what is in God," he says, "we take memory, intelligence and will."[38] Not that he ascribes an absolute exactness to this comparison. On the contrary he explains to us that it is lacking in several ways and that it would be ridiculous to conceive the divine essence as a soul whose persons would be the faculties. But in spite of the imperfections and deficiencies which he does not hesitate to acknowledge in the trinity that we bear about in ourselves, he is attached to it on account of the good use he can make of it. We have just seen that, according to St. Augustine, the divine Persons produce all Their works and that They act as if They constituted only one principle. But how is this unity of action conceived? The analogy of the human soul throws a light on this mystery. "When I name my memory and intellect and will," we read in *De Trinitate*, "each one of the words which I use, means only one of the faculties in question, but in order to produce it the co-operation of my memory, my intellect and my will has been indispensable. This image aids us in understanding . . . how the inseparable action of the Trinity is found in the objects which symbolize the Father, the Son and the Holy Ghost."[39]

The example of the human soul served Augustine not only in explaining the unity of action of the divine Persons; it helped him to unravel another problem. It was not enough to have placed in relief the substantial unity of the Father, the Son and the Holy Ghost. Though welded together by their substance these three Persons are in some way distinct; otherwise the names by which they are designated would be only denominations corresponding to no reality. In what way then do the divine Persons differ? It is to the solution of this question that the fifth book of *De Trinitate* is devoted. After reminding the reader that the explanation of the distinction of the Persons

[36]In *De Trin.* 9, 3 ss., he offers an analogy drawn from mind which knows itself and which knowing itself loves itself, and loves at the same time the knowledge it has of itself.

[37]*De Trin.* 15, 5: " . . . ut inveniretur in mente evidentior trinitas ejus, in memoria scilicet et intelligentia et voluntate." This analogy is developed in *De Trin.* 10, 17-19. Cf. also 15, 39 ss.

[38]*Epis.* 169, 6.

[39]*De Trin.* 4, 30.

ought not to be sought in the divine substance, since all three have precisely the same substance,[40] the author asks if the *accidents* could not furnish the solution sought. We see that the same substance possesses many qualities or modes of existence which seem to be as if placed and plated upon it, for which reason philosophers give them the name *accidents*. Hence, since the explanation of the distinction of the divine Persons cannot be found in substance, the first thought which presents itself is to demand this explanation from the accidents and to conceive the Father, the Son, and the Holy Ghost as three accidents subsisting in the divine substance. This solution would be a convenient one, but the illustrious Doctor was obliged to recognize that it was unsatisfactory. In order to prove this, it was sufficient to remark that an accident is, by its very definition, a reality distinct from substance, a something of which the latter *ex se* could be deprived, without ceasing to exist. But God is necessarily all that He has; His perfections are one with His essence, and consequently there are no accidents in the divinity.[41] But then where are we to look for the reason of the distinction of the three divine Persons? "In Their relation," replies St. Augustine.[42] Here he explains to us that the words "Father" and "Son" are necessarily related to each other since there is no father without a son, nor son without a father, so that in viewing them, they are set in opposition, and consequently they are mutually distinguished. He concludes from this that the Father, inasmuch as He is Father, is necessarily distinct from the Son, although outside of this point of view they make but one and the same Being, since They possess the same perfection. He then extends the same view to include the Holy Ghost Who is the gift of the Father and of the Son, and with regard to Whom consequently the Father and the Son bear the relation of the giver and the thing given.[43] In short, the conclusion at which Augustine arrives is, that, in God, if the substance and perfections are considered, the most absolute unity must be maintained, and that the only distinction

[40] *Ibid.* 5, 4.

[41] *Ibid.* 5, 5.

[42] *Ibid.* 5, 6: "In Deo autem nihil equidem secundum accidens dicitur, quia nihil in eo mutabile est; nec tamen omne quod dicitur secundum substantiam dicitur. Dicitur enim *ad aliquid*, sicut Pater ad Filium et Filius ad Patrem . . . hæc non secundum substantiam dicuntur, sed secundum relativum; quod tamen relativum non est accidens quia non est mutabile."

[43] *Ibid.* 5, 13: "Sed tamen ille Spiritus Sanctus . . . in eo quod proprie dicitur Spiritus Sanctus, *relative dicitur*, quum et ad Patrem et ad Filium refertur. Sed ipsa relatio non apparet in hoc nomine; apparet autem quum dicitur Donum Dei."

which exists between the divine Persons comes from their mutual relations, or if you will, the part that They play with regard to one another. The Father is Father only in so far as He is opposed to the Son; when we abstract from the opposition, we have before us only the divine substance with its infinite perfections. It is the same with the other two Persons. Hence the principle of Augustine that all that is not relative—that is to say, that every other term than the terms "Father," "Son" and "Holy Ghost"—ought to be left in the singular.[44] "The Father is God," he says, "the Son is God, the Holy Ghost is God; but as this is applied to substance, it follows that there are not three gods, but only one God, which is at the same time Trinity. The Father is great, the Son is great, the Holy Ghost is great; however, there are not three great beings but only one. . . . The Father is omnipotent, the Son is omnipotent, the Holy Ghost is omnipotent, and yet there are not three omnipotents but only one."[45]

These three divine Persons are then simply relations. But how can we conceive such a state of being? How can we understand persons who possess the same essence and who are nevertheless distinguished by the relations that exist between them? Augustine believed he found in the soul an explanation of this difficulty. He remarked that the three faculties of the soul in which he had perceived a reflection of the divinity here again furnished an analogy: "Memory," he says, "considered in itself is life, mind, and substance; but in so far as it is memory it is in relation with other things; it is the same with the intelligence and will. Each of these faculties is in itself life, mind and essence. Fundamentally they are the same; they are distinguished only by their relations."[46] However after having sought to explain the presence of three Persons in one substance by the human soul, he himself felt all the defects of his explanation; "The memory," he says, "the intellect and the will belong to me, they do not belong to themselves; it is not for themselves, it is for me, that they act, rather it is I who act by them. . . . They are the property of only one person but they are not that person. On the contrary, in this sovereignly simple nature which is God, although

[44] *Ibid.* 5, 9: "Quidquid ergo ad seipsum dicitur Deus et de singulis Personis singulariter dicitur, id est de Patre et Filio et Spiritu Sancto, et simul de ipsa Trinitate, non pluraliter sed singulariter dicitur."

[45] *Ibid.* 5, 9. Cf. *De Civitate*, ii, 10: "Quod habet (Trinitas) hoc est excepto quod relative quæque persona ad alteram dicitur . . . .In quo ergo ad seipsum dicitur non ad alterum, hoc est quod habet."

[46] *De Trin.* 10, 18.

there is only one God, there are, however, three Persons: the Father, the Son, and the Holy Ghost."[47] Moreover after having made this avowal the holy Doctor consoles himself by observing that the human soul was only an image of the Trinity.[48]

Now that we know the doctrine of St. Augustine on the three divine Persons, it is easy for us to trace the path he trod to the dogma of the Trinity. When he received baptism at the hands of St. Ambrose, the Latin Church had long believed in the unity of substance in the Trinity. While the East, in order to maintain the distinction of the hypostases, conceived the divine nature common to the Father, the Son and the Holy Ghost, on the type of the human nature common to all the children of Adam, the West, on the contrary, impregnated with the spirit of Sabellius, conceived the divine substance common to the three Persons on the type of substance such as it is in each one of us.[49] Here they consider the divine nature as an individual, as a species. If St. Augustine could have compared Greek theology with the Latin theology, he would probably have felt some difficulties, but that theology was an enigma for him. Doubtless he read the discourses of the Cappadocians, notably those of St. Gregory Nazianzen; but he read them only to find arms against his adversaries and not for instruction.[50] Accordingly, he was but little influenced by them. Moreover the following passage of *De Trinitate* shows us how the Eastern terminology impressed him: "What the Greeks call οὐσία we call essence and more commonly substance. They also employ the term *hypostasis*; but I do not see the difference which they make between *ousia* and *hypostasis*. It is certain that the most of those who speak Greek use the formula μίαν οὐσίαν, τρεῖς ὑπόστασεῖς which in Latin is equivalent to: *only one essence, three substances.*"[51] It is evident that the Bishop of Hippo, did not understand the conceptions which the Greeks wished to express by their formulas.

Shut up though he was within the circle of Western ideas St. Augustine brought to bear upon these ideas a philosophical mind. Up to his time, little had been done except to preserve the formula

[47] *Ibid.* 15, 42.

[48] *Ibid.* 15, 43.

[49] Hippolytus and Tertullian, who are exceptions, do not represent the theology of the West on this point.

[50] He may have borrowed from St. Gregory Nazienzen his explanation of the divine Persons by the notion of relation. At any rate, we find the germ of this theory in *Orat.* 29, 16.

[51] *De Trin.* 5, 10.

first made by Pope Callistus, and afterwards retouched by Pope Dionysius. It was deemed sufficient to set alongside the notion of the unity of divine substance that of the three Persons. Augustine endeavored to explain how the Father, the Son and the Holy Ghost could have acted, appeared to men, how above all They could have subsisted in the divine essence without destroying the sovereign unity. In a word he undertook to give a reason for the faith that was in him, to explain the mystery to which he was attached by faith which no doubt could dim.

Has he succeeded in his attempt? Has he managed to make the human reason understand how three Persons can possess the same substance? If the mystery of the Trinity consisted wholly in maintaining the unity of the divine essence, then indeed we should have to bear witness for him that the results which he has obtained, accord fully with his intentions. In fact, the explanation that he gives of the divine Persons, of Their apparitions, Their Missions, of Their existence itself, maintains and safeguards the unity of the divine substance under the strictest and most absolute conception that can be formed. But there are two sides to the dogma of the Trinity, and the Trinity of the divine substance is only one of these phases. After having shown that the Father, the Son and the Holy Ghost are not three substances, St. Augustine, in order to complete the task that he had imposed upon himself, ought to have shown us that the Father, the Son and the Holy Ghost are distinct as Persons without being distinct from the point of view of substance. But it must be acknowledged that he has brought to this problem no beginnings of the solution. He offers us the example of memory, intellect, and will which exist simultaneously in the human soul. He warns us, however, that the comparison of the trinity which is in the human soul with the divine trinity is not exact in every detail.[52] Doubtless we would be wrong in demanding that he give us comparisons which should bear a perfect resemblance. We should be satisfied if, between the three faculties of the human soul and the divine Persons, the divergencies bear only on points foreign to the comparison.

---

[52] *Epis.* 169, 6: "Nec ideo putanda sunt hæc tria Trinitati sic comparata ut omni ex parte conveniant . . . primo ergo in hoc invenitur ista similitudo dissimilis quod tria hæc, memoria, intelligentia, voluntas animæ insunt, non eadem tria est anima; illa vero Trinitas non inest sed ipsa Deus est . . . Deinde quis audeat dicere Patrem non intelligere per se ipsum sed per Filium, sicut memoria non intelligit per se ipsam."

But it is not asking too much to demand that the objects compared should resemble each other in the very point in which comparison is instituted. If the faculties of the soul are to give us an image of the Trinity, these faculties should at least be persons. With this element in common, we might shut our eyes to the profound differences which must necessarily exist between created persons and divine Persons. Now memory, intelligence, and will have not their own individuality, or, to use St. Augustine's expression: "They belong to a person; they are not this person." Hence the condition indispensable for the comparison is totally lacking. The human soul, possessing multiform activities despite its unity of substance, may help us to conceive the substantial unity of the Father, Son, and Holy Ghost; but it affords no explanation of Their personal distinction. It throws perhaps a light on one of the sides of the mystery of the Trinity; it leaves the other in complete darkness. And since the mystery consists in the combination of the notions of unity of substance and plurality of Persons, the example of the human soul furnishes no illustration of the Trinity; it is no help for our understanding of it.

St. Augustine also teaches us that the divine Persons are distinguished and constituted by the relations which they have to each other. This theory of relations would be most acceptable if it could fulfil what it promises, that is to say, if it could show us out of what the Persons of the Trinity are made. Unfortunately it can not. After all, what are these relations in which the Father, Son and Holy Ghost are found? Are they the divine substance itself? But this substance, being absolutely simple, rejects the slightest shadow of multiplicity or distinction. Are they modes of being which are attached to substance? But St. Augustine himself acknowledges that what we call modes of being or accidents cannot exist in God. He tells us, it is true, that a father is necessarily distinct from his son, and that their relations set them apart from each other. No doubt the relations of fatherhood and sonship are opposed to each other, and set apart the beings to whom they belong. It is evident that if there be in the divinity a relation of fatherhood and a relation of sonship, these two relations demand two distinct subjects, two Persons. The question is precisely to know how these two relations can coexist in one essence which is absolutely simple. Do the fatherhood and the sonship modify the divine substance, or do they leave it unchanged? If they leave the substance untouched, they cannot produce distinct subjects. If they modify it and give it a special stamp then

we have two substances, one with the stamp of fatherhood, the other with that of sonship. No doubt the two substances possess the same properties; they possess them in common; they possess them all—save one. The first has paternity, which the second has not; the second has sonship, which the first has not. These substances therefore are not in every respect the same; they are not absolutely at one; and it is inexact to say that the Father has the same substance as the Son. Needless to say, the same holds good of the Holy Ghost. In a word, it is easy to see what these relations are not; it is hard to see what they are, or that they are anything more than words. Moreover, in spite of the ingenuity he displays in his efforts to hold to the received terminology, St. Augustine was nevertheless embarrassed by this terminology. At the end of a long dissertation on the absolute and the relative in the Divinity, he lets slip this avowal: "When the question comes up: what are the three, human language shows itself as strikingly deficient. However we call them three *Persons*, not that this expresses what they are, but that some term must be used."[53] It seems safe to say that the writer of these lines would never have spoken of three divine Persons if he had not found this formula already established.

JOSEPH TURMEL.

[53] *De Trin.* 5, 10: "Tamen quum quæritur quid tres, magna prorsus inopia humanum laborat eloquium. Dictum est tamen tres personæ, non ut illud diceretur, sed ne taceretur." *Ibid.* 7, 11: " . . . ne omnino taceremus interrogati quid tres, quum tres esse fateremur."

NOTES.

The Holy Father has issued an important decree on the Study of Sacred Scriptures, a translation of which is here given:

I. The instruction in Sacred Scripture to be imparted in every seminary should embrace: first, the principal ideas concerning inspiration, the canon of the Scripture, the original text and the most important variants, the laws of Hermeneutics; secondly, the history of both Testaments; and thirdly, the analysis and exegesis of the different books according to the importance of each.

II. The curriculum of Biblical studies is to be divided over the entire period during which ecclesiastical students pursue their course of sacred studies within the walls of the seminary; so that when the course is finished each student may have gone through the entire curriculum.

III. The Chairs of Scripture are to be filled according to the circumstances and the means of the different seminaries, but always in such a way that no student shall be deprived of the opportunity of learning those things of which a priest may not lawfully be ignorant.

IV. Since, on the one hand, it is not possible to give a detailed exposition of the whole of Scripture, and on the other, it is necessary that the whole of Scripture should be in some sense known to the priest, the professor should take care to have special treatises or introductions for each of the books, analysis, proofs of authenticity, etc.; but he will, at the same time, dwell at greater length on the more important books and parts of books.

V. With regard to the Old Testament he will make use of the latest results of research in illustrating the history of the Hebrew people, and their relations with other Oriental nations; he will treat of the main features of the Mosaic Law; and he will explain the principal prophecies.

VI. He will take special pains to imbue his students with zeal to study and understand those Psalms which they recite daily in the divine Office; he will select some of those Psalms for interpretaton in order to show by way of example the method to be followed by the students in their private studies to interpret the others.

VII. Treating of the New Testament he will explain briefly and clearly the special characteristics of each of the four Gospels and the proofs of their authenticity; he will also illustrate the general character of the entire Gospel story, and the doctrine contained in the Epistles and the other Books.

VIII. He will pay special attention to those parts of both Testaments which concern Christian faith and morals.

IX. He will always remember, especially in treating of the New Testament, to imbue with its teachings those who are afterwards by their words and their example to teach the people the doctrine of salvation. He will, therefore, in the course of his instruction explain to his students the best way of preaching the Gospel and will stimulate them as occasion

arises to observe diligently the commands of the Lord Christ and the Apostles.

X. The more promising students are to be instructed in the Hebrew tongue, in Biblical Greek, and whenever possible, in some other Semitic language, such as Syriac or Arabic. "It is necessary for professors in Scripture and it is becoming in theologians to know those languages in which the canonical books were originally written by the sacred writers, and it is of the greatest importance that these languages should be studied by ecclesiastical students and especially by such of them as aim at obtaining academical degrees in theology. Efforts should be made to have chairs in all academies for other ancient languages and especially the Semitic." (Encyclical "Providentissimus").

XI. In seminaries which enjoy the right of conferring academic degrees; it will be necessary to increase the number of lectures on Sacred Scripture and consequently to go more deeply into general and special questions and to devote more time and study to Biblical exegesis, archælogy, geography, chronology, theology and history.

XII. Special diligence is to be shown in preparing select students for the academic degrees in Sacred Scripture according to the rules laid down by the Biblical Commission—a matter of no small importance for securing suitable professors of Scripture for the seminary.

XIII. Every Doctor in Sacred Scripture will be most careful never to swerve in the least in his teaching from the doctrine and tradition of the Church; he will of course make use of the real additions to our knowledge which modern research supplies, but he will avoid the rash commentaries of innovators; so too he will confine himself to the treatment of questions which contribute to the elucidation and defense of the Sacred Scriptures; and finally he will be guided in his plan of treatment by those rules full of prudence contained in the Encylical "Providentissimus."

XIV. Students should endeavor to make up by private study what the schools fail to supply in this branch of sacred learning. As lack of time will render it impossible for the professor to go over the whole of Scripture in detail, they will by themselves devote a portion of time every day to a careful perusal of the Old and New Testaments—and in this they will be greatly helped by the use of some commentary to throw light on obscure passages and explain the more difficult ones.

XV. Students are to undergo an examination in Scripture as well as in other parts of theology to show the profit they have derived from the lesson before they are allowed to pass into another class or to be initiated in Sacred Orders.

XVI. In all academies every candidate for academic degrees in theology will be asked certain questions on Scripture relating to the historical and critical introduction as well as to exegesis; and will prove by examination that he is sufficiently acquainted with the Hebrew tongue, and has a knowledge of Biblical Greek.

XVII. The students of Sacred Scripture are to be exhorted to read not only interpretations of the Scripture, but good authors who treat of subjects connected with this study—for instance the History of both Testaments, the Life of Our Lord and the Apostles, and books of travel in Palestine—from all of which they will easily acquire a knowledge of biblical places and customs.

XVIII. To further this object efforts will be made to supply each seminary, as far as circumstances will permit, with a small library in which books of this kind will be at the disposal of students.

The recent issue of the *Gerachia Cattolica* contains a list of the members and consultors of the Pontifical Commission for Biblical Studies. The Commission proper consists of Cardinals Rampolla, Satolli, Merry del Val, Segna, and Vives y Tuto. The consultors are given as follows:

Father Vigouroux, S. S., formerly Professor of Scripture in the Catholic Institute of Paris, *First Secretary*.

Dom Laurens Janssens, O.S. B., Professor of Theology in the College of San Anselmo, Rome, *Second Secretary*.

Father David Fleming, O. F. M., Provincial of the Irish Province of his Order.

Father A. Lepidi, O. P., Master of the Sacred Palace and Assistant of the Congregation of the Index.

Father Thomas Esser, O. P., Secretary of the Congregation of the Index.

Mgr. Ceriani, Prefect of the Ambrosian Library, Milan.

Father de Hummelauer, S. J.

Mgr. Lamy, Professor Emeritus of the Catholic University of Louvain.

Dr. Otto Bardenhewer, Professor of Exegesis at Munich.

Mgr. Mercati, of the Vatican Library.

Father Gismondi, S. J., Professor of Oriental Languages in the Gregorian University.

Father Cereseto, of the Oratory of St. Philip, Genoa.

Dr. Van Hoonacker, Professor of Scripture at Louvain.

Mgr. Salvatore Talamo, Rome.

Dr. Grannan, Professor of Scripture in the Catholic University of America.

Mgr. Kaulen, Professor of Sacred Scripture at Strasburg.

Dom Ambrogio Amelli, O. S. B., Prior of the Monastery of Monte Cassino.

Father Robert Clarke, of the Archdiocese of Westminster, (lately deceased).

Father M. J. Lagrange, O. P., Professor of Sacred Scripture in the College of St. Stephen, Jerusalem; editor of *La Revue Biblique Internationale*.

Dr. Umberto Fracassini, Professor of Sacred Scripture in the Seminary of Perugia.

Father Cornely, S. J., Rome.

Dr. Hoberg, Professor of Scripture in the University of Freiburg (in Baden).

Dom Weikert, O. S. B., Professor of Oriental Languages in the College of San Anselmo, Rome.

Father Vincent Scheil, O. P., Professor of the Institute "des Hautes Etudes."

Mgr. Confalonieri, Professor of Scripture in the Seminary of Florence.

Dr. Bernard Schaefer, Professor Emeritus of Scripture in the University of Vienna.

Mgr. Legendre, Professor of Scripture in the Catholic Institute, Angers.

Father Prat, S. J., Rome.

Mgr. Gutberlet, of the Seminary of Fulda.

Dr. Paul Vetter, Professor of Exegesis at Tübingen.
Dr. Poels, of the Catholic University of America.
Father Fillion, S. S., of the Catholic Institute, Paris.
Dr. Hugo Weiss, Professor of Exegesis at Bamberg.
Dr. Torio, of the Seminary of Valencia.
Dr. Henri Lesêtre, of the Archdiocese of Paris.
Dr. Düsterwald, Rector Emeritus of the Collegium Albertinum, Bonn.
Dr. Chauvin, Superior of the Seminary of Mayenne (Laval).
Father Balestri, O. S. A., Professor Emeritus of Scripture in the College of St. Monica, Rome.
Father Giovanni Genocchi, Procurator General of the Missionary Fathers of the Sacred Heart.
Father Lepicier, O. S. M., Professor of Theology in the College of the Propaganda.
Father Delattre, S. J., Professor of Scripture in the Gregorian University, Rome.
Dom Hildebrand Höpfe, O. S. B., Professor of Scripture in the College of San Anselmo, Rome.
Father Molini, O. F. M., Professor of Scripture in the College of San Antonio, Rome.

Since the beginning of the year there has been considerable activity amongst theologians and exegetes concerning the all important Biblical question. Just a year ago we chronicled a number of books and articles—by Abbot Ford, Dr. Poels, Father Lagrange, Fr. Sydney Smith, Fr. von Hummelauer—which at least tended towards broader views on the question. The most striking of these was the book of Father von Hummelauer, a work which was sufficiently remarkable for its intrinsic merits, but which gained an extrinsic interest on account of the great Society to which the author belongs. Perhaps it was the latter fact that aroused the activity of the more conservative elements in the Society to undertake a campaign against the rapidly spreading broader views of Inspiration. At any rate, we have been presented with a series of books and articles—in *Études*, *Civilta Cattolica*, *Razon y Fe*, and the Innsbruck *Zeitschrift*—by Pesch, Murillo, Schiffini, Brucker, Billot, Fonck, Dorsch, and others, mainly in defense of traditional opinions. Of these, Father Pesch's work *De Inspiratione Scripturæ Sacræ* merits—and will receive—ampler notice in our next number.

Many of these writers direct no small portion of their attack against Father Lagrange, the eminent editor of *La Revue Biblique*, whose work on *Historical Criticism and the Old Testament* was done into English last year at the request of authority as being an excellent work for these times. After a period of restraint, he at last broke silence, and in the *Etudes* (Jan. 5 and Mar. 20) there is "a gentle and joyous passage-at-arms" between himself and Père Brucker. As it stands at present, it is a drawn battle, especially as the only referee, the Church, is not likely to pronounce a hasty decision. Father Brucker thinks that his learned brother in the priesthood does not take sufficiently into account the ecclesiastical traditions. On the other hand, Father Lagrange replies that those who criticise his solutions of the acknowledged difficulties content them-

selves with attacking his orthodoxy, but carefully refrain from any straightforward attempt to deal with these same difficulties.

Meanwhile an Italian Jesuit, Father Schiffini, had taken the field. Compared with him, his French *confrère* of the *Etudes* is "as water into wine"; his German brother—well, without metaphor, as a Teuton to a Latin. The very title of his book is a war-cry—*Divinitas Scripturarum Adversus Hodiernas Novitates Asserta et Vindicata.* He is not reticent of his mind, even when his own brethren in religion are in question. He attacks openly the views of Father von Hummelauer, and is impatient at the mildness of Father Brucker; he ranges himself at the side of Father Delattre. Father Schiffini is an eminent theologian, and his latest work has undoubted merits, which have won for it Papal commendation, but he has something of the forensic cast of mind, and something too of the forensic style of dealing with those who do not agree with him. Much may be pardoned in a man who is contending earnestly for a point which he considers of the utmost importance to religion, but it would be a case of charity sinning against charity to condone the language used concerning Father Lagrange, which the latter quotes in *Revue Biblique*, April, (p. 323). The method of the distinguished Dominican differs from that of the Rationalists only in not being as open and honest: "Haec itaque methodus errori mendacium addit." His letter to Mgr. Batiffol arouses this comment: "An haec ad fucum faciendum sint gesta, lectores viderint. Deus certe non irridetur!" And in another connection: "Hunc quoque locum, more suo, sophistice corrumpere sategit." He worked out his historical method, we are told: "ut rationalisticam methodum ad catholica castra adduceret."

Father Lagrange's views should be made to stand the test of the most thorough-going criticism; but concerning himself there can be but one opinion. We pass over what may be considered his external titles to consideration, such as that he is a member of a great historic Order in the Church, a distinguished Thomistic theologian, the editor of the leading Catholic Biblical Review, the founder and head of a Catholic School for Bible Studies in the Holy Land, and a consultor of the Biblical Commission. Considered in himself, he is an able and honest scholar, and a devoted and loyal priest, and one who has done more to keep heads sane and steady during these times of transition than any other man in the Catholic Church. It is no wonder, then, that he reads these words of Father Schiffini with pain and indignation that render him speechless.

It is a pleasure after all this to be able to quote the sincere testimony of Father Lagrange to the fair and courteous treatment he has received from the eminent German Jesuit theologian, Father Christian Pesch: "Conscious that I have not burdened the *Revue Biblique* with my personal quarrels, I feel myself free to thank Father Pesch for his method of treatment. I am so used to being dealt with as a public enemy, or at least as a self-styled critic who is altogether ignorant of the first principles of theology, that I am deeply grateful to him for having spared me from insults, and indeed from a single disagreeable allusion. In the ten pages which he has seen fit to devote to me, he has cited numerous passages which he has taken the trouble to translate into Latin, not as is too often

done, to throw the emphasis on a phrase which can be made compromising by taking it out of its context, with a sly hint by way of commentary, but in a way to present what, I scarcely dare call, on account of the 'occasional' character of my work, a general view of the Bible. I am especially grateful for his saying—and the saying is perfectly correct: 'Principia sunt scholæ thomisticæ.'" Father Lagrange goes on to say that in the main he feels himself at one with Father Pesch on the question of inspiration.

We have just referred to Father Lagrange's services to the Church in a period of transition like the present. Turning to the June number of the *Ecclesiastical*, we meet with the following passages, which are written in connection with a fine and generous tribute to another Catholic editor, Mr. Wilfrid Ward: "Those who seemed to be best skilled in reading the signs of the times think the world is passing through a 'transitional era.' Certainly the saying approves itself in the domain of industry, the mechanical arts, and the physical sciences. Hardly less obviously true is it in the order of thought, philosophical, theological, and spiritual. In a very vital sense indeed, every period of thought may be called transitional, for thought is a living thing that grows and changes, and every age is rooted in its predecessor and flowers and fruits in its successor. Nevertheless there are eras that show phenomena of thought, belief, aspiration, and endeavor which stamp them as signally 'transitional,' as bearing their human freight from one stage of thinking and doing to another widely different. During 'transitional eras,' such as the present is deemed to be, the difficulty of adjustment and passage from the past to the future, lies as usual in either extreme—on the one hand, in an ultra-conservatism that sees no room or grounds for progress and so holds stubbornly to the *quod traditum est*, not distinguishing herein the substance and the divine elements, from the human and purely transient accretions; on the other hand, there is the excessively hasty and rash radicalism that seizes upon the newest and often unverified findings or the inadequately based inferences and interpretations in order to substitute them for the essential content of the racial and Christian possession—thus needlessly pouring out the baby with the bath.

"One reason at least for these extreme attitudes in the face of actual demands may probably be found in the fact that both fail to interpret, or rather to understand, the implications or relations of their respective positions. The ultra-conservative, the *intransigeant*, having come by heredity and education to reduce the content of faith to a formula, and its practice to the use of the sensible sign, has lost sight of the inner life and hence progressiveness of both theory and conduct: while the too eager innovator, the rashly *transigeant*, fails to notice that the new conquests of the mind, in so far as they are proven to be true, must be implied or connected with the older deposit of truth. Mediating between these two extremes there have always been—nor are they wholly wanting now—men of larger mould, minds that see farther and deeper and are steadier and surer in their methods. These are the providential leaders who carry over without destroying the old to the new. To seize this mediating spirit, to organize, and effectuate it, should obviously be the aim and programme of our reviews. It is gratifying to see how clearly this is discerned and is now being carried out by the Nestor among the Catholic reviews in England."

Passing to the *Tablet*, we find that the always interesting writer of "Literary Notes" has hit upon a citation which opens up a line of thought equally pertinent to present conditions. He quotes a phrase from Cardinal Pallavicino's history of the Council of Trent, that possibly Luther's opponents by declaring him a heretic, forced him to become one. The writer goes on to say: "We venture to think that these weighty words of Cardinal Pallavicino contain a warning which Catholic controversialists will do well to take to heart. And if we are not greatly mistaken, this lesson is more especially needed at the present moment. We are passing through a period of crisis and transition. Many minds are bewildered by new difficulties unknown in earlier ages, or dazzled, it may be, by the light of new discoveries or by the brilliant theories put forward by modern critics and philosophers. Quite apart from anything that may be said or done by Catholic writers, there is an inherent danger in the situation. But when an adventurous apologist strikes out a new line, and makes concessions or suggests compromises, many fear or feel that this is adding to the danger. And a host of zealous champions come forward to refute the rash innovator, and denounce him as little better than a heretic or an unbeliever. But let them beware of the danger against which they are warned by the Jesuit historian: 'Puo essere che col dichiararlo Eretico prima del tempo, lo facessero diventare.'"

Catholic scholarship in England has suffered a loss by the death of Father Robert Clarke, priest of the Archdiocese of Westminster and one of the Consultors to the Pontifical Commission on Biblical studies. It is true that Father Clarke's contributions to the literature of the subject were rather insignificant, but he was a true scholar and a devoted priest, and as such exercised a wide and beneficent influence. It will be remembered that when Prof. Mivart was writing the series of letters which ended in his break with the Church, Cardinal Vaughan recommended him to place his difficulties before Father Clarke. If the eminent scientist had done so, the unfortunate ending of the affair might have been avoided, though it is difficult to think so, as Mivart wanted categorical answers to questions which will not have been thoroughly threshed out till a few generations have worked over them.

It is announced that the Franciscans, following the example of the sons of St. Dominic, have opened a Biblical School in Jerusalem. No body of men in the Western Church has been in such intimate touch with the Holy Land as the Franciscans, on account of their position as custodians of the holy places. The courses offered comprise General and Special Introduction, the archæology and geography of Palestine, Exegesis (in harmony with the traditions of the Order), and a special course to defend the authenticity of the sanctuaries and the Franciscan traditions. The *Revue Augustinienne* says that Father David Fleming is supposed to be the originator of the idea. There may be some dissatisfaction in the minds of many that the new school conceives its functions somewhat narrowly. But in the long run nothing but good can come of the undertaking. It will breed Catholic scholars—exegetes and archæologists—who will give a new lustre to the Order of St. Francis and an efficient defence to Catholic positions.

BOOK REVIEWS.

The Valerian Persecution—by PATRICK J. HEALY, D. D. Houghton, Mifflin & Co. Boston, 1905. pp. 285.

To John Baptist de Rossi, the first archæologist who took up seriously the work of exploring the Roman catacombs interrupted by the death of Bosio, must largely be attributed the honor of attracting the special attention of historians to the first age of the Church. This laudable result of modern archæological investigations suggests a contrast between the seventeenth and nineteenth century by no means creditable to the former. No one of his contemporaries, Catholic or non-Catholic, fully realized the importance of the great work accomplished by Bosio; whereas, on the contrary, the achievements of De Rossi have won universal recognition.

Among the earliest of De Rossi's disciples was M. Paul Allard, the historian of the Martyrs. The numerous interesting details of early Christian life made known to the world through the famous *Bolletino* and the *Roma Sotteranea* of De Rossi, added so much to our knowledge of the Church in the first three centuries as to make a revision of the history of the relations of Church and State during this period very desirable. This useful work has been excellently performed by M. Allard in his monumental *Histoire des Persécutions.* In English, however, we have so far no exhaustive history of the pre-Continian period, and therefore, Dr. Healy's excellent book on one of its most important epochs is all the more welcome.

The author in his preface informs us that the reign of Valerian saw the most critical period in the relations of Church and State before the age of Constantine. Hence, evidently, his selection of this vantage ground as the best from which to make a survey of the policy of the Emperors with regard to the Church up to the middle of the third century. A detailed history of the most conspicuous martyrs of the Valerian Persecution occupies the latter part of this volume, and the record of their sufferings, as graphically described by the author, is of absorbing interest. But the first two chapters, with the fifth and seventh, will be found of particular value for the clear, concise account they contain of the principles upon which were based the policy of persecution.

At first view it is surprising to find in the ranks of the persecutors of the Christians such Emperors as Trajan and Marcus Aurelius,

while on the other hand we find the brutal Commodus and the contemptible Elagabalus indifferent or friendly. The reason for this anomaly is tersely stated by the author: "Each side seemed to have attained (in the reign of Valerian) to a full realization of the fact that it contained in it qualities destructive of vital elements in the other." Consequently, "the Roman Empire as then constituted could scarcely co-exist with any considerable organization of Christians."

But why could not the two societies co-exist and work in harmony for the good of their common subjects? For the very reason that no Roman statesman would entertain the idea that there could be two authorities, each supreme in its own sphere, the one concerned with the spiritual, the other with the temporal interests of the citizen. The religions of antiquity were national in character, and, consequently, the regulation of the worship of the gods was the most important function of civil administration. But the Founder of Christianity introduced a new principle, the antithesis of that universally accepted hitherto, when He instructed His disciples to give to Cæsar what belonged to Cæsar, and to God what belonged to God. But Cæsar was not easily induced to allow so important a department of imperial administration to escape his control. Back of the thousand calumnies which were the outcome of popular prejudice, the antagonistic principles of Christianity and imperial Rome in this regard were the statesman's final reason for hostility to the Church.

The persecutions of Decius and Valerian, from the manner in which they were carried out and the object aimed at, were far more dangerous than any that preceded them. The former of these Emperors, by means of torture and confiscation, endeavored to bring about a wholesale apostasy from Christianity. Valerian's policy differed in several respects from that of Decius. He did not ask Christians to renounce Christ: they might, if they wished to, worship their own God, but not to the exclusion of the gods of the State. His edicts, too, were directed against the clergy and the nobility only; if these two orders could be compelled to renounce their faith, the rank and file of the faithful could easily be disposed of. But Decius and Valerian were in the end no more successful than preceding Emperors whose names are associated with persecution. Their failure foreshadowed the time when the question of the relations of Church and State would take a new form in the reign of Constantine.

MAURICE M. HASSETT.

The Unseen World: An Exposition of Catholic Theology in Its Relation to Modern Spiritism—by ALEXIUS M. LEPICIER, O. S. M. Benziger Bros., 1906. pp. 284.

It is an interesting and timely task that is undertaken in these pages by the eminent professor of the College of the Propaganda. To very many minds,—and those among the best,—there is no subject that exercises a stronger attraction than eschatology, although there are few fields of human knowledge in which investigation is more difficult or speculation more insecure. The boldest and most thorough handling of the matter which we have had is the product of scholastic thinking. It is based on facts of Sacred Writ and hints given in divine revelation, but many of its conclusions are the deductions of active logical minds from the concept of spirit. The nineteenth century, true to the methods which won so great success in the visible world, began a systematic attempt to examine into the facts of present experience and to sift the true from the fraudulent, as a basis for a new rational explanation of the phenomena. Although this movement has been made the occasion of much criticism and of some thoughtless merriment, it cannot but go on; and it may be that the twentieth century will bring to the investigation of the unseen world the same devotion as its predecessors did to the things that are visible.

As results of this interest in the phenomena of spirit, we already have a number of proposed philosophical explanations, and in addition, a religion. Accordingly, Father Lepicier rightly considers that it is time to examine the new theories in the light of the views of Catholic theologians. For this task, his competence on the side of theology is beyond doubt; for the facts, he seems to rely largely on the excellent summary given by Mr. J. Godfrey Raupert in his *Modern Spiritism*. However, he treats the facts with such openness of mind and breadth of view as to disarm criticism, especially since the question he puts himself is: granting the reality of the facts, what hypothesis will best account for them? The hypotheses advanced are, he says, mainly two. "The first attempts to account for the manifestations by the action of a purely natural and material agent of a conceivably subtle and complex character. The second attributes them to the operation of an intelligent order of beings of an immaterial and spiritual character." This latter theory, he says, usually connects the phenomena with the souls of the dead; but he advances as another and better explanation, that they are the product of pure spirits who never possessed bodies.

To prove his position, the author examines in two long chapters: (1) the existence, nature, knowledge, and power of the angels, and (2) the condition and powers of departed souls, carefully applying his conclusions to the classes of facts offered by investigators of spiritistic phenomena. His finding is that all of them can be explained on the theory of pure intelligences, while many cannot be accounted for on a ghost-theory. He examines and rejects such theories as subliminal consciousness, astral body, dual personality, magnetic fluid, etc. Then continuing his main line of argument, he judges from moral effects that the spirits back of the phenomena are evil.

Father Lepicier's exposition of the views of theologians is always direct, concise and accurate, Those who are familiar with scholastic terminology and with the difficulty often felt of expressing scholastic positions in English, will be pleased with his ease and clearness or presentation. Even the reader who has been hitherto unfamilifa with the topics treated cannot complain that he is unable to follow them; although we feel, on the other hand, that very many will remain sceptical about the value of the proofs offered, and in general, as to whether the Schoolmen knew as much as they claimed about what spirits can or cannot do.

FRANCIS P. DUFFY.

The Key to the World's Progress: Being an Essay on Historical Logic—by CHARLES STANTON DEVAS, M. A., Oxon. Longmans, Green & Co., 1906.

Before giving into his reader's hands that pattern of *The Key to the World's Progress*, which the author of this book has fashioned out of his personal views and interpretations of Christianity's influence upon the world, he makes provision against the possibility of this key proving a misfit to some of the problems the student of history might happen upon in his researches by recommending the latter's arming himself with "an imperial theory of history that shall serve as a fruitful hypothesis, and that the severest test of ascertained fact shall not be able to dissolve." (p. 7). As a precedent for this method of approaching historical research he points out that "the example of serious historians shows that it is no mere accumulation of facts taken at random, nor a blind induction which guides them and leads them to such contradictory results, but rather for each historian his own implicit or explicit assumptions, tacit understandings, an impalp-

able notion of reasonableness, critical feeling, personal conceptions and historical tact, that determine his choice of facts and the issue of his argument." (p. 5).

The author's measure of civilization as a test of the world's progress is profoundly philosophical as well as rational. The ignorant practice of many present day demagogues of applying the word *progress* to every spasmodic achievement in mechanical invention or industrial art without stopping to examine into the actual results of such achievements in the economic or social conditions of the people—not to speak of their moral effects—is made to look very foolish under the fine test of values that Mr. Devas uses in his measure of the world's progress and civilization. "The word progress," he remarks, "no less than civilization, requires to be used with precision, and precisely in these pages is used to express an increase in the quantity or quality of some good." (p. 11). He would make us ask not what material loss has resulted from a great national calamity, but what ethical gain has been derived from it? This is the only good to be considered.

It is from his originally determined conviction, or "imperial theory" that the progress of Christianity among men is the measure of the progress of the good in the world that Mr. Devas proceeds with his arguments for the claims of Christianity, and specifically of Catholic Christianity, as the only solution or "Key" to the true civilization and progress of the race. In beginning these arguments he assumes at once an attitude of antagonism toward all contrary theories as to any other causes claiming a share in this progress, particularly in the moral or spiritual order. Indeed he has elected this attitude of contradiction to the "world" as being the most distinctive mark of the Christian character; and, consistently with it, he prepares a plan of argument for the Church's claims by classifying the apparent contradictions of the latter under what he calls her "antimonies," ("Taking the word antimony to mean a seeming and soluble as distinct from a real and insoluble contradiction," p. 38) ten of which he defines under the following propositions: (1) The Church appears in opposition to intellectual civilization and yet to foster it; (2) in opposition to material civilization and yet to foster it; (3) represents a religion of sorrow and yet of gladness; (4) appears the opponent and yet the support of the state; (5) upholds the equality of men and yet the inequality of property and power; (6) is full of scandals and yet all holy; (7) upholds and yet opposes religious freedom and liberty of conscience; (8) is one and yet Christendom has ever been divided;

(9) is ever the same and yet ever changing; (10) is ever being defeated and yet is ever victorious."

While there is nothing novel or original in any of the above as bases for arguments in favor of the Church's claims the author has originated some other classifications besides these that seem very singular indeed as propositions upon which to base an explanation of Christianity's success and failure in the world. Before proceeding to expound the above "ten antinomies" he takes a world-view of the human race as a whole, and from the beginning until now, and then divides it, not according to the ordinary classification of it into races, nationalities, etc., but according to the different moral and religious characteristics of races or nations, which he puts under three principle categories: "*Fore-Christians*—those races and nations which have to this day never been penetrated by Christian influence" (though developing into a high state of civilization, like the Chinese and Japanese, or the ancient Peruvians, Persians, Hindus, etc.); "*After-Christians*—a distinct body of men whose fathers or forefathers, or it may be themselves, have passed through Christian influence, and rejected it for something that seemed to them better, an improved or complete religion, or a truer philosophy of life." (p. 42). This body of "After-Christians" he, in turn, divides into two distinct groups, "the Mahometans, who have supplanted the Christians in vast regions of Africa and the East; and, secondly, a group with various names, who have spread in less than a century and a half through parts of Europe, North America and Australasia; nowhere wholly dominant, but in most of France and Australasia, in much of the North American Union, and in parts of England and Germany, sufficiently powerful to be a serious influence on social life." (p. 43). He puts the Jews into a fourth place, "a position apart, neither Fore-Christian nor After-Christian, but standing to Christianity in a singular relation." There will be little difficulty in inferring, from this classification and characterization of *non*-Christians, what status he gives to Christians proper, whom he judges by a strictly orthodox standard of Catholic Christianity, though conceding—albeit reluctantly—that many non-Catholic Christians may be measured by this standard and found to be members of the Church invisible. The one class, however, which is the most interesting of the four groups here named is the "After-Christians"; and the most startling evidence here presented in regard to the character of the persons who form one division of this group is their resemblance to the Moslems (!), who form the

other half of it. Let us hasten to examine on what grounds this resemblance is established—for these persons are very near to us, "they have spread through parts of Europe, North America, particularly in the north-easterly and more settled portions of the United States" (specifically, New England); and they are not a little dear to many of us who claim not only national and political, but blood-kindred to some of them. "They afford on a superficial view," says this author, "a startling contrast to the first group (of After-Christians), the Moslems, but on a closer view a startling likeness. They began in France in the eighteenth century, the second example, Islam being the first, of a large body of men, as distinct from the sporadic and chronic succession of individuals, embracing a new doctrine to supersede Christianity. . . . What is common to them is negative: the rejection of the Christian view of the end of life, of the Christian view of man's nature, of the Christian view of the sanctity of marriage and the training of the young. In their negations they resemble the Moslems." (pp. 51-53). His principal evidence that they have rejected the Christian view of training the young (particularly in the case of those After-Christians who belong to the New England portion of the United States) is "the spread of the elementary, gratuitous, and non-religious schools they call 'public,' long and blindly worshipped, and now calling forth the humiliating avowal: 'We cannot teach duty or the spirit of obedience.'"[1]

His most important proof of their rejection of "the Christian view of marriage" he finds in the vital statistics of the countries in which these "After-Christians" live. He takes the birth rate as an arbitrary measure of the growth or decline of the moral status of these countries; and in the great falling off of France in this respect he again notes "a resemblance to the depopulation of Islam." His arraignment of the same deficiency among Americans is still more

[1]The author refers us to Professor G. Stanley Hall's *Adolescence* for this quotation, which had been quoted in a review of this book in the *Times* of March 31, 1905, from which Dr. Devas perhaps got his opinion of the book itself. The inference from this quotation, however, that Professor Hall has turned the weight of his searching criticisms of educational conditions in our country into an argument against the value of "elementary, gratuitous, public" schools is too sweeping. This chieftain of the American movement for free public education is the last person from whom the cry of "failure" of this system will come, though he is the first one to see and protest against that system's defects which defeat its best interests and retard its ultimate success. If Professor Hall's many and diverse criticisms for and against this system could be put into a single phrase it might be this: More schools but better; on schools rather than bad ones.

severe. He says "Their public schools have produced a type that tends to self-destruction; the high birth rate of olden times, the 'American increase' that so startled Malthus a century ago, has decayed *pari passu* with the decay of religion, and now the native American is in process of disappearance; in the case of Massachusetts where elaborate statistics are kept, the very figures are given; and this sterility is openly deplored by the President of the Republic." (p. 55). It might be interesting in this connection to stop long enough to ask and answer in detail the question, Who is the native American; and how long did it take to produce the type called native? And also, Are we not at present engaged in producing a type which will be entitled to claim all the characteristics and prerogatives of the former "native" as soon as the duly recognized period of residence on American soil shall have expired?

To the minds of our most distinguished students of the sociological and economic conditions of the new world the question of our "native" birth rate does not appear so simple of solution as Mr. Devas makes it in the following paragraph, with its grave implications of the standard of our "native" morality.

"The population of the United States advances by leaps and bounds, but it is not composed of the descendants of the older settlers, much rather by the multitudinous new-comers from the Christian parts of Europe; many of these emigrants soon to be caught up in the After-Christian whirlpool and to be taught the new ways of life and the new morals of divorce and sterility." (p. 55).

While our students of sociology and economics recognize the grave menace to our national welfare, physical as well as moral, that is offered by the falling off in our native birth-rate, their examination into the principal causes and occasions of this state of things has led them to far different conclusions than those offered by the studies of Mr. Devas, or even by the off-hand deductons of our busy President. It is a phenomenon far more accurately accounted for by the economic and industrial revolutions that have changed the whole personnel of our "native" population within the last one hundred years and less, than it is describable to a decadence in our national *morale*. In a former agricultural life the American people increased and multiplied as naturally as plant and vegetable life grows in the sun and the fructifying earth. We have been transformed within a few generations from a rural to an urban people; and the places left vacant by "native" American farmers are in turn occupied by "the multitudinous new-

comers from Christian parts of Europe"; who in turn vacate them when "the new ways of life" are learned here, but not altogether because they have also learned "the new morals of divorce and sterility."

Furthermore, other of our students of sociology, together with our noble army of social workers in the slums of our great cities where those "multitudinous new-comers from Christian parts of Europe" swarm in the greatest numbers are turning in testimony every day to show that the latter learn many things of more profit, morally, physically, industrially and even religiously than the harmful knowledge referred to. In his psychological investigations into the causes of the high birth-rate among the lower classes the sociological student is led to quite different conclusions as to its moral significance than those formulated by this author. Destitute of the higher intellectual and æsthetic joys of life as well as of those higher physical pleasures which afford healthy distraction from human misery, life in these grades of society is unfortunately and necessarily lived almost wholly upon the plane of animal appetite. The constant deprivation of sufficient food and drink and bodily comfort only strengthens this appetite in them and leads them to dissipation and excess when the means of gratifying these cravings are within reach. It is noted too that these experiences of physical misery seem by a morbid reaction to stimulate rather than check the satisfaction of the elemental passions, which, though confined to legitimate ways is more accidentally than deliberately moral on that account. Moreover, as a student of economics, Mr. Devas knows that "high" civilization even in its literal and best sense invariably accompanies a lessened birth-rate. The inferences that are drawn from this fact vary according to a person's standard of the value of quality over quantity in the civilization of the human species. That fecundity is a characteristic of human beings in low stages of civilization, and sterility the more usual accompaniment of the highly developed human temperament are commonly known facts of physical science.

After all, though Mr. Devas seems to have comprehended the world in his outlook upon the mission of Christianity to the race, and while he declares that "Christianity claims to have entered into possession, to have appeared as man's redemption at a definite historical time, to stretch forward through all time, to stretch backwards in preparation through all time to the beginning, to rest secure on the timeless and infinite," he does not go far enough in his theory that Christianity is the world-saver as well as the world-mover, when he

limits it to a specific period of time and a strictly specialized form. In a larger sense than he interprets the old saying *anima naturaliter Christiana*, man is naturally a Christian because the meaning of Christianity in its highest sense is the meeting of God and man through the mediatorship of Christ—the Word made flesh—and the desire of this meeting and union has implicitly always existed in the human heart. It is therefore true in a most literal sense that Christianity did its work of soul-saving before Christ actually came, and that those who most desired this union were God's chosen people, while those who adhered to religions lacking this idea remained outside the pale of salvation. To carry the theory forward into the future as well as back into the past, can we strictly call any nation or sect of religious believers "After-Christians" (meaning that they have radically departed from Christianity in its literal sense) if they still adhere to a belief in the Incarnation and desire to partake of its benefits, which are union with and love of God through the mediatorship of His Son Jesus Christ?

A. A. McGINLEY

Out of Due Time: A Novel—by MRS. WILFRID WARD. Author of "One Poor Scruple" and "The Light Behind." Longmans, Green & Co.

Mrs. Wilfrid Ward has a genius for apt titles; witness that of a previous novel, "The Light Behind," with its telling aphorism from Mrs. Browning:

> "Dear God," she cried, "and must we see
> All blissful things depart from us or ere we go to Thee?
> We cannot guess Thee in the wood or hear Thee in the wind?
> Our cedars must fall round us ere we see *the light behind*."

"One Poor Scruple," which, if we mistake not, preceded the work just mentioned, also arrested attention because of its title.

The gift is indeed no mean one, and its possessor is to be congratulated in that it must have been bestowed upon her by a fairy godmother at birth.

The four short words with which she has christened her latest venture in the field of fiction, are in themselves an epitome of all that is contained therein. "Out of Due Time"—the simple but telling phrase pictures it all with one master stroke,—the pathos, the tragedy, the agony and loss, the penitence, the submission, the reparation which make so great a part of four peoples lives.

For therein is pictured for us pathos, unutterable pathos, and tragedy, the inevitable tragedy, which, like an avenging Nemesis, shadows, has ever shadowed the lives of those men of thought who are before their time.

The book is not only a novel written by a Catholic, but it is also avowedly and distinctly a Catholic novel: it is quite as certainly a novel with a purpose. It is in effect a Brief for Authority, in the words of a secular reviewer "a defence of the Church against the accusation that she is intolerant of intellectual freedom and progress, that she silences the thinker, and persecutes the reformer."

But Mrs. Ward holds the scales with a steady hand, and adjusts her balances to a nicety, evincing absolutely no bitterness in her argument for or against, though she betrays a sympathy keen and intense with those who suffer in the struggle, with those who fret and chafe in poor human's nature little way, beneath the restraining hand of that Mother of the Ages.

The story which is that mainly of four persons, who, led by one of their number, Paul d'Etranges, join together in an earnest effort to start a review for the purpose of harmonizing "modern thought and Catholic thought 'to make one music as before,'" moves somewhat slowly in the beginning, but with artistic power, steadily and surely increases in intensity of interest and vividness of style. Its appeal is not at any time to the average reader, who might in effect pronounce it dull and uninteresting, for its theme is of an interest removed far indeed from "the madding crowd."

Among the Catholic laity there is, however—and the class is growing in numbers daily—a large body of thinking, questioning souls to whom the apparent difficulty of reconciling the tenets of faith with the tendencies of modern thought, not only in the field of theology, but also in those of science, literature and art, in an ever-increasing pain. That is the public to which Mrs. Ward chiefly appeals, and—in our judgment at least—aims to convince through the medium of her powerful and uplifting work of fiction, that after all the greater wisdom, as well as the sublime act of faith, lies in a childlike submission to the Voice of a Church which amid the jarring of creeds, preaches clarion-like across the centuries Jesus Christ, and Him crucified.

For in effect, as the author reminds us through the lips of her hero: "All her intellectual work has had this one object—to preserve the spirit and teaching of Christ intact. Even superstitions which do not clash with this, her mission, she may treat leniently. The

knowledge she guards and teaches is the highest, but it is not all the sciences."

And in a final summing up of the entire situation as it presents itself to the editors of the "Catholic International Review," which Authority has just condemned, George Sutcliffe puts the whole matter into a nutshell in these memorable words:

"The Church here" (in Rome, whither they had gone to submit their difficulties) "seems to me far more like the early Church than I expected it to be. It is the absolutely living centre of spiritual life, of heroic devotion, throughout the world, to the souls of men. I do not say that I am in love with all the officials; I am not. But I do think that the width and the wisdom and the sense of spiritual values here are enormous. I know that there is a danger of being more keen about two additional missionaries to the Indians, than the founding of a chair of philosophy; but I think that St. Paul would have been in the same danger. In spite of all their aggravating courtly ways, of their childish insistence on externals, and in spite of some unworthy little men among the nobler ones, and of great racial differences from myself, I do feel here that the whole is far greater than all its parts, and that I endure the human that I see, because it so thinly disguises the Divine. But d'Etranges, don't think me quite a fool, if I go further still. I don't think only that there would be a danger of tyranny and of upsetting the spiritual life of the many, if they always adopted the guidance of the intellectual men of the moment, but I think it is actually in the interests of thought in the long run that they should act as a drag upon progress. Mind, I think they don't understand this themselves, they are not as wise as their own actions; but it is in the very nature of things that the men of action should be a drag on the men of thought. You, a Frenchman, are not more alien to the government of the Vatican than you should be to that of the House of Commons. The nation in the world which has been the quickest to put theories into practice is France, and we do not all think that she has been the happiest and the wisest. I think this difference in pace is in the nature of things, because the men of action have a true instinct that mankind to decide truly must decide slowly, and I believe that these men of thought who are before their time, must of necessity suffer, and suffer very much."

With this suffering and its effect upon the lives of the four principal characters, this powerful and intensely sympathetic novel has mainly to do.

Mrs. Ward has the keenest sympathy with the ardors and impetuousities of youth. She knows the heart of her sister woman, and with a pen hardly less gifted than that of George Eliot herself, she pictures for us her heroine in colors no less true than those in the hand of her who gave us a Dorothea Brook—of whom one is strongly minded from time to time in Lisa Fairfax. One would hardly like to compare d'Etranges to Casaubon, nor would it be fair, for the cases are not analogous. But the thought does intrude itself, when in turn *fiancée*, friend and sister are sacrificed to the unbending intellectual pride of one who has many of the qualities of a mental basilisk.

The devotion of this loving and most devoted of sisters is one of the finest, albeit the saddest things in modern fiction. Paul d'Etranges was never meant for home life, and the simpler, domestic joys. Yet the strange, wild and most sublimely unselfish love which burned in one woman's heart for him, and which won him to penitence and reparation in the end, amply compensated for, if he had but known it, the more ordinary joys of the more ordinary mortal.

As for Sutcliffe, the real hero of the book, one's heart goes out to him in all tenderness and respect. His struggle enlists one's most vivid sympathies—surely he must be alive somewhere on this little earth to-day—and his final triumph over self, his magnificent submissiveness to the Voice of Authority, in which with vision sharpened by the wonderful spirituality of the atmosphere of Rome, he discerns a wisdom in its entirety far beyond that of the schools, all claim our deepest respect.

The beautiful story of human love which finally in its course unites hero and heroine, is dignified and restrained throughout, losing nothing thus in purity, tenderness or truth.

"Out of Due Time" we confidently predict will long be remembered for its thoughtfulness and its power, its vivid and fearless picturing of conditions which are facing so many thinking, questioning minds to-day.

We notice with pleasure that the book is attracting much favorable criticism in the secular reviews.

M. J. Brunowe.

St. John Baptist De Rossi—Translated from the Italian by Lady Herbert. Benziger Bros. 1906. pp. lxii, 202.

A simple, attractive, "personal" account of the life and character of this model of the pastoral clergy in modern times. The name of the translator is ample security for the fidelity and ease of the English version.

The late Cardinal Vaughan wrote an Introduction of 62 pages on "Ecclesiastical Training and Sacerdotal Life," well worthy of the author of *The Young Priest.* His remarks on the place of the diocesan clergy in the work of the Church are excellent.

The Life of St. Teresa of Jesus—Translated by DAVID LEWIS. T. Baker, London. 1904.

A new edition of Lewis' excellent translation of this remarkable revelation of God's dealings with His chosen, amplified with notes and an introduction by Father Benedict Zimmerman, O. C. D.

Reflections From the Mirror of a Mystic—Translated by EARLE BAILLIE. T. Baker, London. 1905. pp. 98.

A good rendering of choice bits from the works of Rüsbrück, the well-known mystical writer of the fourteenth century. In making selections, the author acknowledges indebtedness to Ernest Hello's *Oeuvres Choisis de Rosbrock.* He adds a few words of introduction on the life and works of Rüsbrück.

The Life and Writings of St. Patrick—With appendices, etc., by MOST REV. DR. HEALY, Archbishop of Tuam. Gill, Dublin. Benzigers, New York.

A very full account of the subject, showing careful study of all the sources, replete also with archæological data and bits of local description. It is not primarily an attempt at "critical" history like Prof. Bury's book on the same subject; but in dealing with miracles, the author naturally does not possess the metaphysical preconceptions which bias the Trinity professor's point-of-view. Archbishop Healy advances the evidence for them and in general leaves the matter to the judgment of the reader, though he sometimes shows his own mind clearly enough.

In the Land of the Strenuous Life—By ABBE FELIX KLEIN. Author's Translation. Chicago. McClurg & Co. 1905. pp. 387.

A most interesting, chatty, appreciative account of the author's tour through the United States. By reason of his interests and studies, Father Klein was much better equipped to appreciate America and its ideals than most foreigners. The book has a present value to his fellow-Catholics in France as an example of how a sister Church has dealt with conditions which they have to face. Americans will enjoy it as a shrewd though kindly appreciation of many elements in national and religious life from an outside point of view.

A Handbook of Literary Criticism—By WILLIAM HENRY SHERAN. Hinds, Noble & Eldredge, New York. 1905.

The purpose of this volume as indicated in its preface is to furnish "an analytic and comprehensive survey" of the various literary forms in prose and verse. The introductory chapters deal with the usual questions of literary composition—its form and content. These usually dry topics are treated in a peculiarly interesting fashion. The two chapters on personality in literary art are especially note-worthy in this respect. The body of the work is divided into two parts dealing respectively with the

various departments of prose and poetry classified according to form—the letter, the essay, biography, history, the oration, fiction, the drama, the epic and the lyric. The history, structure, merits and varieties of each form are discussed and illustrated by examples from classic sources. Appreciations are furnished from such masters of literary criticism as Matthew Arnold, Carlyle, Newman, Gladstone, Stedman, etc. The field covered by the work is large, and while special efforts have been made towards conciseness, the treatment is very complete. The author has succeeded in his effort to make the work "a compendium of the best criticism." The plan is unique and has exceptional advantages for the student. The value of the book is enhanced by the bibliographies arranged according to the various literary forms treated by the author. The student of literature will find in this volume a wealth of information, embodying as it does some of the best results of literary criticism.

Meditations on the Mysteries of Faith, etc., for Each Day and the Principal Feasts of the Year—By a Monk of Sept-Fonts. Translated by the Religious of the Visitation, of Wilmington, Del. Revised and Edited by Rev. Ferreol Girardey, C. SS. R. 2 vols. Herder. 1906.

These two volumes comprise over 1,000 pages, quarto. They do not aim at an elaborate method, or at anything new or startling in the matter. But ideas which have been found substantial spiritual food for generations past are presented in simple and direct form, and with a certain amount of personality. The work has certain very distinct merits. Sacred Scripture is used liberally. There is no tendency to use apocryphal or visionary writings, to advocate extravagant devotions, or to introduce wonders. The meditations speak much of God, Christ, and Christian duties. They are not too highly mystical; they have the right tone for most members of religious communities, or for those of the laity far enough on in the spiritual life to follow the practice of meditation.

BOOKS RECEIVED

From the Australian Truth Society.

Radium: Its History and Its Properties, by Rt. Rev. Monsignor Molloy D. D., Rector Catholic University, Dublin.

Kendall: The Australian Poet, by Rev. J. J. Malone.

Gordon: The Australian Poet, by Rev. J. J. Malone.

Through the Furnace: A Story, by Benj. Hoare.

The Rise and Progress of the Church in Australia, by the Most Rev. T. J. Carr, D. D., Archbishop of Melbourne.

Modern Astronomy, by Arthur Wadsworth.

The Church and the Fine Arts, by J. W. Foster Rogers.

Christian Civilization and the Perils That Now Threaten It, by the Most Rev. P. J. Ryan, D. D., Archbishop of Philadelphia.

How They Enter the Fold, by Benj. Hoare.

St. Brigid, Virgin, by His Eminence, Cardinal Moran.

The Priests and People of Ireland in the Nineteenth Century: A vindication, by His Eminence, CARDINAL MORAN.

Mary Immaculate and Democracy, by MOST REV. J. J. KEANE, D. D.

Louise de la Vallière: Duchess and Magdalen, by REV. E. J. KELLY, D. D.

The Catholic Church and Temperance, by VERY REV. F. C. HAYS.

Little Ernia's Birthday Gift, by BENJ. HOARE.

Is There Salvation Outside the Church? or the Doctrine of Exclusive Salvation, by the MOST REV. T. J. CARR, D. D., Archbishop of Melbourne.

The Miraculous Conception and Virgin Birth of Christ, by a Client of Mary

REVIEW OF PERIODICALS

The Catholic University Bulletin, April, 1906. GEORGE M. SAUVAGE: "The New Philosophy in France"—(A moderate defence of pragmatic tendencies—well selected bibliography). FRANCIS X. ALBERT: "The School of Nisibis"—(Brief but scholarly history of this once-famous Nestorian school, with translation of its statutes.) H. A. POELS: "History and Inspiration: St. Jerome"—(Interesting account of St. Jerome's views on inerrancy, with the author's own position—a most important article).

The American Catholic Quarterly, April, 1906. DONAT SAMPSON: "Pius VI and the French Revolution." BRYAN J. CLINCH: "Our Lady of Guadalupe." "WILLIAM F. MURPHY: "Some Aspects of Free-Will"—(Good handling of arguments and objections). D. BARRY: "The Witness of Conscience to the Existence of God"—(Shows that the argument does not stand merely on a Kantian basis. Knowledge of conscience and hence—to some extent—of God is a primary fact of consciousness). F. AVELING: "The Angelic Doctor on 'The Angels.'" (Defense of the utility of St. Thomas' lengthy treatment of this topic).

The American Ecclesiastical Review, March, 1906. VINCENT MCNABB: "The Johannine Logos"—(An interesting study on the reasons for the use of the word *Logos*, and other cognate questions). H. T. HEUSER: "Catholicizing the United States"—(A study in methods—very practical and very sensible). R. H. BENSON: "The Conversion of England"—(A discussion of conditions and methods). April, 1906. H. H. WYMAN: "Mr. Mallock's Psychology"—(A brief estimate of the philosophical basis of theories accepted by Mallock). W. GOETZMANN: "The Essential Note of the Eucharistic Sacrifice"—(A defense of the "Oblation" Theory). May, 1906. E. M. SHAPCOTE: "Our Lady's Teaching." "Recent Bible Study." June, 1906. MGR. P. O'KELLY: "What Think You of Christ?"—(A summary of Father Loisy's views). "Recent Bible Study"—(A commentary on the recent Letter of the Pope on the Study of Scripture).

The Catholic World, May, 1906. M. D. PETRE: "Studies on Friedrich Nietzsche"—(Nietzsche's attitude towards woman). W. J. KERBY: "Life and Money"—(Savers and spenders). JOSEPH MCSORLEY: "Open-mindedness"—(The claims of the Church to the honest consideration of non-Catholics). ABBOT GASQUET: "Some Letters of Father Hecker" (to Mr. Richard Simpson, of the *Rambler*—very interesting).—June, 1906. A Franciscan Number. Special Articles by MONTGOMERY CARMICHAEL, FATHER CUTHBERT, COUNTESS DE LA WARR, and F. PASCHAL ROBINSON. Also continuation of Studies on Nietzsche (attitude towards Christianity) and Letters of Father Hecker. Analysis of Mrs. Wilfrid Ward's new novel, by DR. FOX.

The Messenger, May, 1906. THOMAS F. WOODLOCK: "The Truth in Its Proper Use"—(A study in the ethics of journalism in relation to truth-telling, scandal-giving, and detraction). June, 1906. JAMES J. WALSH: "The Foundation of City Hospitals." A. J. MAAS, S. J.: "The New Apologetics"—(A careful presentation and criticism of the views of M M. Blondel and Laberthonnière). Under the heading "Scripture" is offered a solution of the difficulty connected with the genealogies in Genesis.

Dublin Review, April, 1906. "Cardinal Newman and Creative Theology"—(An historical study of the application of Reason to the Depositum Fidei, showing how such intellectual activity produces brilliant heresiarchs on the one hand and constructive theologians on the other, according as the thinking mind is or is not influenced by the Church; an application of this generalization to the nineteenth century and especially to Newman.) R. H. BENSON: "An Historical Meditation"—(A clever sympathetic pen picture of the state of mind and conscience of an English priest during the period when Henry VIII was forming his National Church). W. BARRY, D. D.: "The Holy Latin Tongue"—(An account of Church Latin, tending to show that it is not barbarous or decadent, but that it is an incomparable religious literature which needs no revision on pagan models). "Jaures and Clemenceau—A Contrast of Temperaments"—(A study of two French journalistic and political opponents). PROF. WINDLE, F. R. S.: "Weismann and the Germ Plasm Theory"—(A criticism of Weismann's theory, especially as regards its ultimate complexity). BARON FRIEDRICH VON HUGEL: "Experience and Transcendence"—(An application of the intuitive method of approaching and conceiving truth to our knowledge and experience of God, with a description and criticism of three excessive conceptions concerning the difference and the relations between the soul experiencing and the Reality thus experienced.) "Christian Doctrine in an Early Eastern Church"—(An example of a development of Christianity independent of Greek thought in the strongly Semitic Church of the Euphrates Valley. An exposition of its teaching on the Sacraments and other matters of Christian Belief not directly connected with the Creed).

The Irish Theological Quarterly, April, 1906. V. ERMONI: "Auguste Sabatier's Religious System"—(A Resumé of the principle points in his Religion of the Spirit with a Refutation that establishes the Religion of Authority). JAMES MCCAFFREY: "The Vatican and France"—(A short account of the events leading up to the Separation). JAMES MCRORY: D. D.: "Father Pesch on Inspiration"—(A discussion of the advanced views of some recent critics and a Review of Father Pesch's Book—a continuation of the article on the Church and the Scriptural Question). J. M. HARTY: "The Church and the Unborn Child"—(A continuation of the article on this question in the Jan. issue). P. J. TONER: "The Modern Kenotic Theory (II)"—(An explanation of the presuppositions of Kenoticism with its positive arguments). W. MCDONALD: "The Revival of Mysticism"—(An examination of the complaints against the excess of intellectualism in Scholastic Apologetics with an exposition of the advantages claimed for Immanence).

The American Journal of Theology. "William Rainey Harper"—(A brief memorial notice). PROF. W. WALKER: "Changes in Theology among American Congregationalists." E. C. AMES: "Theology from the Standpoint of Functional Psychology"—(Treats of the religious consciousness in its genesis and growth and in its bearing on conduct). PROF. M. S. TERRY: "The Old Testament and the Christ"—(Discusses Christ's attitude towards the Old Law). JOHN M. P. SMITH: "The Rise of Individualism Among the Hebrews." REV. L. ARPEE: "Armenian Paulicianism and the Key of Truth."—(An attempt to learn the tenets of this sect from a heretical manuscript entitled "The Key of Truth"). PROF. S. M. JACKSON: "Document: 'The Scorn of the World: A Poem in Three Books' (II)"—(Translation from the original Latin of Bernard, a monk of the Benedictine Monastery of Cluny. Translation from the pen of H. Preble, and under the editorship of Prof. Jackson).

The Hibbert Journal, April, 1906. DOM CUTHBERT BUTLER, M. A.: "Is the Religion of the Spirit a Working Religion for Mankind?"—(Cites Sabatier to prove that the development of doctrine, ritual and authority was natural and inevitable; also that in Catholicism can be found "a deep and beautiful religion, a sap of Christian life, a source of mystic soarings (*élans*) and of heroic devotions." Shows that Christ did not reject authority or externals; and that these are helps and not hindrances to the religion of the spirit. "I hold that the fallacy that runs through the whole of M. Sabatier's last book is that which is contained in the very title—the assumption of any incompatibility, or even antagonism, between a Religion of Authority and the Religion of the Spirit.") T. ESTLIN CARPENTER, M. A.: "How Japanese Buddhism Appeals to a Christian Theist"—(A sketch of Buddhistic sects and principles, with a comparison of the fundamental ethical ideals of Buddhism with those of Christianity). PROF. E. S. DROWN: "Does Christian Belief Require Metaphysics?"—(A study on the Divinity of Christ. Author rejects "substance-philosophy" for "will-philosophy." "He who finds Christ the absolute revelation of the divine will, finds Him also the absolute expression of the divine being." Christ is a Creator, inasmuch as he creates a new humanity). EDMUND G. GARDNER: "St. Catherine of Siena"—(A biographical sketch by an admirer of the saint). REV. W. JONES-DAVIES: "The Laws and Limits of Development in Christian Doctrine"—(A very general enumeration of the tests, causes, and desirable limitations of development). The Author of *Pro Christo et Ecclesia*: "The Salvation of the Body"—(A study of healing by faith in the Christian Church, with the contention that such power could still be exercised. "If health is the heritage of Christendom, it is waiting to be realised by corporate faith.") T. W. ROLLESTON: "The Resurrection: A Layman's Dialogue." SIR OLIVER LODGE: "Christianity and Science."

Revue Biblique Internationale, April, 1906. "Communication de la Commission Pontificale pour les études bibliques." "Lettre de Sa Sainteté Pie X sur la question biblique." "Lettre de Sa Sainteté Pie X a Mgr. Le Camus." MGR. BATIFFOL: "Le Judaisme de la Dispersion tendait-il a devenir une église?"—(Substantially the same as the same writer's article in the last issue of the NEW YORK REVIEW). R. P. H. VINCENT: "Les villes cananéennes (suite)" —(An interesting article treating of the architectural structure, the building materials, and the fortifications of the ancient cities of Canaan). DR. A. BAUMSTARK: "Les Apocryphes coptes." R. P. L. FEDERLIN: "A propos d' Isaie X, 29-31." R. P. P. DHORME: "Deux textes religieux assyro-babyloniens." R. P. GERMER-DURAND: "Découvertes archéologiques a Abougboch." R. P. H. VINCENT: "Les fouilles de Ta'annak." "Exploration générale de la Palestine."

Revue du Clergé Français, May 1st, 1906. J. TURMEL: "La théologie de Bossuet" —(A continuation of M. Turmel's study of Bossuet as a theologian. The article shows the side taken by Bossuet in the controverted theological questions of his day, with a word as to how he understood the development of dogma, and as to his attitude towards biblical exegesis). J. BOIS: "L Eglise russe en 1905"—(A review of the attempts at reformation in the orthodox Russian Church, begun in 1905, under the shadow of the great movement towards political and social reform). E. LENOBLE: "Chronique philosophique." H. LEDUC: "La Science humaine de Jésus." E. BOEGLIN: "Le Denier de Saint Pierre"—(An article showing why the "Peter's pence collection" should be continued). CH. BUJON: "La Soutane"—(Treats of the recent discussion by the government as to whether it should prohibit the French clergy from wearing the cassock in the streets. The author is of the opininon that in the present circumstances the discontinuance of the custom of wearing the soutane in public would be a gain). May 15th, 1906. ABBE GAYRAUD: "Anciennes et

nouvelles Fabriques"—(A study of the financial side of the situation entailed by the recent laws concerning the separation of Church and State). A. VIGOUREL: "Un essai de synthèse liturgique"—(A synthetic study on the origin and growth of our principal liturgical functions, particularly the Mass). G. PERIES: "Cas de conscience. Une institutrice embarrassée pour lire et pour ecrire." F. DUBOIS: "Chronique du mouvement théologique en France"—(Article a propos of Henri Brémond's book on the psychology of faith according to Cardinal Newman, and of a series of articles in the *Annales de la philosophie chrétienne* by M. Mallet). V. ERMONI: "Chronique du mouvement théologique a l'Etranger."

Revue d' Histoire et de Littérature Religieuses, March-April, 1906. P. DE LABRIOLLE: "La polémique antimontaniste contre le prophétie extatique"—(A careful study, *bien documenté*). A. DIES: "L'évolution de la théologie dans les philosophes grecs"—(From Pythagoras to Empedocles).

Revue Augustinienne, March, 1906. LIEVAIN BAURAIN: "La vie Chrétienne en Russie." AUGUSTE ALVERY: "La notion du sacrifice"—(Gives a resume of the discussion in the *Eccliastical Review* on the same topic: also Father Bruneau's article in this REVIEW. Favors the immolation theory). PHILIBERT MARTAIN: "Le matérialisme de Tertullien"—(Review of the recent work of M. Adhémar d' Alès entitled *Théologie de Tertullien*, supplemented by an excellent resumé of reviews of the same work in other periodicals). "Le Miracle de St. Janvier"—(Testimonies in its favor by men of science). "Bulletin Patrologique." April, 1906. SALVATOR PEITAVI: "La propagande protestante en Angleterre"—(A study of Protestant methods). SERAPHIN PROTIN: "Jésus-Christ crucifié dans la théologie de St. Paul." FRANÇOIS POITEAU: "l'Essénisme." "Bulletin Scripturaire"—(An excellent review of recent articles and books, with selections in some instances of the opinions of other reviews concerning the same books). LIVINIEF: "Le mouvement religieux en Russie"—(Embodies a letter from a Russian woman, a convert to Catholicity, on the spiritual condition of the Russian Church.)

Bulletin de Littérature Ecclésiastique, April, 1906. J. MARGRETH: "La Philosophie religieuse de R. Eucken"—(A study and an appreciation of the philosophico-religious principles of Rudolf Eucken of the University of Jena. The study is based on Eucken's book *Der Wahrheitsgehalt der Religion*). LOUIS SALTET: "Le schisme d'Antioche au IVe siècle"—(An appreciation of two theses on the ecclesiastical history of Antioch in the fourth century, written by M. Cavallera for the "doctorat és lettres"). "Saint Jean Damascéne source de Saint Thomas"—(An appreciation of the thesis written by the Abbé Duffo to obtain the degree of Doctor of Theology).

L'Université Catholique, May, 1906. CHANOINE VALENTIN: "Le Dénouement de l'Isolée.'" G. ANDRE: "Une page d' histoire sur les associations cultuelles"—(The writer in order to show the impracticability of the recent law concerning the ownership and administration of Church property in France, recalls and describes the troubles incidental to the "Trustee System" in the United States during the first half of the nineteenth century). DU MAGNY: "Le nouveau statut legal de l' Eglise de France." ABBE JEAN BARRALLON: "Le tombeau de la T. S. Vièrge." ABBE DELFOUR: "Le voyage de Sparte." PH. GONNET: "Hésiode moraliste."

Revue Pratique d' Apologétique, May, 1906. G. MICHELET: "La Crise actuelle de la morale"—(Assuming a complete revolution to have been effected in the manner of treating and solving moral problems outside the Church, this article is written with a design to acquaint the reader with the new systems, tendencies and methods,

and to point out the dangers to which they expose society). G. BRUNHES: "L'Idée de tradition dans les trois premiers siècles, (suite)"—(Shows that the idea of a living teaching authority prior to Scripture and vested with authority to interpret Holy Writ was clearly understood from the very beginning of Christianity). H. LESETRE: "Les récits de l'Histoire sainte: Les patriarches primitifs"—(It would be imprudent to assert that the question of the biblical chronology of the first ages, or that of the long lives attributed to the primitive patriarchs is a matter that concerns faith. The study concludes that lives of two hundred years or more do not correspond with any known historical facts. Their reality therefore should not be asserted in the name of the Bible, as its interpretation on such points is very problematical). A. BOUDINHON: "L'Eglise et l' ame des femmes"—(An answer to the absurd assertion that the Catholic Church discussed in solemn council whether or not women have souls). "Correspondence:"—A Mgr. Amette: Temps de gréve; Origine de la confession; L'Apologétique définie par le Cardinal Perraud.

Studi Religiosi, March-April, 1906. E. PISTELLI: "Papiri evangelici"—(A critical study of Gospel fragments dwelling at some length on the *Protevangelium Jacobi*, with a view to determine its probable text and date). S. MINOCCHI: "La nuova Cultura del Clero"—(Shows in a masterly way that "the so-called" new Catholicism with its historical and critical method in sacred sciences is very ancient; discusses thoroughly the causes which have hindered its progress). A. PALMIERI: "Il vecchio Cattolicismo e la Chiesa russa"—(A comprehensive treatise on the desirable unity of "ancient Catholicism" and the Russian Church). S. MINOCCHI: "Storia e letteratura Francescana"—(A review of some critical and historical works on St. Francis of Assisi and his order, viz., of Goetz, Fr. Graziano, O. S. F., Fr. Delehaye, and others). M. F.: "Studi recenti sul Nuovo Testamento"—(A glance at works on the New Testament by men such as Wellhausen, Müller, Zimmerman, Belser, Heigel, Bischoff, Vollmer, and others). S. MINOCCHI: "Versione di Isaia, cap. xxx, 24—xxxviii, 9"—(A translation from the Hebrew, with critical notes).

Rivista della Scienze Teologiche, April, 1906. U. FRACASSINI: "Le origine del canone del Vecchio Testamento"—(A study on the formation of the Hebrew Canon, dealing particularly with the influence exercised by the Scribes). G. GARAVANI: "La questione storica dei 'Fioretti.'" A. PALMIERI, O. S. A.: "A proposito dell' Economia agricola dell' Impero Bizantino." M. FEDERICI: "Bollettino Biblico: Antico Testamento."

Miscellenea di Storia e Cultura Ecclesiastica, April, 1906. F. BORGONGINI DUCA: "Un nuovo Ms. del diario di S. Infessura." ANGELO MELAMPO: "Attorno alle bolle papali: da Pasquale I a Pio X." PIO PAGLIUCCHI: "I castellani del Castel S. Angelo." A. MONACI e U. BENIGNI: "Note al papiro Marini XC." MGR. MERCATI: "I Mss. greci donati da Carlotta di Lusignano ad Innocenzo VIII."

Bessarione, Jan.-Feb., 1906. MGR. MARINI: "L' Immacolata Concezione e la Chiesa Ortodossa Dissidente"—(A careful examination of passages from the writings of two writers of the Greek Church to show that they are in accord with Catholic belief concerning the Immaculate Conception). MGR. MARINI: "Il Dufourcq e l'anno della morte di S. Pietro"—(St. Peter was not martyred during the Neronian persecution). AURELIO PALMIERI: "Il ristabilimento del patriarcarto in Russia e le polemiche delle stampa Russo-Ortodossa"—(A study of internal religious conditions in the Russian Church by one who is an authority on the subject). P. G. BALESTRI: "Il Martirio di Apa Serapione di Panefosi." A. PELLEGRINI: "Di un sugello Italo-Bizantino." GIULIO FARINA: "L'obelisco lateranense e la riforma religiosa di Chuenaton."

WITH OUR CONTRIBUTORS.

WILLIAM TURNER was born in Limerick, Ireland. He was a student at the Jesuit College in his native city, and at the age of seventeen he was graduated from the Royal University in Dublin, taking second honors in his chosen subject, Philosophy. In 1888 he went to Rome, and while pursuing his theological course, also studied philosophy and was awarded the *Bene merenti* medal, given for special excellence in philosophy. In 1893 he went to Paris and studied at the Sorbonne until 1894, when he came to St. Paul and for ten years was Professor of Philosophy in St. Paul's Seminary. While a member of the seminary faculty he published a book entitled *The History of Philosophy*, which was adopted as a text book by all the Catholic colleges and many non-Catholic institutions in the United States. The volume was translated into Italian and appears among the text books in the universities in Rome. In 1904 Dr. Turner went to Germany to make special studies of manuscripts, in order to gather material for a more extensive book dealing especially with mediæval philosophy. He has been recently appointed Professor in the Department of Philosophy at the Catholic University of America.

ERNESTO BUONUAIUTI was born in Rome in 1881, and received his education in the Pontifical Roman Seminary, having amongst his professors the eminent Orientalist, Father Genocchi, Procurator General of the Missionaries of the Sacred Heart, and also Dr. Minocchi, now editor of *Studi Religiosi*. After teaching philosophy for a short while in the Propaganda College, and in the Roman Seminary, he was appointed Professor of Church History in the latter institution—a position which he now holds. During the past three years he has been a contributor to the *Rivista delle Riviste* of Macerata, and to *Studi Religiosi*, of Florence. He is now editor of the *Rivista Storico-critica delle Scienze Theologiche*, of Rome—an account of which will be found in the department of NOTES in the April-May issue of this REVIEW.

LEON GRY, who contributes an interesting study on "The Idea of Light in the Old Testament" in the present issue, gained his Doctorate in Theology from the Catholic Faculty of Angers. Continuing his studies at Rome, he obtained the degree of Licentiate in Sacred Scriptures, one of the degrees recently instituted by the Holy Father in connection with the Biblical Commission. He is at present at the University of Freiburg, in Switzerland. He is the author of a volume on Millenarism.